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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to critically and comparatively analyse the issues relating to the 
passing of property and risk under the United Nations Convention on the Contract for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) and English Law (SGA). The passing of property and 
risk plays a central role in the area of international legislation in relation to sales contracts. 
These elements can be the most significant components in contracts of sale between 
parties, whether in the international or domestic field. The reason is founded on their legal 
nature and the close relationship between them. The passing of property and risk has been 
a central issue for practitioners, judges and lawyers dating back to the Roman period and 
several ideas have been proposed to resolve it. Where the situation is different for contracts 
of sale in relation to the passing of property and risk, whether in the domestic or 
international field, it still creates many unresolved problems, because of ongoing changes 
in the field of modern commerce, which may contribute to unfair implications between the 
parties. 
It has been observed in this thesis that both English law and  the CISG adopt the party 
autonomy principle, where the intention of the parties - whether in relation to the passing 
of property or risk - is the basic rule. However, the difference lies in the default rules. 
While English law involves default substitutional rules, which apply in cases where there is 
an absence of an expressed or implied indication regarding the intention between the 
parties, the CISG lacks such default rules regarding the transfer of property, which could 
be viewed as its main weakness, although the CISG does involve such provisions with 
respect to the transfer of risk. 
This thesis willdiscusses, the legal nature of the rules in relation to the passing of property 
and risk, and the role of the party autonomy principle, and the impacts and legal difficulties 
that might arise through the application of these rules, whether they are default rules or 
based on the party autonomy principle. It will also examine the legal gaps and weaknesses 
of both legal systems in an attempt to identify such legal difficulties and to find appropriate 
solutions and remedies. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
International trade has become one of the most vital issues in contemporary globalisation. 
Indeed, the volume of international trade conducted worldwide has continually increased.1 
It follows, therefore, that the rapid growth in international trade requires a consistent legal 
interpretation to facilitate the formation of contracts between merchants from different 
countries, and simultaneously to resolve the legal problems that may potentially arise out 
of contracts of sale.  
This need seems particularly pressing when we examine some of the complex issues 
related to international trade, including dealing with a wide range of goods, buyers and 
sellers – many of whom are located in different countries - and choosing the applicable 
rules to govern the contract.2 Among them, issues pertaining to the passing of property and 
risk play a significant role in the area of international legislation, especially in relation to 
sale of goods contracts. The passing of property involves determining the point in the 
transaction of a sale when the seller ceases to be the owner of the property and the buyer 
assumes ownership. A property right can be defined as a connection between an individual 
and a thing. As Bridge says: 
The touchstone of a property right is its universality: it can be asserted 
against the world at large and not, for example, only against another 
individual such as the contracting partner. If, under a contract of sale, I 
acquire the ownership of a chattel, my property right to the chattel may be 
asserted not just against the seller but against the whole world.3  
However, to a certain extent, such an absolute statement seems to give way to the issue of 
the passing of risk which means that liability for loss of and/or damage to the goods passes 
from the seller to the buyer; the corollary of that transition is that the buyer bears any loss 
or damage relating to the sold goods. 
                                                 
1 World Trade Organisation, ‘International Trade Statistics 2013’ (WTO, 2013) 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf.    accessed 04 March 2016. 
2 Tobias Plate, The Buyer’s Remedy of Avoidance under the CISG: Acceptable from a Common Law 
Perspective , Vindobona Journal of International Commercial Law and Arbitration (2002) 6  .57. 
3 M. Bridge Personal Property Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, p.12 
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The significance of and interactions between these issues can be repeatedly observed in 
interpretations given by international or national courts and tribunals,4 as well as the 
peculiar nature of such issues which may contribute to unfair implications between the 
parties of the contract. This is because the passing of property and risk in the contract of 
sale has a vital importance in contributing to the potential outcome for either party. This is 
particularly the case in an international sales contract, where the value of the commodities 
is usually high, and the contracts invariably complex, and the contracting parties are 
situated in different countries with different legal systems.Therefore, the parties involved 
in international sales of goods contracts often take into account the issues related to the 
passing of property and risk by selecting the exact time that the property and risk pass, and 
the contractual terms to govern the contract.5 Although most national legal systems attempt 
to address this issue, discrepancies occur in the interpretation provided by the Roman Law 
countries and those countries following the common law rules, such as England.  
The rules on the passing of risk have been the subject of regulation in various international 
standard trade terms; the most popular and successful attempt to harmonise the law 
pertaining to the international sale of goods on this matter is the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, adopted in Vienna in 1980 
(CISG). However, despite the existence of the CISG, English law still stands firmly on the 
stage of the international sale of contracts, with significant jurisprudence being provided in 
this area of law. This divergence originated from the UK’s refusal to sign the CISG despite 
its earlier influential role in drafting the CISG in the early stage.6Accordingly, the parties 
may subject their issues of the passing of property and risk to either of these two major 
branches of law. Similarly, the parties may choose to deviate from the rules provided for in 
their legal systems, in that they have freedom to identify the time when the property and 
risk will be deemed to have passed. In such cases, it is very likely that the intention of the 
parties may conflict with the rules of the national law or international convention. Under 
these circumstances, the immediate question which arises from the passing of property and 
risk is whether the parties’ agreement supersedes the relevant rules. In other words, which 
                                                 
4 P. M. Roth, 'The Passing of Risk', (1979), the American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 27, No. 2/3, 
Unification of International Trade Law: UNCITRAL's First Decade p. 291-310 
5 Indira Carr and Peter Stone, International trade law (4th ed, Routledge-Cavendish 2010). 81. 
6 Sally Moss, Why the United Kingdom Has Not Ratified the CISG, 2J.ofL.and Com.483, (2005-2006). See 
also Angele Fort, The United nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods :Reason 
or Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 Baltimore.L.Rev.51(1997);also Nathalie Hofmann, Interpretation 
Rules and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK’s Ratification of the CISG and to the harmonisation of 
Contract Law in Europe 22 PaceInt’lL.Rev.141(2010);  Barry Nicholas, The Vienna Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 105L.Q.R.201(1989); Robert G.Lee, The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods OK For the UK?,J.B.L131[1993]. 
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rule is the primary rule – taking precedence over the application - and which is the default 
rule under the English law or the CISG?   
1.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to interpret and examine analytically the issues related to the 
passing of property and risk in international sale contracts for the sale of movable goods 
under English law and the CISG, which are the two main branches of law influencing the 
understanding of the current topic among Libyan business people engaged in the 
international sale of goods, in order to ascertain the interactions between the primary rules 
and the default rules to serve as guidance for the future enactment of the Libyan sale of 
goods law. Furthermore, the thesis will attempt to discover the shortcomings and gaps in 
these legal systems, in an attempt to provide the hypothetical remedies to fill such gaps (if 
any), as well as identifying what the model for the passing of property and risk should be, 
by making a comparative analysis of the rules pertaining to property and risk allocation 
under the CISG and the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA).  
To achieve such aims, the research will examine the relevant provisions in relation to the 
passing of property and risk under the CISG and the English Sale of Goods Act. It also 
intends to examine the extent of the application of the party autonomy principle and the 
legal nature of such rules as they apply in these different systems, as well as the rules 
concerning the different types of international contracts, including contracts of sale which 
involve the carriage of goods,7 and contracts for the sale of goods in which trade usage is 
incorporated8 and, further, whether the provisions of the CISG and/or SGA provide an 
ideal solution to these issues or not. 
  
1.2 Reasons for Undertaking the Current Research 
 
The concept of the passing of property and risk in the law of the sale of goods is a crucial 
point in the contract of the sale of goods: that is to say, determination of the point in the 
transaction of the sale when the seller ceases to be the owner of the goods and the buyer 
                                                 
7 (n 4 )296 
8 Bainbridge, Stephen. "Trade Usages in International Sales of Goods: An Analysis of the 1964 and 1980 
Sales Conventions." Va. J. Int'l l. 24 (1984): 619 
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assumes ownership. Furthermore, the bearing of risk is an extremely significant issue 
which can torpedo the general understanding of ownership and preoccupy both parties 
involved in a contract of sale. Thus, the importance of the passing of property lies in its 
consequences, especially in terms of risk, the right to sue, the ability to pass a good title, 
and the security of payment of a party as against an insolvent other party. Furthermore, in 
cases of international sales, problems in relation to the passing of property arise most 
frequently in determining whether the goods can be treated as security for payment of the 
price.9  
The transfer of risk in the contract of sale is a question of great practical significance 
because of its potential for undesirable and unexpected consequences. Risk of loss rules 
establish whether (a) the seller may still recover the price of the goods, and (b) whether the 
buyer must pay for the goods and take delivery, despite the fact that the goods are partially 
damaged or totally destroyed. Although risk has been dealt with extensively, it still creates 
numerous unsolved problems, by reason of the constant changes in modern commerce: 
container and multimodal transport, bulk consignments, loss of unascertained goods and 
interpretation of 'loading' are only some of the problematic areas for which the present 
study attempts to propose solutions. 
The rules on the passing of risk answer the question as to whether the party could claim 
any remedies for loss despite the passing of risk10 and whether the buyer is obliged to pay 
the price for the goods even if they have been lost or damaged, or whether the seller is 
entitled to claim their price. Due to harsh and sometimes unfair consequences, the passing 
of risk forms a subject which the parties specifically refer to in their contract in an attempt 
to avoid confusion and possible litigation. 
 
Normally, the parties make specific arrangements in their contract regulating the passing of 
property and risk, or make express or implied agreements on the application of standard 
trade terms. However, in cases where such arrangements are not included, then the rules of 
national laws or international conventions regulating the matter will apply, whether as 
primary or default rules. In other words, determining the rule which has priority in 
application is very important in order to avoid disputes which may arise between the 
parties regarding such issues. 
                                                 
9,Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 5th Edn., Sweet and Maxwell, (1997)  1133 
10 As it will be seen this is regulated in article 70 CISG 
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In fact, accurately determining the time of the passing of property and risk would avoid 
such disputes which may arise between the parties. The passing of property and risk 
between the seller and the buyer is a matter of significance in the event of the insolvency 
of either party, and the liability, and seizure on the outbreak of war. Such issues, in fact, 
are covered by different rules, including domestic and international rules. These rules 
present different solutions, and therefore different consequences may result. Such 
consequences may be unfair, especially if the different solutions adopt different theories in 
relation to the passing of property and risk.  
1.3 The value of the research 
Although there may be some legislative gaps in relation to sales – whether they be 
international or domestic (English law or CISG) - it is relatively easy in a domestic sale for 
the seller and the buyer to achieve such purposes, since they may know each other well, 
and, more importantly, their contract is often governed by a uniform domestic sales law 
under a uniform legal system. However, the issue becomes more complicated in 
international commercial transactions when the seller and buyer are located in different 
countries with different social values and subject to different legal systems. This can lead 
to uncertainty of the law applicable to their contract, and thus can create uncertainty in 
international commerce and distrust among the parties and seriously undermine 
international trade. 
The value and originality of this research is to examine such complicated issues and risks 
arising from the passing of the property in relation to international sales of goods from the 
perspective of party autonomy, both analytically and critically, as well as trying to discover 
the legislative gaps, whether in international sales or in domestic sales, in order to provide 
suitable proposals and remedies that would achieve a fair balance between the parties in 
the contract with respect to these matters, in particular, to provide a model for Libyan 
legislatures to consider in their enactment of international sale of goods law in terms of the 
trading with two major systems. Currently, the Sale of Goods law in Libya virtually does 
not exist. The researcher’s legal career in Libya has informed him that only scattered 
general principles dealing with immoveable (real property) under the civil law have been 
used to interpret moveable goods. Such a failure in providing specific and detailed rules on 
such issues requires immediate attention by means of an examination of the two major 
branches of law which directly affect the understanding of the relevant issues. 
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The analytical critique of the research proposals and remedies may also prove valuable for 
the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 or the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods, in order to find out if there are any legal gaps, and provide the 
remedies and suitable solutions for issues regarding the rules in relation to the passing of 
property and risk. Moreover, it may be of value for some developing countries, especially 
those that are trying to amend their relevant laws or those that are trying to create new 
laws.  
The lack of detailed provisions in Libyan law can be seen in the limited number of 
provisions applied for interpretation. Only ss. 207, 208, 936 and 937 regulate the passing 
of property, with s.210 being related to the passing of property and risk. Among them 
s.936 of Libyan civil law provides the basic rule regarding the passing of immovable 
property, where the property passes at the time of conclusion of the contract, supplemented 
by ss 207, 208 and 937 dealing with the identification of the goods, where immoveable 
property in the goods cannot be transferred to a buyer until the goods are ascertained. It is 
worth noting that the basic rule provided by s. 936 is presented as general rule without any 
details, and, further, its interpretation links the movable with immovable (real property) 
and fails to distinguish between them.  Moreover, with respect to the provisions for 
ascertaining the goods, these do not include any rules for ascertaining the intention of the 
passing of property.  
Furthermore, the rule of passing of risk under s.210 of Libyan civil law applies the delivery 
rule, where the risk passes at the time of delivery. This provision has been applied to 
interpret all types of contracts, and is not limited to sales contracts. Moreover, Libyan law 
is also noted for its use of domestic rules in the interpretation of international sale of 
goods, as the law fails to provide any rules in respect of passing of risk in goods sold in 
international transit, nor rules governing sale of goods involving carriage of goods by 
different modes of transportation across the borders.  This has created uncertainty for the 
both Libyan and international traders dealing with Libya under the CISG, English Law and 
virtually non-existent Libyan frameworks. Consequently, the need arises to create a model 
of the passing of property and risk which is specific and detailed and covers all the related 
rules.  
To summarise, international trade has become one of the most vital issues in modern life, 
making the need for an accurate legal system that is able to facilitate the formation of 
contracts between merchants from different countries and simultaneously resolve the legal 
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problems that may arise out of contracts of sale more important than ever. This research 
will be valuable for Libyan legislators or those in other countries in providing a model to 
draft suitable and detailed legal rules in line with developments in international trade, as 
well as to avoiding some of the legal gaps and flaws in some other laws related to 
international trade, whether the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 or the CISG.  
1.4 Scope of the Research  
Due to the virtual non-existence of Libyan law on the issues examined in this thesis, the 
scope of the research is mainly focused on the rules covering property and risk passage 
under the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 (SGA) and the United Nations' Convention on 
International Contracts of Sales of Goods 1980 (GISG). The coverage of the research 
attempts to answer the main research questions regarding the time of passing of property 
and risk and to address any deficiencies and also the role of the party autonomy principle 
in determining such issues in English law by comparing its provisions with those of the 
CISG.  
As discussed in the next section, the research will employ the methodology of a critical 
analysis of the laws, doctrines, principles and jurisdictions that are the focus of this study. 
Focusing on English and common law jurisdictions, as well as judgments handed down by 
international jurisdiction, including arbitral tribunals, the research will undertake a critique 
and analyse the issue of the passing of property and risk under English law and the CISG, 
based on the relevant articles and case law studies of the aforementioned jurisdictions.  
1.5 Methodology 
The method most suited for achieving the aim of this study is the comparative analytical 
approach, in terms of analysing relevant legal texts to determine an optimal legal approach 
to the issue. The purpose of the study is to determine the time of the passing of property 
and risk, and to address any deficiencies found, as well as the role of the party autonomy 
principle in determining such issues in English law by comparing it with the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. The comparative 
methodology allows researcher to examine the difference in legislative regimes, namely 
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English Sale of Goods Act and the CISG11, their formulation, application and practice. 
Having considered these issues, the results of this comparison will offer recommendations 
and remedies that may prove significant in addressing the deficiencies highlighted in the 
current comparative study. 
The comparative analytical method applied involves comparison between the provisions of 
statutes, regulations and codes that are especially relevant to English law and the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods as well as examining 
case law and the official records and reports of the convention. Sources researched include 
books, law journals, and other publications in legal and related fields which provide the 
breadth and depth required for such comparative research.   
 
1.6 Definition of the contract of sale of goods 
1.6.1.- A contract of sale of goods 
The sale of goods contract is the most commonly used in transactions, whether at the 
international or domestic level. The CISG, in line with most legal systems12 , adopts the 
traditional model of offer and acceptance.13 It has been defined in art 14 in conjunction 
with art 23, as a contract of sale concluded when one party makes a proposal and the other 
party then accepts this proposal. That is to say, there must be a definite offer made by one 
party that is clearly accepted by the other.14  
Notably, the CISG deals with contracts that generally result from the exchange of 
concurrent declarations of intention by two or more persons. The process of contract 
formation is a process of communication between the person making the offer (the seller) 
and an acceptance by the person to whom the offer is made, the offeree (buyer).15 In 
England, on the issue of transferring the ownership of goods, according to s. 2(1) of the 
                                                 
11 Sally Moss, ' Why the United Kingdom has not ratified the CISG ' (2005-06) 25:483 Journal of law and 
commerce 483-485 
12 Rudolf Schlesinger Formation of contracts: a study of the common core of legal systems Vol 2, 1584 
13 Peter Huber, Alastair Mullis, The CISG (2nd edn Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007). 69 
14 Roald Martinussen, Overview of international CISG sales law (BookSurge Publishing, 2006).19 
15 Wolfgang Hahnkamper, ' Acceptance of an offer in light of electronic communications  ' (Journal of law 
and commerce 2005-06) 25:147 147 
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English Sales of Goods Act1979, a contract of sale of goods is defined as: ‘a contract by 
which the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a 
money consideration, called the price.’  
What this indicates is that the property (ownership) in the goods is passed from the seller to 
the buyer in exchange for a sum of money determined by the parties of the agreement.16 In 
return, the buyer pays the amount of money called the price. Apparently, the contract of 
sale is an obligatory contract between the parties, where the seller is committed to transfer 
the property to the buyer, whilst the buyer is committed to paying the price.17 This 
definition confirms that the contract of sale is a transfer of property contract. It has been 
submitted that a contract of sale is first and foremost a contract and a consensual 
transaction based on an agreement to buy and an agreement to sell, which is distinguished 
from several other transactions which are normally quite different from the sale of goods, 
but which, in particular circumstances, may closely resemble them, such as a contract of 
loan on the security of goods, a gift, or a contract of bailment etc.18 
Benjamin links the concept of the contract of sale to the concepts of sale and agreement to 
sell. In other words, if the passing of property is postponed to a future date or until the 
fulfilment of a condition, then the contract is not a sale but an agreement to sell,19 and, as 
such, will become a sale only when the property is transferred. The decisive test is, 
therefore, whether or not the property passes by virtue alone of the making of the contract; 
as Tucker. once put it, "I think that everything in the Sale of Goods Act goes to show that 
the words ' sale ' or ' sell,' when contrasted with the words ' agree to sell ' or ' agreement to 
sell,' necessarily involve something under which the property in the goods has been made 
to pass.20 
1.6.2 Contract of sale and the agreement to sell  
The distinction between the sale and the agreement to sell is significant. Although the sale 
and the agreement to sell constitute a contract of sale and the general expression embraces 
both, there is a notable and crucial difference between them. The cornerstone of this 
                                                 
16 Paul Dobson & Rob Stokes. Commercial Law, (7th edt. Sweet & Maxwell Limited of Avenue Road, 2008) 
17 Sanhoori, Abdel Razek, The mediator in explaining the Civil Law, 1970, Encyclopedia of law, Cairo. 19 
18 P.S. Atiyah, John N. Adams; with sections on Scots law by Hector MacQueen, Atiyah’s Sale of goods, 
(Harlow: Longman, Twelfth edition 2010 ), 7,9 
19 Benjamin's Sale of Goods (9th Edition Sweet & Maxwell: London 2014)  26,27 
20 Mischeff v. Springett [1942] 2 All E.R. 349, 352 
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distinction lies in the obligations and effects of the agreement, such as transfer of property 
and risk from the seller to the buyer. In the agreement to sell, the property remains with the 
seller until the contract been signed. It is clear that the difference between the sale and the 
agreement to sell lies in the title of the property which remains with the seller; 
nevertheless, in the case of the sale the property passes to the buyer.21  
The obligation to transfer the property is an obligation under the contract of the sale of 
goods. In other words, an agreement to sell is a contract, and as such, cannot give rise to 
any rights in the buyer which are based on property or possession of the goods, but only to 
claims for breach of contract.22  It is worth considering the circumstances which may affect 
materially the performance of an obligation and which would make it impossible to 
implement the contract, such as force majeure and frustration of the contract of sale, which 
are probably two of the major problems that may be faced in international trade.
                                                 
21 B.R.K Oteshwara Rao vs G.Rameshwri Bai AIR 2004 A..34. See also, Benjamin's Sale of Goods (9th 
Edition Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2014) ,27 
22(n19) 26,27 
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1.6.3 Theories of passing of property and risk 
The relevant issues in linking the definitions of a contract of sale and agreement to the 
passing of property and risk can be further complicated, and indeed have always 
constituted a problematic area which has formed a subject of regulation in almost every 
legal system. Depending on the legal structures, social circumstances and background, 
different theories have been developed and adopted regarding the time of the passing of 
property and risk.  
Property can pass from the seller to the buyer at any time according to the circumstances of 
the contract. The first instance is where it passes from the seller to the buyer by mere 
consent - where the transfer of property takes place upon conclusion of the contract of sale. 
On the other hand, property may pass at a different time, for example at the moment of 
delivery of the goods, according to the circumstances of the contract of sale.   
However, it must be noted that most legal systems which apply any of the above 
principles, regarding the transfer of either risk or property, allow for the parties’ 
contractual autonomy to set their contractual terms. For example, art 6 of the CISG makes 
clear that contractual provisions prevail over the rules of the CISG. Indeed, most contracts 
provide for the time of the passing of risk, i.e. the point from which the buyer must pay for 
the goods, even if they have been lost or damaged. To this end, the parties sometimes 
specify precisely the time or place at which the risk passes or, more frequently, refer to 
standard trade terms, such as those developed by the International Chamber of Commerce. 
In other words, the parties are given the possibility to derogate from the aforementioned 
rules provided for in their legal system, where the parties may have contractual autonomy 
and modify the general rules and, in particular, may prevent the delivery of the goods from 
determining the passage of property, or may lead to the separation of the moment of the 
passing of property from the moment of the passing of risk.23 
                                                 
23 Marco Torsello, 'Transfer of ownership and the 1980 Vienna sales convention. A regretful lack of uniform 
regulation' (2000) International Business Law Journal 941 
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1.6.4 Overview on the party autonomy principle  
One of the objectives of the current research is to use the concept of party autonomy to 
examine the rules of the passing of property and risk. The freedom of contract is the first 
step to comply with the principle of party autonomy, because parties could not have 
bargaining power without freedom to decide the terms of the contract.24 Party autonomy is 
a choice of rule doctrine that permits parties to choose the rule to govern their contract.25 In 
other words, it seems evident that the freedom of the parties to contract according to their 
intention ought to be recognised when determining the applicable rules to which the parties 
are willing to be subject, either through a choice a particular clause from a particular law, 
or create a new clause according to the parties’ preference. It has been defined as freedom 
of contract or self-arrangement of legal relations by the parties according to their intention.  
Party autonomy has been a common principle in contract law; thus it has been drafted into 
one of the most successful international conventions in contract law. Art 19 of CISG states 
that ‘A reply to an offer which purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, 
limitations or other modifications is a rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-
offer.26 Furthermore, arts 6, 8 and 9 of the CISG deal with party autonomy and parties’ 
intentions and provides the freedom to parties to decide which rule of the country will 
govern their contract. It provides bargaining power to parties by letting them negotiate the 
terms of contract in line with their interest. It represents all the characteristics of party 
autonomy, including freedom of contract, by allowing parties to decide the contractual 
terms, and equal bargaining power, by letting parties negotiate the terms as to what they 
give consent. 
In the same way, in English law, this aim of freedom of contract is reflected in the wording 
of most provisions of the SGA. For example, the rules governing: time27 when breaches of 
conditions can be treated as warranties,28 rejection for trivial breaches,29 the passing of 
property and risk,30 and payment and delivery,31 amongst others, can all be varied by the 
                                                 
24 Nygh, Peter. Autonomy In International Contracts. Oxford University Press. 1999,29 
25 Willis Reese & Maurice Rosenberg, Conflict of laws, cases and materials (8th ed. 1984) 576–96. See also 
David Mcclean, Morris: The conflict of laws (5th ed. 2000) 4–5 
26 CISG, art 19 
27 SGA, s 10 
28SGA, s 11(4) 
29 SGA, s 15A(2) 
30 SGA, s 17 and 20 
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parties’ agreement. The wording of these provisions indicates that variations from the 
contract can be either expressed or implied.32 In this context, Chalmers stated that sale is a 
consensual contract, and the Act does not seek to prevent the parties from making any 
bargain they please. Its object is to lay down clear rules for the case where the parties have 
either formed no intention or failed to express it.33 Indeed, regarding the issue of party 
autonomy, the CISG and English law are both seemingly flexible instruments designed to 
accommodate the parties’ expectations under the contract. 
In the case where party autonomy has not been implemented to provide parties with the 
freedom to decide contractual terms,34 it is subject to domestic legislation, because 
legislation sets some limitations to protect public or individual interests. In that case, the 
expressions of ‘good faith’ in civil law and ‘duty not to misrepresent’, ‘fair dealing’ and 
‘unfair terms’ in English law represent the private or individual interests that are aimed to 
be protected, such as protection of the weaker party in the contractual relationship. On the 
other hand, the most common limitation is that of the mandatory rules, especially in 
conflict law which is prone to give courts authority to decide to what extent the terms 
would be enforceable. In fact, such mandatory rules aim to protect morality, equity and 
public interest.35 Therefore, international contracts face some difficulties in applying such 
principles, because every country tries to protect their own public policy by implementing 
limitations on party autonomy. Yet the party autonomy principle remains the most 
important principle in the area of sales contracts, as will be seen.  
1.6.5 Force majeure and frustration 
Due to the limited length of the research, the doctrine of force majeure is not included in 
the main theme of the thesis. Nevertheless, it must be clearly distinguished from the 
theories of property and risks. The execution of contracts may be exposed to risks and 
difficulties impeding their implementation, and sometimes these may make it impossible to 
fulfil the contract, which leads to a breach of the contractual relationship balance between 
the parties, due to force majeure. 
                                                                                                                                                    
31 SGA, s 28 
32 SGA, s 15A(2) 
33 Mackenzie Chalmers, Sale of Goods Act 1893 , (2nd ed London W Clowes & Sons 1894) 
34 ( n24 )211 
35 Ibid. 
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The doctrine of exemption, under the CISG, is basically predicated on how risk of liability 
and exemption from damages play out when a party fails to perform any obligations  in the 
contract due to unforeseen circumstances beyond his control. It must be proved that he 
could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time the 
contract was concluded, or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences. 
Furthermore, goods might suffer loss or damage at various points in time from the 
formation of the contract of the sale of goods up to the actual handover to the buyer.36 This 
loss, if it is accidental, will fall within the concept of risk; the incidence of risk according 
to Bugden and Lamont-Black is relevant in determining any right of suit and/or damages 
and question of insurable interest.37 
In other words, such unexpected or unforeseen events may prevent the implementation of 
the conditions contained in the contract of sale and may make the contract impossible to 
implement. This then becomes detrimental to the rights of the parties, leading to a breach 
of the nodal balance between the parties. Once the contract becomes impossible for any 
reason, then it can be said that theis a case of force majeure or an unexpected event, caused 
by an external power, for instance earthquakes, storms and wars.  
The doctrine of force majeure exempts a defaulting party from liability of implementation 
of the contractual obligation, including the passing of risk.38  Art 79 of the CISG states that 
a party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the 
failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be 
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the 
contract or to have avoided or overcome it, or its consequences. Namely, the impediment 
must not fall in the sphere of risk of the obligor; it must have been unforeseeable; and, it or 
its consequences must have been unavoidable.39  For instance, if the goods are at the 
                                                 
36 Bernd von Hoffmann, 'Passing of Risk in International Sales of Goods' (1986) Ch. 8, 267. Available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/vonhoffmann.html  
37Paul M. Bugden and Simone Lamont-Black, Goods in Transit ( Sweet & Maxwell, 2013) para 25-027. See 
also Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, "International Sales Law", Oceana (1992), 261  
38 Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law 245-290. See also John Honnold Uniform Law for 
International Sales (3ed Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999) Article 79 para 423.4 
39 Stoll and Georg Gruber in Peter Schlechtriem and Ingeborg Schwenzer (eds) Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (2 English ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 
Article 79 paras 10-24 
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buyer's risk and perish or deteriorate, the buyer may be liable for damages for non-
acceptance, if the seller has suffered any repercussions.40    
Nevertheless, a party assumes the risk which comes with some bundle of obligations; he 
would not be shielded from liability under art 79 of the CISG when faced with events 
which fall squarely outside his control. This is because it will be contradictory for a party 
who legally bears the risk to also turn round and say the obligation is frustrated and thus 
seeking exemption from his liabilities, though he can be exempted from paying damages if 
the elements of art 79 are proved.41  
However, such exemption from liability of implementation of the contractual obligation, 
would be subject to art 81(2) of the CISG, which gives a party who has performed the 
contract either wholly or in part the right to claim restitution from the other party of 
whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract. Furthermore, the theories 
of risks are different from the doctrine of frustration. The doctrine of frustration regards the 
contract as terminated42 when it is frustrated by some extraordinary and unforeseeable 
event, which can be considered a reason for exemption from contractual liability.43  
Under the doctrine of frustration provided in the common law and s.7 of the SGA, the 
contract is avoided and both parties are relieved from all their obligations under the 
contract Subject to the issue of restitution. 
However, this will not be the case if the special rules as to the passing of risk of loss 
provide that any party bears the risk.44 For instance, under the contract of sale of goods, the 
doctrine of discharge (frustration) can be displaced by the operation of the rules as to risk, 
                                                 
40 Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law 245-290 
41 Ndubuisi augustine nwafor. 'Comparative and Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of 
Exemption/Frustration/Force Majeure under the United Nations Convention on the Contract for 
International Sale of Goods, English Law and UNIDROIT Principles' (PhD university of Stirling 2015). 
At 78 
42 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (3rd 
edition edn Kluwer Law International, 1999)..369-1, n.369-2. discussion infra Ch.II, Part I.A.1, A.2 
43 Ewan McKendrick, Force majeure and frustration of contract (Lloyds of London Press, 1991). See also 
G.I. Treitel, Frustration and force majeure ( London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994) 
44 G.I. Treitel, Frustration and force majeure (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1994),77 
Chapter 1   
 
16 
 
if under those rules the risk can pass at an early stage rather than at the later stage of the 
contract performance.45  
Risk implies that a party is bound to bear the accidental loss of or damage to goods, while 
frustration implies the allocation of risk in a contract when a situation that is out-with the 
fault and liabilities of the parties happens to render the contractual performance 
impossible. Whenever a contractual party has knowingly contracted to assume a risk, then 
the contract will not be said to have been frustrated if the impediment that renders the 
contract impossible to perform fell within the contracted risk.46 
 
Generally, under the 1979 Act, which reflects the position in common law, if the risk falls 
on the buyer he must take the risk of damage or loss, take delivery of the goods and pay for 
them. If the property in the goods has passed, the seller will be able to bring an action 
against the buyer for the price, under s.49(1), if the buyer fails to pay for the goods. 
It must be noted that under the English law of frustration, a contract of sale cannot be 
frustrated by the destruction of the subject matter, or part of it, after the risk has passed to 
the buyer.47 Due to the limited word count, the doctrines of force majeure and frustration 
have to be excluded from the discussion in this thesis, and the discussion will only be 
focused on the principles and theories related to the passing of property and risk.  
1.8 A Roadmap of the Thesis 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One has introduced the thesis, outlining 
the significance of the issues to be examined, the scope and value of the research and 
providing definitions of various terms under the two instruments. Chapter Two 
concentrates on examining the issue of the passing of property and risk under Libyan law. 
This chapter will address the provisions governing the issue of passing of property, 
including the party autonomy principle, and will attempt to ascertain the primary rule and 
the default rule, at the same time providing a critical analysis and discussion of the rules of 
passing of property under the Libyan Civil Code, highlighting the weaknesses in the 
                                                 
45 Ibid (n 26) para 3-010, 81 
46 (n 41)308 
47 ( n 44) 
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Libyan law in order to determine the remedies in accordance with English law and the 
CISG.  
Chapter Three concentrates on examining the issue of passing of property under English 
law. It provides critical analysis and discussion of the rules of passing of property under 
English law. The discussion will address the provisions governing the issue of passing of 
property, including the party autonomy principle, and will attempt to ascertain the primary 
rule and the default rule. In order to determine the exact time of passing of property, 
through the discussion on the rules of passing of property in the specific and unascertained 
goods and the role of subjective intention and appropriation of goods in determine the time 
of passing of property will be identified.  
Chapter Four provides provides a detailed examination and discussion of discussions of the 
issue passing of property under the CISG. This chapter intends to answer the question of 
whether the CISG regulates the issue of the passing of property and whether the CISG 
considers the passing of property an issue which is based on the impact of the contract of 
sale, or is it one of obligations and rights of the parties within the contract of sale? 
Furthermore, interpretation of the provision of art 4(2) becomes essential, as it seems to 
expressly exclude the issue of the timing of the passing of property from the scope of 
application of the CISG. It is also necessary to examine the party autonomy principle as an 
important principle which runs through the entire thesis and is integral to understanding the 
strengths and recognising the ambiguities of the CISG, with respect to the passing of 
property issue, through examining the provisions of art 6 of the CISG.  
 
Chapter Five examines the provisions regarding the passing of risk issue under English 
law, and tries to determine the exact time when the passing of risk to the buyer takes place. 
This chapter provides critical analyses of the provision of s.20 of SGA. It further presents a 
critical evaluation of the importance of the intention of the parties and the prima facie of 
passing of risk with the property, attempting to answer the questions that arise as to 
whether “unless otherwise agreed” or “risk being passed with the property” is the basic 
rule; why English law links the passing of risk to the passing of property, and why English 
law does not leave the timing in relation to the passing of risk to the parties involved.  
Reading it in conjunction with s.17 of SGA, the chapter also sets out to identify the gaps, if 
any, in relation to such issues in the SGA.  
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Chapter Six focuses on the rules of passing of risk under the CISG. The time of passing of 
risk under the CISG, depending on the circumstances of the terms of the contract of sale 
will be the main focus of the chapter. The discussion will be extended into the provisions 
of arts 67, 68 and 69. Therefore, a critical analyses examination of these different aspects 
of this issue and other related articles will be carried out in this chapter. Furthermore, the 
principles applying to the passage of risk, together with sanctions where the seller breaches 
the contract (art 70), the concept of the buyer’s right of avoidance as a remedy and its main 
requirement of fundamental breach, as well as the meaning, implications and justifications 
for such a remedy, will be discussed and analysed. The chapter also examines the party 
autonomy principle and the legal nature of the passing of risk rules under the CISG, 
through the role of art 6 of the CISG.  
Finally, Chapter Seven will summarise the findings of the study and its criticisms of the 
passing of risk issues under both the English law and CISG and provide remedies and 
suggestions for a way forward to fill the gaps in this area of law, by addressing the issue of 
a fair balance between the parties in the contract with respect to these matters. 
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Chapter 2 – Overview of passing of property and risk 
under the Libyan Law 
2.1 Introduction  
The Libyan legal and governmental structures are based on two constitutional documents. 
These are the Constitutional Proclamation of December 1969, replacing the former Libyan 
Constitution of 1951, and the Declaration of the Establishment of the People's Authority, 
enacted in March 1977. Both embedded a rather peculiar form of government, termed 
Jamahiriya (“rule of the masses”)”, a political agenda that may be described as a socialist 
ideal under an authoritarian cover. 
The socialist theory adopted by the Libyan government is embedded both in the 
Constitutional Proclamation and the Declaration, which had a significant influence on 
commercial trading, and, subsequently, on the commercial law. It saw the Commercial 
Code 1953 thoroughly revised and revoked while the Civil Code of 1954, although 
maintained, provides few detailed provisions on the time of passing of property and risk.  
In the revoked Libyan Commercial Code 1953, the issues of passing of property and risk 
were not regulated, while, the Libyan Civil Code 1954 remains the primary law for civil 
transactions. This includes sale of goods contracts, real and personal rights and obligations, 
specific performance, evidence, assessment of damage and the contractual relationships 
surrounding sale exchange. Implicitly, the issues of passing of property and risk could have 
been argued to be covered by the Libyan Civil Code 1954.   However, its apparent lack of 
detail regarding the issues of passing of property and risk fails to provide a clear guidance 
on this area of law.  
Actually, the lack of detailed provisions in Libyan law can be seen in the limited number 
of provisions applied for interpretation. Accordingly, ss207, 208, 936 are the only 
provisions regulating the passing of property with s210 being related to the passing of risk, 
supplemented by s147 regarding the party autonomy principle. Among these, s936 of 
Libyan civil law provides the basic rule regarding the passing of immovable property, 
where the property passes at the time of conclusion of the contract, supplemented by ss207 
and 208, dealing with the identification of the goods, where immoveable property in the 
goods cannot be transferred to a buyer until the goods are ascertained. Nevertheless, the 
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rule provided by s936 comes as general rule without any further details and its 
interpretation covers both movable and immoveable (real property), failing to distinguish 
between them. Moreover, with respect to the provisions of ascertaining the goods, this does 
not include any rules for ascertaining the intention of the passing of property. 
The delivery principle adopted in s210 of the Libyan civil law, which is applied to interpret 
all types of contracts and is not limited to the sale of goods contract, dominates the issue of 
the passing of risk. According to this provision, the risk passes at the time of delivery; 
however, this provision is inconsistent with the Libyan law, in which risk would transfer 
regardless of the identification of goods. What transpires is that the Libyan law links the 
issue of passing of risk to the delivery time, instead of linking it to the situation of goods. 
Consequently, further complications may arise regarding the issue of the passing of risk 
when it is linked to the delivery time. Such complications also occur in circumstances 
where the parties intend explicitly or implicitly to pass the risk before the delivery, in the 
case of unascertained goods, under s147 of the Civil Code. 
In addition, Libyan law is also noted for its use of domestic rules in the interpretation of 
international sale of goods, as the law fails to provide any rules in respect of passing of risk 
in goods sold in international transit, nor rules governing the sale of goods involving 
carriage of goods by different modes of transportation across the borders. This has created 
uncertainty for the both Libyan and international traders dealing with Libya under the 
CISG, English and virtually non-existent Libyan frameworks. Consequently, the need 
arises to create a model of the passing of property and risk which is specific and detailed 
and covers all the related rules. 
2.2 Passing of property under the Libyan law 
Under the Libyan law, the passing of property rules are stipulated in the Civil Code 1954. 
Section 407 of the Libyan Civil Code defines the contract of sale as a contract that obliges 
the seller to pass the property of goods to the buyer against payment. In other words, this 
contract is a binding contract for both parties, whereby the seller must pass the property 
and the buyer must pay the price. Therefore, some law scholars argue that the main 
function of a sales contract under Libyan law is the passing of property.1  
                                                 
1 Sanhoori, Abdel Razek, The mediator in explaining the Civil Law, (4nd edn, Encyclopedia of law, Cairo 
1970) 349 
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The timing of the passing of property is stipulated in s936 of the Libyan Civil Code. The 
guiding principle in relation to the passing of property is that the property of moveable and 
immoveable (real property) goods passes from the seller to the buyer at the time when the 
contract is concluded. It reads: the property in the movable and immovable goods passes to 
the buyer when the contract is made, as long as the seller is owner of the goods and 
subject to section 207.. This provision provides the general principle of the timing of 
passing of property and covers both immovable and movable property but fails to 
distinguish between immovable (real property) and movable goods and take into account 
the different types of properties. In the widest and most comprehensive sense of movable 
and immovable property, the provision lays down the general concept in respect of 
property and is interpreted to be applicable to both movable as well as immovable 
property, subject to the express language of the section concerned. 
Seemingly, the real test according to Libyan law of whether a property is immovable or 
movable is the intention behind the transfer and the transferability of the property. For 
example, generally a tree will be treated as an immovable property, but it will be treated as 
movable property if it is felled and used to build a house and both pass according to the 
same rules subject to s207, where the goods must be ascertained goods, as long as the 
seller is the owner of the goods which is to be discussed in a later section. Thus, the 
general principles dealing with immovable (real property) under the civil law has been 
used to interpret movable goods, where property of immovable and movable goods passes 
at the time when the contract is made.  
However, the parties may choose to deviate from the rules provided by the guiding 
principle, in that they are free to identify the time when the property and risk will be 
deemed to have passed, where the ascertainment is further qualified in s147, which makes 
the passing of property dependent upon the intention of the parties, under these 
circumstances. The immediate question which arises regarding the passing of property is 
whether the parties’ agreement supersedes the relevant rules. In other words, which rule is 
the primary rule – taking priority over an application? 
2.2.1 Intention of the parties to pass property and the legal nature of the 
Libyan law 
The basic rules which govern the process surrounding the passing of property from the 
seller to the buyer in a transaction adopt the general principle of passing of property when 
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the contract is made. However, this rule has to be further analysed against s147 of the 
Libyan Civil Code.  
Section 147 provides that:  The contract makes the law of the parties. It can be revoked or 
altered only by mutual consent of the parties.  
According to s147, the parties of the contract can exercise contracting autonomy, 
according to their intention. Formation of a contract generally requires an offer, 
acceptance, consideration, and a mutual intent to be bound. S147 provides the party 
autonomy principle, where the parties are free to contract according to their intention. 
Logically, the coverage of the party autonomy principle in the Libyan Civil Code 
undoubtedly extends to cover the issues of passing of property and risk, as well the rights 
and obligations of the parties to the contract.  
Such a view receives support in the argument that the passing of property issue may be 
expressly or implicitly inferred from the terms of contract, the transaction or by usage. In 
practice, it has been held that the basic rule is intention of the parties, where the parties are 
obliged to fulfil the contract according to their agreement.2 Thus, the property of goods 
may pass at the time of the conclusion of the contract or at the time chosen by the parties, 
according to their intention. 
Apparently, the court has given effect to the parties’ intention where they agreed; giving 
priority to an agreement between the parties may refer to the principle of the freedom of 
parties to contract and create the terms of their agreement as they desire (the party 
autonomy principle). Accordingly, the parties have the right to create the terms of the 
contract according to their intention. Although Libyan law does not mention it expressly, it 
has been indicated that the intention of the parties with regard to the passing of property 
and risk takes priority over any other rules. In other words, the parties’ intention 
supersedes any other rules, since it could be viewed as the basic rule in relation to the 
passing of property.  
Indeed, it seems that the Libyan law provides a system which is governed by the rule that 
the property passes when the contracting parties intend for it to pass. If, however, the 
intention of the parties is being overlooked by the parties, the court will resort to other 
criteria to supplement the parties' intention with a default rule.  In other words, in the 
                                                 
2 Libyan Supreme Court no 8571, 66.  22 /12/ 1970. 
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absence of any expressed or implied indication regarding the intention between the parties 
with respect to the time of passing of property in an award, the property then passes to the 
buyer, according to s936, where the property of movable and immovable (real property) 
goods passes from the seller to the buyer at the time when the contract is concluded.   In 
this case it is clear that Libyan law provides a substitutional rule, presented in s936, which 
applies in the case of absence of any indication regarding the intention between the parties 
with respect to the timing of the passing of property 
Apparently, this agreement is the primary rule and takes priority in application over any 
other rules. As a result, the principle of time when the contract is made is apparently 
merely a substitutional principle, not a dogma. In other words, the intention of the parties is 
the basic rule which takes priority over the rule provided in s936 of the Libyan Civil Code. 
It seems that Libyan law has adopted two legal rules regarding the passing of property. In 
the sense that the idea lies in the adoption of both: a basic rule, which overrides any other 
rules in application, and a substitutional rule, which applies in the case of the absence of a 
basic rule. Nevertheless, such rules of passing of property should be provided by the basic 
rule in s147 or by the substitutional rule in s936, which would be inapplicable unless the 
goods are specific goods and the seller must be the owner of the goods, moreover the 
contract should be an unconditional contract. 
2.2.2 Passing of property of specific goods under the Libyan law: 
definition of ascertainment 
Section 208-1 defines specific goods as goods identified and agreed on at the time a 
contract of sale is made.  
This means the parties understand which goods which have been agreed upon. Apparently, 
the property cannot pass to the buyer at the time of making the contract unless the goods 
are ascertained goods at the time a contract of sale of goods is made, taking the intention of 
the parties into consideration. Following this, an agreement on undefined goods outside the 
scope of the contract of the sale of goods, as well as future goods, means these are goods to 
be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the contract of sale has been made.  
In general, specific goods are those goods agreed at the time when the contract is made. 
For example, goods sold in supermarkets are specific goods, because both parties (buyer 
and seller) have agreed and identified upon the goods at the cash desk.  
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Actually, at the time when the contract is made, no property of unascertained goods can be 
passed to the buyer unless the goods are ascertained. Accordingly, the principle that 
property changes ownership at the moment the contract is made in relation to specific 
goods seems to be an absolute rule with respect to time of ascertaining the goods. 
Nevertheless, different rules may be applied to determine the timing of ascertainment, 
which may be well after the time when the contract was made. 
Clearly, the time of contract of sale being made is the main factor with regard to 
ascertaining the goods. While this appears to be an absolute rule with respect to the time of 
ascertaining the goods in the case of passing of property at the time of the contract, the 
element of the parties’ intention, as stipulated in s147 of the Libyan Civil Code, should 
also be considered. Under party autonomy, the property of goods passes at the time when 
the parties intend it to pass. The reading seems to suggest that ascertainment can be subject 
to the parties’ intention, as the ascertained property in goods passes when parties intend it 
to pass, under s147.  
In the case where the goods are ascertained, the property will only pass when the parties 
intend it to be passed. Determining such intention relies on the reading of the terms of the 
contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case. However, in the case 
where no such intention can be discerned, then s936 will be applied where the property 
passes at the time of the contract is made, though this is subject to the rule of s208, where 
the goods are identified and agreed on at the time a contract of sale is made. Accordingly, 
no property passes until the goods are ascertained, whether at the time of the contract or a 
later time.  
Requirement of Ascertained Goods 
Section 207-1 provides that: No transfer of property in the goods can take place from the 
seller to the buyer unless and until they are ascertained.  
This provision provides the starting point in restricting the passing of property to 
ascertained goods. Hence, where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, no 
property in the goods is transferred to the buyer until the goods are ascertained. In fact, the 
enforcement of s207-1 means that there is no field for the transfer of property unless the 
goods are ascertained. Noticeably, it restricts the transfer of ownership and makes it only 
apply to ascertained goods, which appears to be a mandatory provision. 
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In fact, while aforementioned provision of s 936 of Libyan Civil Law provides the general 
rule regarding the passing of property, where the property passes at the time of conclusion 
of the contract, it is restricted by s207-1 which deals with the identification of the goods 
and the property in the goods cannot be passed until the goods are ascertained. This 
provision makes a distinction between specific and unascertained goods.   
It has been held that, the property of movable and immovable goods passes to the buyer at 
the time of conclusion of the contract, as long as the sold goods have been identified and 
agreed on at the time a contract of sale is made, unless the parties agreed otherwise.3  This 
includes the complete share specified or percentage of goods identified and agreed at the 
time of making the contract of sale;4 it also constitutes existing specific goods.  
Following this, an agreement on unascertained goods outside the scope of the contract of 
the sale of goods, as well as future goods, which are goods to be manufactured or acquired 
by the seller after the contract of sale has been made, and these can never be specific 
goods, unless such goods are described carefully and sufficiently to the contract of sale. 
However, it is worth mentioning that, apart from the actual identification of the goods, 
ascertainment may also cover goods identified merely through description. Provided that 
the description was careful and sufficient, the goods are considered to be specific goods, 
which are therefore sales by description, and cover catalogue purchases and orders made 
through a dealer. 
Unidentified parts of an identified bulk 
Unidentified parts of an identified bulk are considered as ascertained goods under s218 of 
Libyan Civil Code provides that, when goods are sold in bulk, property is transferred to 
the buyer in the same way as property of an ascertained good.  
In meaning, a buyer of part of an identified bulk becomes an owner in common of the bulk, 
with each such buyer’s undivided share in the bulk, even in the case of goods in bulk when 
the amount of the price depends on the extent, weight or measure of the goods sold being 
ascertained. Clearly, the Libyan Civil Code has addressed the problem of a sale of a part of 
an undivided bulk, where the property of such kind of goods passes at the time of making 
                                                 
3 Libyan Supreme Court no 223, 57.  22 /11/ 1990 
4 Libyan civil code, S 208 
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the contract, as long as the contract of sale is an unconditional contract and the seller is the 
owner of the goods. 
Appropriation  
S208 provides that, where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods 
by description, and goods of that description and are unconditionally appropriated to the 
contract, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer. Accordingly, in the case of 
sale of unascertained goods property passes to the buyer when goods are unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract. 
The importance of ascertainment can be seen in s208 of the Libyan Civil Code, which 
applies to such contracts: it outlines the basic requirements which allow for property to 
pass, confirming that the goods must be unconditionally appropriated. It appears that 
appropriation plays a key role in the process of converting goods from being unascertained 
to become ascertained. 
This rule covers the process of converting the goods from being unascertained to be 
ascertained. It seems to be a dynamic process, which allows the property to be passed to 
the buyer. Accordingly, no property passes until the goods have been appropriated, and the 
passing of unascertained or future goods should occur through their unconditional 
appropriation. Although s208 states that unascertained or future goods by description must 
be unconditionally appropriated to the contract, it provides no guidance regarding how 
such appropriation can occur, whether by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the 
buyer with the assent of the seller. Consequently, a lot of possibilities can arise and cause 
confusion in applying this rule. 
 
Borrowing from English jurisprudence, it has been said that appropriation involves 
selection on the part of the seller, in which he has the right to select and choose the article 
which has been agreed within the terms of the contract of the sale of goods.5 However, 
selecting the goods which the seller intends to pass is not sufficient. If that were the only 
issue, the seller could feasibly change his mind and use the selected goods to fulfil a 
different contract, thereafter using different goods to fulfil this contract. Therefore, 
                                                 
5 Benjamin's Sale of Goods(8th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London , 2010) 232 
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appropriated goods within the contract must be reasonably supposed to attach to the 
contract irrevocably. In other words, the goods in question have to be irrevocably 
earmarked and attached to the relevant contract. This means that there exists irrevocable 
identification of the goods, which puts it beyond the power of the seller to substitute 
goods.6 
Indeed, the goods could be appropriated unconditionally in different ways; it may take 
place through delivery, through a process of exhaustion of all other options, through 
consolidation, or by segregation. Thus, appropriation can occur when the buyer's portion is 
physically isolated from the bulk. It may also occur through the withdrawal of the 
remaining portions owned by other buyers, ascertainment by process of exhaustion. It can 
also come about when the buyer purchases the remainder of the bulk, including his own 
unascertained portion.7 
In fact, Libyan law states that unascertained goods must be ascertained but does not offer a 
specific explanation of how appropriation could occur. This provides a wider field for the 
parties to express their intention as to how the goods can be unconditionally appropriated; 
at the same time, it gives freedom to the courts to interpret and infer appropriation from the 
facts and circumstances of individual cases. Obviously, an intended appropriation must be 
unconditional in order to be effective. Namely, the party appropriating the goods must 
intend to appropriate the agreed goods unconditionally, and not upon some future event. 
Further, unconditionally means that such appropriation is not subject to any express or 
implied condition, or any future act.8 
Generally, the contract of sale must be unconditional, and appropriation must also be 
unconditional in order to allow the property to pass. However, a condition can be 
expressed or implied. It may be imposed on appropriation even if it is not included under 
the terms of contract, showing that the seller intends to reserve certain rights upon the 
goods until such conditions are fulfilled. This ensures that the appropriation is ineffective 
and prevents the property from passing, at least until the fulfilment of the conditions. 
                                                 
6 P.S. Atiyah, John N. Adams ; with sections on Scots law by Hector MacQueen , Atiyah’s Sale of 
goods,(Harlow: Longman, Twelfth edition, 2010 ) 7, 9 
7 William Tetley, Q. C., 'Sale of Goods the passing of title and risk: a resumé Faculty of Law McGill 
University Montreal, Quebec, Canada 19 
8 (n 6)240.  
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In fact, the goods must be ascertained in order for the property to pass, but such 
ascertainment, which may occur through unconditional appropriation, is no more than 
making it possible for the property to pass, and once goods are ascertained the property 
passes at the time when the parties intend it to pass, according to s147 of Libyan Civil 
Code.  
In meaning, Libyan law has adopted the principle of party autonomy as an essential 
principle, as shown by its incorporation into its provisions as a basic rule. This  means that 
the principle of appropriation and consent is just that, a general principle, not a basic rule 
or dogma. Actually, while the basic standards of transfer of property in relation to specific 
goods constitute the time when the contract is made, and the intention between the parties, 
the basic standards underpinning the transfer of property in relation to unascertained goods 
is unconditional appropriation.  
In other words, an appropriation is the legal principle according to the Libyan law, but that 
does not necessarily result in the passing of property, which still requires the intention of 
both parties, which is basic rule of passing of property.   Section 147 allows the property to 
pass when the parties intend it to pass. Thus, the intention of the parties is paramount and 
overrides any other rules. On the other hand, s208 of Libyan Civil Code states that no 
property in unascertained goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are 
ascertained.  
This means that, where there is a contract for the sale of ascertained goods which are 
unconditionally appropriated under the contract, with absence of any expressed indication 
regarding the intention between the parties with respect to the time of passing of property 
in an award, the property then passes to the buyer at the time when the contract is made, 
according to s936.  
In fact, in the case of specific goods, property passes when the contract is made, or at a 
later time, depending on the goods in question and the intention of the parties according to 
s147. In that sense, the goods do not need to be appropriated unconditionally, because they 
are already ascertained goods. However, in the case of unascertained goods, the situation is 
different, because the goods still need to be appropriated unconditionally. Obviously, if 
there is intent between the parties, but no appropriation takes place, the property cannot be 
deemed to have passed, because s208 prevents the property from passing; only when the 
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goods have become appropriated according to the intention of both parties is it deemed to 
have passed.  
Assuming that the goods are appropriated unconditionally under the contract of sale, but 
the parties intended to pass the property at a specific time, for example, at the time of bill 
of landing is delivered, the property cannot pass until the bill of landing is delivered to the 
buyer, even if the goods are appropriated. 
Apparently, the main function of appropriation is to identify the goods, ascertain them, and 
tie them irrevocably into the particular contract - thereafter the property cannot pass once it 
has been ascertained, but it can pass when the parties intend for it to pass. In other words, 
the goods may become ascertained, yet do not pass until such time as both parties intend 
for it to pass. 
The seller must be the owner of the goods 
According to s207 of the Libyan Civil Code, if the seller is not the owner of the goods nor 
the authorized agent of the owner at the time of the sale, no property passes. This situation 
in fact, may arise in a range of cases, running from the situation where the seller has stolen 
the goods all the way to a case where the seller honestly believes that he is the owner of the 
goods but has himself been misled by a previous seller.  
In such cases there is a conflict of interest between that of the original owner of the goods 
who is seeking to recover them or their value and the ultimate buyer who has paid good 
money for goods which he believed the seller was entitled to sell to him. In general, it is 
desirable to protect the interests both of the owners of property and of honest buyers who 
pay a fair price, so no property passes at the time of conclusion of the contract, even in the 
case of specific goods in an unconditional contract.  
The contract should be an unconditional contract 
An unconditional contract should be interpreted as a contract containing no condition 
unfulfilled by the seller and the conditions shall be essential conditions. According to s255-
1 of the Libyan Civil Code, any conditional contract is not effective unless the condition is 
fulfilled. Clearly this provision is a general provision that applies to any contract, then, 
logically, extends to cover the contract of sale consequently the contract of sale must be 
unconditional contract.  
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Obviously, this interpretation focuses on essential conditions. An unconditional contract is 
meant to indicate that the contract is free of any condition which affects the passing of 
property. For example, a conditional sale agreement, under which the passing of property 
occurs only upon payment of the price, or a contract under which the seller must himself 
acquire the goods before he can fulfill his agreement to sell them to the buyer, would not 
be unconditional.  
If the contract of sale is unconditional and the goods specific, property to the specific 
goods passes, when the contract is made, unless the parties have a contrary intention. It is 
immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery are postponed, unless the 
parties have agreed that the passing of property is conditional on the payment or on the 
delivery, in which case the payment or delivery will be the condition would prevent the 
passing of property.  The courts, however, usually infer from the contract that the parties 
did not intend title to pass, but rather intended that it should pass only upon delivery or 
payment. 
Payment condition 
In fact, section 419 of the Libyan Civil Code restricts the time of passing of property on the 
payment where the parties have agreed that the passing of property is conditional on the 
payment. In that sense, the contract of sale must be an unconditional contract and should 
not be subject to the payment as condition. 
In fact, the parties are free to agree that the passing of property is conditional upon the 
payment, and that such an agreement could be expressed or implied. Nevertheless, the 
situation would be different if the postponement of payment was agreed as the condition. 
In this situation, the property cannot pass until the condition of payment is fulfilled 
because the payment becomes a related condition to the property when the parties agree to 
suspend the transfer of property on the payment.  
However, if the price paid premiums and the payment carried out all of the premiums, the 
transfer of property to the buyer is based on the time that the contract of sale is concluded.9 
In other words, the general rule of passing of property from the seller to the buyer at the 
time as the contract is concluded still applicable even in the case of a conditional sale 
agreement, under which the passing of property occurs only upon payment of the price, 
                                                 
9 Libyan civil code, S3  
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where the property passes retroactively at the time of making the contract not at the time of 
the payment.   
Clearly, the provision of s419 is grounded on the party autonomy principle, where parties 
are free to decide contractual terms.10 Nevertheless, postponement of payment on its own 
cannot affect the passing of property, which means that the property can be passed to the 
buyer even when payment is postponed. Therefore, payment should not be considered as a 
condition which can prevent the passage of property, unless otherwise agreed. 
In fact, where there is a contract of sale of specific goods, no property passes to the buyer 
at the moment of making the contract, if the contract of sale is subject to any condition, 
whether the payment or otherwise. It does not matter whether it is an expressed or implied 
condition, as long as the condition is unfulfilled, even if the condition related to certain 
rules outside the scope of the contract of sale.  
Ascertaining the intention of the parties 
Although the Libyan law sets conditions for transfer of property where the seller must own 
the goods, the goods must be specific goods and there must be an unconditional contract, 
in fact an ambiguity lies in the lack of some detailed rules that would provide presumptions 
for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods 
is to pass to the buyer.  
In general, where the seller is bound to measure or weigh the goods to ascertain the price 
and that the specific goods are in a deliverable state , the rules would provide presumptions 
for ascertaining the intention of the parties in the case of absence of any indication of 
intention of the parties. This ambiguity, in fact, might be due to considering the rules 
regarding the deliverable state among the acts of ascertaining the goods. Nonetheless, the 
lack of such rules in the Libyan Civil Code could weaken the Libyan position on this issue.  
It seems that, the idea adopted by Libyan Civil Code lies in the adoption of both a basic 
rule, which overrides any other rules in application, and a substitutional rule, which applies 
in the case of the absence of a basic rule. In other words, it has adopted the principle of 
party autonomy, and at the same time adopted a different principle, which is that the 
passing of property when the contract is made applies in the case of absence of any 
                                                 
10 Nygh, Peter. Autonomy in International Contracts (Oxford University Press. 1999) 211 
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expressed indication regarding the intention between the parties with respect to the timing 
of the passing of property. 
Clearly, the Libyan law adopts the party autonomy principle, where the intention of the 
parties - whether that be in relation to the passing of property or risk - is the basic rule. It is 
worth noting that, the enforcement of ss207, 208 and dealing with the identification of the 
goods, where the property in the goods cannot be passed until the goods are ascertained, 
may restrict passing of property, where there is no field for the transfer of property unless 
the goods are ascertained. Clearly, such a rule restricts the transfer of property and makes it 
only apply to ascertained goods, which appears to be a mandatory provision. 
2.3 Passing of risk under the Libyan law 
The exact time of the passing of risk in a contract of sale is very significant to both the 
seller and buyer. The reason for this lies in the importance of determining which party will 
bear the consequences of damage or loss. Existence of risk is commonly understood to 
define the state of the person who suffers the damage when goods are lost. In other words, 
being in risk can make one party within the contract free from carrying out his obligations, 
whereas the other party remains bound to perform his obligations. Nearly every national 
legal system includes rules on the passing of risk, and the passing of risk has also been the 
subject of regulation in the Libyan Civil Code. Apparently, the general principle in Libyan 
law is that the risk of accidental loss or damage falls on the party who in the possession 
and has control of goods, in that sense, the risk passes at the same time as delivery of the 
goods.11 
According to s210 of the Libyan Civil Code, the passing of risk is not related to the issue 
of passing of property, but linked to the time of delivery. Consequently, goods remain at 
the seller's risk until the delivery time, but when the delivery has been made to the buyer 
the goods are at the buyer's risk, notwithstanding of passing of property. This is due to the 
fact that the obligation to deliver the goods may be separated from the obligation of the 
passing of property, unless the parties under contract have agreed otherwise.  
                                                 
11 Libyan civil code s.210 
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2.3.1 Linking passing of risk with the concept of delivery under the 
Libyan law 
According to s424-1 of Libyan Civil Code, the delivery may occur through different 
methods.  It may imply a physical act which the seller must perform in order to put the 
goods in a deliverable state, where, obviously, this act is found in actual delivery. 
Furthermore, it can occur when the seller aims to enable the buyer to obtain control of the 
goods, by putting the goods at the buyer's disposal. Under this concept, s424-1 of Libyan 
Civil Code states that: Delivery consists in putting the goods at the disposal of the buyer, 
even if the buyer is not in physical possession of the goods, as long as the goods are under 
the control of the buyer.  
Due to a lack of case law, it is unclear whether the concept of delivery according to the 
Libyan law is restricted to the physical meaning of delivery or is understood in a broader 
sense, which includes putting the goods at the buyer's disposal. Consequently, the buyer is 
likely to be placed with positive burden in his awareness of ‘at the buyer’s disposal’ and 
such a burden can be created by the handing over of documents or by any other (informal) 
message.  
2.3.2 Exceptions in relation to passing of risk under the Libyan law 
The link between risk and delivery is restricted by s426 of the Libyan Civil Code, where 
the passing of risk under this provision does not depend on the buyer's taking physical 
delivery of the goods. The goods could be passed by the buyer's taking physical delivery, 
or at the time at which the goods are placed at his disposal, when delivery is due.  
Although the passing of risk at the time at which the goods are placed at the buyer’s 
disposal when delivery is due may deviate from the general rule of s210, it can be also 
understood as a delivery as long as the buyer has become aware and delivery is due, where 
the goods are placed under the buyer’s control. In the case of default of the buyer to taking 
possession of them, the risk of loss or damage will still be passed, on the grounds that 
delivery has occurred by placing them at the buyer's disposal. On the other hand, 
unsuitability may entitle the buyer to reject goods that are not in conformity with the 
contract. 
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According to English jurisprudence, it has been said that passing of risk at delivery time 
seems most fair, on the ground that the party who was in the possession of goods would be 
in the better situation to take the convenient precautions to protect them, and should also be 
in a suitably connected position to deal with the lost or damaged goods and insurer when 
the goods are insured.12  Directly linked with such a view is the question related to goods 
in transit. As indicated above, the Libyan law provides no rules to regulate the issue of 
passing of risk in contracts of sale which involve the carriage of goods. The lack of 
detailed provision on this issue is further exacerbated by Libya’s domestically oriented 
Civil Code.  
Due to the different nature of domestic and international sale of goods contracts in terms of 
the transportation involved, the Libyan law’s use of domestic rules, designed to deal with 
local trading conditions, as the law in the interpretation of international sale of goods is 
inappropriate. It fails to provide any rules in respect of passing of risk in goods sold in 
international transit or any rules governing the sale of goods involving carriage of goods by 
multi-modes of transportation across the borders. This is most evident in the concept of 
delivery adopted in the Libyan Civil Code, where the absence of legal rules regulating this 
issue could be considered as a weakness in Libyan law, which provides no answer, nor is 
there any dedicated rule for regulating the issue of the passing of risk in goods in transit 
where contracts of sale involve the carriage of goods. Furthermore, this local transaction 
oriented rule does not apply in the case where the buyer is not responsible for the loss or 
damage of the of the goods before delivery, which is a common situation in international 
trade, where the buyer would be released from his obligation to pay the price and is 
entitled to recover what he may have already paid under the contract, unless the loss or 
damage occurs after notice is given to the buyer to take over the delivery of the goods.13 
The general rule is that the risk passes to the buyer only at the time of delivery; this rule is, 
in fact, restricted by s426 of the Libyan Civil Code, where the passing of risk under this 
provision does not depend on the buyer's taking physical delivery of the goods. It could be 
passed by buyer's taking physical delivery, or at the time at which the goods are placed at 
his disposal when delivery is due.  
Although the passing of risk at the time at which the goods are placed at the buyer’s 
disposal when delivery is due may deviate from the general rule of the s210, it can be also 
                                                 
12 Wilson J.F, Carriage of Goods by Sea (, 4th edition, Harlow: Long man 2001) 138 
13 Libyan civil code s. 426 
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understood as a delivery as long as the buyer has become aware and delivery is due, where 
the goods are placed under the buyer’s control. In the case of default of the buyer to Take 
possession of them, the risk of loss or damage will be passed, on the grounds that delivery 
has occurred by placing them at the buyer's disposal. On the other hand, an unsuitability 
may entitle the buyer to reject the goods are not conformity with the contract. 
2.3.3 The lack of conformity of the goods  
Conformity of the goods, whether it relates to discrepancies in the quantity or quality of the 
goods at issue, it makes no difference whether the quantity of the goods delivered is more 
or less than agreed upon. Non-conformity of the quality of goods means delivery of goods 
whose quality is worse or better than agreed upon. In other words, one of the most 
important obligations of the seller is to deliver of goods in conformity with the contract, 
while the right of the buyer is to examine the goods to ascertain whether they are in 
conformity with the contract or not, and reject the goods when they do not conform to the 
contract, according to s427 of Libyan Civil Code.  
Hence, according to s427 when the seller fails to deliver such conforming goods for any 
reasons, either for reasons caused intentionally by the seller, such as counterfeit goods and 
fraud, or by accidental causes, for instance loss or damage of the goods during transfer, the 
seller is deemed to have breached a contractual obligation. A breach of contract by the 
seller which is sufficient to allow the buyer to reject goods that are not conformity with the 
contract.  
Accordingly, under Libyan law, in such a situation despite the passage of risks, if the buyer 
properly rejects the non-conforming goods, the risk will revert back to the seller and the 
buyer would be able to place the risk on the seller, whilst the buyer exculpates himself. At 
the same time, despite the risk being passed, the buyer is entitled to request the seller to 
reduce the price of goods that do not conform to the contract, even if the price has already 
been paid. However, the general rule will not apply where the parties have agreed when the 
risk should pass.  
2.3.4 Parties’ agreement on passing of risk 
According to s147 of Libyan Civil Code, the seller and buyer may agree on when the risk 
of loss or damage passes to the buyer. In principle, Libyan law links the passing of risk to 
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the delivery time, as provided in  210. However, the parties may, by agreement, separate 
the passing of risk from the delivery time. An argument departing from the general rule, 
indicating that one party should bear the risk, may be expressly or implicitly inferred from 
their transaction or by usage. The wordings of the Libyan civil code appear to be 
sufficiently wide in the sense that, where there is an express or implied agreement 
providing that the parties utilise party autonomy on such a matter. If so, one party is to bear 
the risk according to the agreement made between the parties even though he has no 
delivery of the goods. It could be understood that Libyan law gives priority to the intention 
of the parties over any other rule. This makes it more flexible with respect to the passing of 
risk, according to the party autonomy principle which is clearly expressed in s147. 
On the other hand, the lack of agreement between the parties on the timing of the passing 
of risk can be objectively interpreted as meaning that the parties intend to follow s210 and 
to have the risk being passed at the time of delivery. The risk however, may pass 
exceptionally to the general rule; this can be inferred by the authorities (court) from the 
circumstances of the case. Where the parties intend to pass the risk separately, i.e. before 
or after the delivery, it is clear and logical that the goods must be sufficiently identifiable 
as those to which the risk relates. It might therefore be assumed that the contract must be 
one for the sale of specific goods, or if it was one for the sale of unascertained goods, the 
goods should have become ascertained before the risk could pass.14 
In general, as discussed above, the Libyan law appears to distinguish between specific and 
unascertained goods with regard to the issue of timing in relation to the passing of 
property. On the other hand, there is no provision highlighting the passing of risk with 
regard to whether the goods are specific or unascertained. It would appear that there is no 
problem regarding the passing of risk at the same time of delivery or even after the 
delivery time, because timing in relation to the passing of risk would be linked and subject 
to the act of delivery in the case of specific goods, where the goods already will be 
ascertained through the act of delivery. However, the germane question relates to 
unascertained goods, where the parties intend to passes the risk before the property, by 
reason of whether the goods are still unascertained. 
From the foregoing, it can be observed that the risk may pass before the delivery time, 
regardless of whether the goods are specific or unascertained, where, there is nothing 
                                                 
14 Benjamin's Sale of Goods (8th Edition edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010) 303. See also Aedit Abdullah 
"Issues in the Tranfer of Risk in CIF Contracts." Sing. L. Rev. 14 (1993) 151 
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peculiar about separating the transfer of risk from the delivery time in the case of 
unascertained goods. Based on this, further complications may arise when the issue of the 
passing of risk is linked with the passing of delivery; such complications may occur in 
circumstances where the parties intend, explicitly or implicitly, to pass the risk before the 
delivery, even if the goods remain unascertained, based on s147, which could be 
considered as a weakness in Libyan law as well be seen.  
2.3.5 Party autonomy and the legal nature of passing of risk  
the restriction discussed above cannot be seen in the case of passing of risk, simply 
because the general rule of passing of risk under the Libyan law is determined by the 
delivery time, where the goods supposed to be ascertained unconditionally through the act 
of delivery. However, according to the principle of party autonomy provided by s147 of 
Libyan Civil Code, it is possible for the parties to pass the risk at any time other than the 
delivery time. Consequently, it is possible for them to pass the risk of unascertained goods 
to shape their own agreements according to their wishes.  
Indeed, in the contract of a sale of specific goods, the risk could be passed from the seller 
to the buyer separately, before or after the delivery, especially in cases involving the 
passing of risk after or at the same time of delivery, as this indicates clearly that the goods 
are specific goods, where the goods could be ascertained unconditionally through the act of 
delivery. It appears that there is no difficulty with passing risk in accordance with the 
intention of the parties involved, whether before or after delivery, so long as the contract is 
for the sale of specific goods. 
However, the question which is most likely to arise in such circumstances is whether the 
risk can pass before the delivery in relation to unascertained goods. According to the 
provision of s147 mentioned above, this may occur in circumstances where the parties 
intend, explicitly or implicitly to pass the risk before the delivery, even if the goods remain 
unascertained; here the priority, indubitably, will be given to intention of the parties, if any, 
on the ground of the party autonomy principle.  
Actually, as we have noticed, there is no expressed provision in Libyan Civil Code which 
prevents the parties in the contract from agreeing to pass the risk before the delivery, even 
if the goods are unascertained. Hence, under party autonomy principles adopted by the 
Libyan law, risk may theoretically pass on without identification being necessary.  
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Indeed, the issue of unascertained goods remains debatable, where the law does not 
mention unspecified goods, the negative interpretation of the provision can mean that the 
risk cannot pass until it is specified; however, the Libyan law does not specifically deal 
with the passing of risk in relation to unascertained goods as it did in regard to passing of 
property. This may due to the fact that, the Libyan law links the issue of passing of risk to 
the delivery time, where the goods are supposed to be ascertained goods through the act of 
delivery. 
On the other hand, suppose that Libyan law linked the risk to the condition of the goods, 
where no risk passes to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified within the contract, 
then the risk could never be passed until the goods are ascertained. Nevertheless, the fact is 
that the Libyan law does not mention such rules. Therefore, the researcher views the 
absence of legal rules regulating such issues could be considered as a weakness in Libyan 
law.
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2.4 Conclusion 
The lack of detailed provisions in Libyan law can be seen in the limited number of 
provisions applied for interpretation. Where the Libyan law is unclear is particularly with 
respect to the issues of passing of property and risk. Firstly, the general principle of 
passing of property and risk does not distinguish between immovable (real property) and 
movable goods, where the same provision applies regardless whether it immovable or 
movable goods. In addition the Libyan law lacks provisions related to ascertaining the 
intention of the parties. Furthermore, it is noted for its use of domestic rules in the 
interpretation of the international sale of goods, as the law fails to provide any rules in 
respect to passing of risk in goods sold in international transit, nor rules governing  the sale 
of goods involving carriage of goods by different modes of transportation across the 
borders. The weakness in Libyan law is also demonstrated by the fact that it links the 
passing of risk to the delivery time, but not to the condition of the goods, where that could 
cause difficulties is particularly in the case of applying the party autonomy principle, 
where the parties may agree to pass the risk before delivery time for unascertained goods, 
as discussed. A research study bridging the gaps in the current Libyan law in this area of 
law could be invaluable for Libyan legislators or other countries in providing a model to 
draft suitable and detailed legal provisions in line with developments in international trade, 
as well as helping to avoid some of the legal gaps and flaws in some other related laws, 
including the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 or the CISG. 
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Chapter 3. - Passing of property under the English Law 
3.1 Introduction 
A crucial point of discussion in relation to the law of sale of goods, is the passing of 
property from the seller to the buyer. The precise moment determining the passing in a 
sale’s transaction is when the seller ceases to be the owner of the property, and the buyer 
assumes ownership. In English Law, the period of time in which property passes differs 
according to whether the contract is for the sale of specific goods or unascertained goods. 
According to s16 of the Sales of Goods Act 1979, where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless must be 
and until the goods are ascertained. Since property in the unascertained goods cannot be 
transferred to a buyer until the goods are ascertained, as Re Wait1 indicated, it is important 
to understand at what point goods become ascertained.  
The traditional view, that the property in specific goods passes from the seller to the buyer 
at the same time as the contract is agreed, works on the basis that the contract of sale is 
unconditional, that the specific goods are in a deliverable state, and that the parties have 
not agreed otherwise. However, such a traditional premise no longer works in modern 
commerce, as Lord Diplock made clear when he commented on this matter in the case of 
Ward v Bignall, stating that, Very little would be needed in modern times to give rise to the 
inference that the property in specific goods is to pass only on delivery or payment.2 
Essentially, the transfer of property in English law depends not only on the goods to be 
specified, but also ideational conditions to be met before property is considered as being 
transferred. 
In England, the rules governing the issue of the passing of property, which identify the 
exact time when the property passes from the seller to the buyer, are stipulated in the Sale 
of Goods Act 1979.  In accordance with s16 of the SGA 1979, the guiding principle in 
relation to the passing of property is the ascertainment of those goods intended to be 
passed from the seller to the buyer. The ascertainment is further qualified in s17(1), which 
makes the passing of property dependent upon the intention of the parties, and applies both 
to specific goods, goods identified and agreed on at the time a contract of sale is made, and 
                                                 
1 Re Wait [1927] 1 Ch 606 (CA) 
2 Ward v Bignall [1967] 1 QB 534 
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also to unascertained goods which, though not identified and agreed on, are ascertained at a 
later stage. 
Accordingly, the parties have the right to agree the time when the property passes in 
relation to specific goods, and in addition to making sure that the goods are appropriated 
unconditionally within the contract. From the foregoing, it would appear that there is a 
relationship between s16 and s17, in the sense that there are two fundamental factors 
required for the transfer of ownership: the first, as pointed out in s16, is that, subject to 
s18(5), the goods must be ascertained by appropriation and consented to; the second, 
pointed out in s17, involves the intention of the parties to pass the property. Where 
complication arises in this regard is in whether s16 or s17 is the primary rule in the passing 
of risk. 
Furthermore, s18-1 of the Act provides guidance where the parties have not expressed or 
implied intention as to when the property should pass. It states that where there is an 
unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in 
the goods passes to the buyer at the time at which the contract is made, and it is immaterial 
whether the time of payment of the price or the time of delivery of the goods are both 
postponed.  
Accordingly, specific goods are defined as those identified and agreed on at the time a 
contract of sale is made. This includes an undivided share, specified as a fraction or 
percentage of goods identified and agreed on, under an amendment made by section 1 of 
the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. Thus, a contract for the sale of a quarter-share 
in a named racehorse will be a contract for the sale of specific goods.3 This may be an 
exception to the rule in relation to the passing of property in specific goods, but such an 
exception is important and will be examined and discussed further in the course of this 
theme.   
In this chapter, the researcher will discuss the rules governing the transfer of property in 
specific goods and unascertained goods, which must be ascertained in order to pass from 
the seller to the buyer. The purpose of this chapter is to conduct an in-depth legal analysis 
on the topic of the passing of property, by clarifying whether the ascertainment or party 
intention is the primary rule governing the process. In this chapter, the discussion will 
focus initially on the issue of the passing of specific goods in terms of objective and 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
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subjective ascertainment. The discussion will be followed by the passing of property in 
relation to unascertained goods, where the concept of appropriation and assent will be 
examined.   
3.2 Passing of property of specific goods under English law 
3.2.1 Objective Ascertainment – Requirement of Ascertained Goods 
The SGA 1979, s61(1), defines specific goods as goods identified and agreed on at the 
time a contract of sale is made. This includes the complete share specified or percentage of 
goods identified and agreed at the time of making the contract of sale,4  it also constitutes 
existing specific goods. In other words, the parties understand which goods have been 
agreed upon. Apparently, the property cannot pass to the buyer unless the goods are 
ascertained goods at the time a contract of sale of goods is made, taking the intention of the 
parties into consideration. Following this, an agreement on undefined goods outside the 
scope of the contract of the sale of goods, as well as future goods, are goods to be 
manufactured or acquired by the seller after the contract of sale has been made, and these 
can never be specific goods.5 
Apart from the actual identification of the goods, ascertainment may also cover goods 
identified merely through description.6 In one particular case, Varley v Whipp7, the 
purchaser had not seen the goods, yet his reliance on the description alone was considered 
a sale by description. In this case, the seller agreed to sell a reaping machine described as 
new the previous year. The buyer had not seen the machine previously, and when it was 
delivered to him, he discovered that it was an old machine. The court ruled that it was a 
sale by description of “specific goods”, meaning goods identified and agreed upon at the 
time a contract for sale is made. As the machine did not correspond to the description, the 
buyer was at liberty to reject the machine.  
According to Channell J, one has to consider the relationship between the identification of 
the machine and the statements made in the description of goods at the time at which the 
                                                 
4 Paul Dobson, Sale of Goods and Consumer Credit (6th edn Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London UK 2000). 
26;  See s.61 SGA 1979  
5 P.S. Atiyah, John N. Adams; with sections on Scots law by Hector MacQueen, Atiyah’s Sale of goods, 
(Harlow: Longman, Twelfth edition 2010 ) 7,9 
6 s18. Rule 5. SGA. 1979 
7 Varley v Whipp [1900] 1 Q.B. 516 
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contract was made, such as that the machine which was to be sold had never been seen by 
the buyer, being a self-binder, being nearly new, and having been used to cut only about 
fifty or sixty acres, , which are considered as identifying and ascertaining the goods. 
Provided that the description was careful and sufficient, the goods are considered to be 
specific goods.  The same rule also applies to all future and unascertained goods, which are 
therefore sales by description, and cover catalogue purchases and orders made through a 
dealer.8 
Generally speaking, specific goods are those goods agreed at the time when the contract is 
made. For example, goods sold in supermarkets are specific goods, because both parties 
(buyer and seller) have agreed and identified upon the goods at the cash desk. A second-
hand car deal also meets the criteria for specific goods, as the parties in question know 
which specific car is being sold. However, accounted bottles of wine from a seller’s bulk 
stock is not considered a contract for specific goods, due to the fact that the description of 
the wine does not tell the consumer which specific bottles of wines from the seller’s stock 
are being sold.  This is because the definition and identification of specific goods are 
related to an undivided share, which is either specified as a fraction or percentage, or even 
the exact type of goods being sold.9 Therefore, an examination and interpretation of the 
terms of the contract is very important in order to identify whether the goods represent 
specific goods or not. 
Furthermore, in the Re Wait10 case, a contract to sell 500 tons of wheat out of 1000 tons 
does not represent a contract of sale in specific goods, because there is no identification or 
ascertainment in the amount of 500 tons out of bulk 1000 tons of wheat. Even if the 500 
tons is separated from the bulk amount of 1000 tons, it still would not make them specific 
goods, because the standard of specific goods is measured by the time at which the contract 
is made. By contrast, if the 500 tons of wheat had been agreed and identified at the time of 
making the contract they would be considered as specific goods.  
On a practical level, there is some ambiguity as to whether goods are specific or not. In the 
case of Kursell v. Timber Operators (1927 CA),11 by the contract dated in September 1920, 
                                                 
8 Statutory regulation of contracts for the sale and supply of goods, Electronic copy available at: 
http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/shipping/003CHAPTERTHREETRADE1.pdf. <accessed on 1 
May 2017> 
9 (n 5) 26 
10 (n 1) 
11 Kursell v. Timber Operators [1927] 1 K.B. 298 
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when the seller agreed to sell and the buyer agreed to buy all available saleable timber, 
defined as "all branches and trunks of trees in the forest of Luhde in the Republic of Latvia 
but not trees of less than six inches in diameter at a height of four feet from the ground”. 
The buyers were given fifteen years in which to cut the timber. After the contract was 
made the Latvian government passed an agrarian law whereby the forest became the 
property of the Latvian Government; the contract was annulled and all property of the 
vendors and purchasers in the forest was confiscated.  
The legal result of these facts focused on the title of the property and whether it was a 
contract for the sale of specific goods on the basis of ascertainment.  In this case not every 
tree in the forest had been identified and agreed upon, but only those complying with a 
certain measurement, which had not been made. Therefore, it was ruled that the property 
had not passed to the buyer. It was pointed out that the definition of specific goods will not 
fit the trees of which it cannot be determined at the time of contract of sale is made. Had 
the trees conformed to the stipulated measurements specified at the time of the contract, 
their property could be passed, because they were ascertained at moment of making the 
contract. 
However, the purpose of the goods contracted and the general language used in the 
contract may also have impacts on ascertainment and fulfil the requirements of 
ascertainment.  What was agreed to be sold was specific goods, consequently the property 
could be passed to the buyer, because the goods were identified and agreed upon at the 
time the contract of sale was made.12  
Both cases discussed above share similar facts but received different judgments. This is 
because in the case of Joseph Reid Pty Ltd the property of all timber has been passed and 
considered specific goods, reliant on clause 8A of the contract. Namely, all timbers, 
without exception and regardless of certain measurements.  
However, in the Kursell case the contract contained a “qualified” statement of the timber 
which was intended for sale; the timber which has been described as all trunks and 
branches of trees but not seedlings and young trees of less than six inches in diameter at a 
height of four feet from the ground at moment of contract of sale is made. Consequently, 
the property of young trees of less than six inches at the time when the contract is made 
cannot be passed, due to the fact that the goods had not been sufficiently identified at the 
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time of making the contract. In contrast, in the Joseph Reid Pty Ltd case the general 
language allows the goods to be sufficiently identified at the time of making the contract 
by clause 8A of the contract. 
To summarise, at the time when the contract is made, no property of unascertained goods 
can be passed to the buyer unless the goods are ascertained. Accordingly, the principle that 
property changes ownership at the moment the contract is made in relation to specific 
goods seems to be an absolute rule with respect to time of ascertaining the goods. 
Nevertheless, different rules may be applied to determine the timing of ascertainment, 
which may be well after the time when the contract was made.  
Subjective Intention 
It is clear that the time when the contract of sale is made is the main factor with regard to 
ascertaining the goods. While this appears to be an absolute rule with respect to the time of 
ascertaining the goods, rather than being a time of passing of property, nevertheless, the 
element of the parties’ intention, stipulated in s17(1) of SGA 1979, also has to be 
considered. Section 17(1) states that the property of goods passes at the time when the 
parties intend it to pass. The reading seems to suggests that ascertainment can be subject to 
the parties’ intention, as the ascertained property in goods passes when parties intend it to 
pass under s17(1), even if it is a later time from making the contract of sale.  
In other words, in the case of where the goods are ascertained, the property will only pass 
when the parties intend it to be passed.13 Determining such intention relies on the reading 
of the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances of the case.14 
However, in the case where no such intention can be discerned, then the rules of s18 on 
ascertaining intention will be applied, with the exception of rule 5. Nevertheless, it is worth 
noting that s18 is subject to an ascertainment objective under s16 and s17 of SGA.  
                                                 
13 S. 17 (1) SGA. 
14 S. 17 (2) SGA. 
Chapter 3   
 
46 
 
3.2.2 Presumed Subjective Intention -Rules for ascertaining the intention 
of the parties 
Under the SGA, the parties’ intention can be expressed under s17(1) or be inferred under 
s18, which lays down five rules, examined in this section, to help in ascertaining what the 
intention required in determining the passing of property. 
3.2.2.1 Rule 1- Ascertainment of intention from fulfilled, implied and conflicting 
conditions – the importance of unconditional contract 
Section 18-1of the SGA emphases the importance of an unconditional contract in inferring 
parties’ intention. It states that where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of 
specific goods in a deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when 
the contract is made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of 
delivery, or both, be postponed. 
 
According to this provision, assuming that the goods are in a deliverable state and the 
contract is unconditional, the property passes to the buyer when the contract is made, even 
if the time of payment or delivery (or both) is postponed. However, the question that 
requires analysis is the meaning of “unconditional contract”. According to Taylor, an 
“unconditional contract” should be interpreted as an unconditional contract containing no 
condition unfulfilled by the seller and the conditions shall be essential conditions.15 
Obviously, this interpretation focuses on essential conditions. The difficulty is what is 
meant by the term “essential condition” and how can we recognise it in the contract of sale 
of goods?  
Essential condition 
In general, every contract of sale of goods must contain a number of conditions between 
the seller and the buyer.  Moreover, every contract of sale contains fundamental conditions 
or obligations in its terms, which apply to both the seller and the buyer, namely, that the 
seller must deliver the goods and pass the property to the buyer. In return, the buyer must 
accept the goods and pay the price. The question related to the words “unconditional 
contract” in s18-1 of SGA, which stipulates that the obligations are included in the terms of 
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the contract, would transfer the contract to being a conditional contract and deprive it of all 
its effects, due to non-fulfilment.  
Among the discussions in the literature, Tetley maintained that English law rests on this 
point.16 However, it has been suggested that the essential condition which can prevent the 
passing of property in relation to specific goods at the time when the contract is made, is 
the condition which can affect the property only;17 and related to the passing of property 
only.18 Others have said it is the condition which prevents rule (1) (passing of property in 
specific goods at the time of a contract is made) from being applied. Accordingly, an 
unconditional contract is a contract which contains no condition, and the non-existence of 
an unfulfilled condition would prevents applying the rule (1).19  
However, how can one see such conditions in the terms of the contract and recognise them 
as effective conditions in the contract of sale of goods, i.e. as conditions that can be 
expressed or implied?   Actually, the identification of the conditional contract varies from 
case to case. For example, the condition may be expressed by the parties or it may be an 
implied condition. In the Varley case discussed above, although the machine was sold by 
description and was described specifically at the time of making the contract of sale, 
nonetheless the property never had passed, due to the unfulfilled implied condition that the 
goods shall correspond with the description, as highlighted by Channell J.; thus, the 
contract was not an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods. As a result, the 
property did not pass when the machine was put on the railway, as putting the goods on the 
railway did not fulfil the implied condition. It was decided, therefore, that the earliest time 
at which the property could be said to pass would be when the machine was accepted by 
the buyer. Without the buyer’s acceptance, the property had never passed.20 
A similar view can be seen in relation to Ollett v Jordan,21 where the defendant, who was a 
fish merchant at Hull, received an order for the supply of a quantity of herrings to a 
hospital (buyer) at Eastbourne and dispatched them by rail. The goods were fit for human 
                                                 
16 (n 5) 312 
17 William Tetley, Q. C., 'Sale of Goods the passing of title and risk a resume' (Faculty of Law McGill 
University Montreal, Quebec, Canada) 19 
18 For example, a conditional sale agreement, under which the passing of title occurs only upon payment of 
the price, or a contract under which the seller must himself acquire the goods before he can honour his 
agreement to sell them to the buyer, would not be “unconditional” within the meaning of rule 1. 
19 (n 4)33 
20 Varley v Whipp [1900] 1 QB 513 
21 Ollett v Jordan [1918] 2 KB 41 
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consumption when they were delivered to the railway company, however, upon their 
arrival, they were no longer fit for human consumption.  
The appellant (buyer) argued that the property in the herrings was not transferred until the 
buyer had an opportunity of examining them to ascertain whether they satisfied the 
description and were fit for human consumption. The judge was of the view that this 
contract of sale was subject to the implied condition that the herrings should be fit for 
human consumption, as the defendant was charged under the Public Health rules which 
provide that the fish should be fit for its purpose. The period for this implied condition 
lasted from the time when they were put on the railway at Hull and the time when, in the 
ordinary course of transit, they arrived at Eastbourne, to the time when the boxes were 
opened and examined by the intending purchaser within a reasonable time. In other words, 
there was no complete sale until the buyer had an opportunity of inspection. If the goods 
were not fit for their purpose, the buyer was not bound to accept them. Consequently, the 
property had never passed, due to the non-fulfilment of the implied condition in this type 
of sale.  
In other words, where there is a contract of sale of specific goods, no property passes to the 
buyer at moment of making the contract if the contract of sale is subject to any condition. It 
does not matter whether it is an expressed or implied condition, as long as the condition is 
unfulfilled, even if the condition related to certain rules outside the scope of the contract of 
sale, as decided in Ollett where the condition was imposed upon the seller by the Public 
Health rules.  
Compared to “conditional contract”, postponement of delivery and of payment play less 
significant roles in the issue of the passing of property. According to s18-1of the SGA 
1979, the property in relation to specific goods passes to the buyer when the contract of the 
sale of goods is made, unless circumstances change, and it therefore becomes immaterial 
whether the time of delivery, or the time of payment (or both) are postponed.22 Generally, 
under English law, the property may pass to the buyer without delivery or payment or 
both.23  
However, conflict may arise if the payment and delivery are set as conditions to be 
fulfilled. If we accept payment and delivery as conditions, that means there is a condition 
                                                 
22 Simmons v Swift (1826) 5 B. & C.862 
23 Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v Hickson [1906] A.C. 419 
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in the agreement and the contract is conditional; consequently, the property cannot be 
passed to the buyer until such conditions are fulfilled. At the same time, there is no 
contract of sale of goods devoid of the obligations of the payment and the delivery of 
goods.24  
Accordingly, if the contract of sale is unconditional and the specific goods themselves are 
in a deliverable state, title to the specific goods passes, according to rule 1 of s18, when the 
contract is made, unless the parties have a contrary intention. It is immaterial whether the 
time of payment or the time of delivery is postponed. The courts, however, usually infer 
from the contract that the parties did not intend title to pass in accordance with rule 1, but 
rather intended that it should pass only upon delivery or payment.25 
Despite the parties’ intention assuming the primary role, the existence of an inconsistent 
intention arising from the different interpretations of postponement of delivery and 
payment could oust the application of s18 rule 1.  This was considered in Re Anchor Line 
(Henderson Bros) Ltd,26 where the buyer company agreed with the sellers' agents to buy a 
crane for a deferred purchase price of £4000, with annual payments by the buyers for 
"interest" and "depreciation" respectively, to be deducted from the £4000. In the meantime, 
the buyers were to have "entire charge and responsibility" for the crane. Later the buyer 
went into voluntary liquidation and the liquidator obtained a court order to sell all the 
buyers’ assets. It is submitted that conflicting intention arose from the wordings of 
“depreciation” and “entire charge and responsibility” which appeared in the contract. 
 It was argued that the letter of the sellers' shows that the intention was that the property 
should not pass until it had been paid for in full. This is shown by the provision as to 
depreciation and therefore that it was not included in the assets sold to the new company. 
The liquidator rejected these claims and contended that on a contract for the sale of 
specific goods the property is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties intend it 
shall be transferred, and the intention of the parties must be ascertained having regard to 
the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties, and other circumstances: where the 
goods are in a deliverable state the property in them passes to the buyer when the contract 
is made, unless a different intention appears from the terms of the contract. 
                                                 
24 (n 7) 
25 R.V. Ward Ltd. v. Bignall [1967] 1 Q.B. 534 at p. 545 
26 Re Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd [1936] Ch. 211 
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The court was of the opinion that the intention of the parties was different from that which 
would be inferred from the document. This difference may refer to their variances in the 
interpretation of the word of depreciation. Hence, the acceptable interpretation of the word 
depreciation related to the dividing of payment. Namely, postponement of payment on the 
annual payments refers to the interest and depreciation and is not a condition to transfer the 
property. Consequently, it is admitted this contract is an unconditional contract for the sale 
of specific goods. 
Therefore, it has been held that, if postponement of purchase price and delivery of the 
goods can properly be described as a postponement of the completion of the purchase, the 
property will pass once the contract has been entered, although in that sense the completion 
of the purchase is deferred.  
The general principle is that the passing of property is a distinctive and separate matter 
from the payment and delivery of goods.27  In other words, the postponement of payment 
or delivery on its own cannot affect upon the passing of property; however, the property 
can be passed to the buyer even when delivery is postponed. Therefore, payment and 
delivery should not be considered as conditions which can prevent the passage of property 
unless otherwise agreed. 
The parties are free to agree that the passing of property is conditional upon the payment or 
delivery of goods (or both), and that such an agreement could be expressed or implied.  
Nevertheless, the situation would be different if the postponement of delivery and payment 
was agreed as the condition. In this situation, the property cannot pass until the condition 
of payment or delivery or both are fulfilled, because the payment or delivery becomes a 
related condition to the property when the parties agree to suspend the transfer of property 
on the payment or delivery of goods.28 The courts, however, usually infer from the contract 
that the parties did not intend property to pass in accordance with s18 rule 1, but rather 
intended that it should pass merely upon payment or delivery of the goods. In such 
situation payment or delivery becomes a conditions must be fulfilled in order to transfer the 
property.29  
                                                 
27 Dennant v Skinner and Collom [1948] 2 K.B.164  
28 Ibid. 212 
29(n 25)  
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Indeed, an unconditional contract is a contract free from any conditions which can affect 
the passing of property, immaterial of whether it relates to the payment or delivery of 
goods or even otherwise. Passing of property actually, has a special legal nature, separated 
from payment and delivery, unless the parties have agreed that the passing of property is 
conditional on the payment or delivery of goods. Nevertheless, in the absence of intention 
of the parties to pass the property at specified time, the property of an unconditional 
contract in specific goods cannot be passed from the seller to the buyer until they are in a 
deliverable state, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2.2.2 Rule 2- The requirement of actual deliverable state and its implied meaning  
 
The passing of property can also be implied by the factor of “deliverable state” observed in 
s18 rule 2, which provides that, if specific goods have to be put in a deliverable state, the 
property presumptively passes when this is completed and the buyer receives the notice. 
According to s61-5 of the SGA 1979, the deliverable state is defined as goods in a state 
where the buyer is bound to take delivery of them. Namely, goods which require work in 
order to make them ready for delivery or in line with the agreed goods in the contract of 
sale, are not considered to be in a deliverable state. Therefore, in Underwood Ltd v Burgh 
Castle Brick & Cement Syndicate30, the specific procedures required to place the goods in a 
deliverable state became the determining factor for the passing of property. In this case, the 
seller had agreed to sell a horizontal condensing engine at a price free on rail in London, 
which allows for the passing the property at the time of loading the goods on the train. It 
weighed thirty tons and was bolted to and embedded in a flooring of concrete. Before it 
could be delivered by rail it had to be detached and dismantled. During the loading 
operation, the seller damaged it by accident, the buyers later refused to accept it.  
In his decision on the buyer’s refusal to take the delivery, Bankes L.J, supported by 
Scrutton L.J., placed the emphasis on the required procedures and stated that, even though, 
the general principle that the property in specific goods passes on the making of the 
contract, the proper inference to be drawn is that the property was not to pass until the 
engine was safely placed on rail in London. This judgment can be interpreted as meaning 
that the general principle only applies where no different express or implied intention 
                                                 
30Underwood Ltd v Burgh Castle Brick & Cement Syndicates [1922] 1 K.B. 343 
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exists. However, in this case, the moment that this engine was in a deliverable state when it 
was put on train was the determining factor of the requirement of deliverable state of the 
heavy engine.  This is because the sellers were bound to do something for the purpose of 
putting this engine in a deliverable state safely.  Deliverable state does not depend upon the 
mere completeness of the subject matter in all its parts.  It depends on “the actual state of 
the goods” at the date of the contract and the state in which they are to be delivered 
according to their agreement. It could be understood that the judgment of the case 
considered the risk and expenses involved in dismantling and transferring this engine. 
Consequently, the parties’ real intention to have the engine “delivered free on rail” is 
implied to have the seller putting the engine in a deliverable state safely. In order to do it, 
he had to dismantle the engine and the failure to do so determined that the title of the 
engine was never passed over to the buyer. 
A similar line of argument can be observed in Philip Head Son Ltd v Showfronts Ltd31 
where the defendant building contractors bought carpet from the plaintiffs; the carpet was 
delivered to the showrooms where it was to be laid, and was sent away by the plaintiffs' 
sub-contractor for stitching, and was returned the next day in heavy bales and was 
subsequently stolen. It was held that the carpet in its bales was not in a “deliverable state” 
because the court inferred that the carpet should be laid by the seller. It is not enough to 
say that the carpet was in deliverable state when was delivered to the buyer’s premises, it 
had to be laid by the seller in order to be in deliverable state. Accordingly, the property had 
not passed and remained with the plaintiffs and the defendants were not liable for the price, 
simply because that deliverable state depends on the actual state of the goods at the date of 
the contract and the state in which they are to be delivered by the terms of the contract,32 
not the mere completeness of the subject matter in all its parts.  
Nevertheless, it has been argued that s.61-5 of SGA does not give a comprehensive 
definition of deliverable state and whether “delivery of physical possession of goods” is a 
requirement, particularly, where the goods are in a deliverable state but defective. Under 
these circumstances, the buyer is not bound to take delivery of them on the basis of breach 
of contractual terms. Atiyah33 pointed out that this argument was largely a response to 
some difficulties created by s11 of the 1893 Act, which were addressed with amendments 
                                                 
31 Philip Head Son Ltd V Showfronts Ltd [1970] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 140 
32 Ibid. 
33 P S  Atiyah, John N Adamss, Hector MacQueen, Atiyah’s Sale of goods, (11th edition ,pearson education 
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in the SGA, 1979. However, if the buyer decides to reject the goods for any reason, the 
property reverts to the seller. The buyer’s refusal of goods would indicate non-physical 
possession of the goods. Therefore, it seems to be generally the case that the phrase 
regarding the goods being in ‘deliverable state’ concerned to deliver the goods which are 
related to delivery of physical possession of goods. Actually, the passing of the possession 
of goods differs from the passing of the property of goods, because the physical possession 
of goods can be transferred only if the parties intend to pass it.   
Indeed, there is a tendency to interpret the term “deliverable state” by reference to the 
physical possession of goods,34 which means that it distinguishes between the passing of 
property of goods and the transfer of the physical possession of goods. These generally do 
not occur simultaneously. Consequently, the seller can be in possession of goods even 
when the property of them has passed to the buyer. In contrast, the seller can retain the title 
of the property even though the physical possession of goods has been delivered to the 
buyer.35 
It is worth of noting that the rule of putting goods in a deliverable state applies only when 
this obligation is placed upon the seller and the buyer could not make the property pass by 
performing the acts which was the seller’s duty to do; consequently, this rule would not 
apply in the case where this obligation was placed on the buyer,36, and the situation would 
be covered by the parties’ intention under s17 of SGA 1979.37 
 
3.2.2.3 Rule 3 – The elements of weighing, measuring or testing requirements in 
ascertaining intention 
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, the seller may be bound to weigh, 
measure, or do something to the goods to ascertain the goods to be placed in a deliverable 
state. This rule is a structural rule; it is probably construed to cover some components. 
According to s18-3 of SGA 1979, the property does not pass if the seller failed to weigh, 
measure, test or do something else required by the contract to put the goods in a 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Paul Dobson & Rob Stokes. Commercial Law, (7th edt. Sweet & Maxwell Limited of Avenue Road, 2008) 
PAGE number 
36 Acraman v Morrice [1849] 8 C.B.449 
37 See Above NO 11 
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deliverable state for the purpose of ascertaining the price. It is clear that the aim of the rule 
is to ascertain the price of goods where the price is unknown, because the price cannot be 
computed until the extent or quality of the goods has been determined.38 
However, would the passing of property be decided otherwise had the price already been 
paid by the buyer? Similar to the requirement of goods “being put free on rail” in 
Underwood Ltd v Burgh Castle Brick & Cement Syndicate, the sale of hay in Lord Eldon v 
Hedley Bros39 provided for the sale of the hay at various prices per ton “put free on rail”. 
The buyer paid the estimated value of the stacks of hay to the seller, a party to the tenancy 
agreement with another landlord, at the time of entering into the contracts. After the 
termination of the tenancy agreement, the landlord's agent advised the buyer that as a result 
of the termination of the tenancy agreement, the hay would not be allowed to be removed 
from the farm, but the buyer continued the process of cutting into the eight stacks of hay 
and taking the hay away. The landlord, thereupon, brought an action against the buyer and 
contended that the seller had no right of property or beneficial interest in the goods. 
The appellant (landlord) contended that at the date of the contracts for the sale of the hay 
the subject matter of the contracts was not ascertained and therefore, no property in the 
goods sold passed to the buyers until they were ascertained, and the property in 
unascertained goods only passes to the buyer when goods of the description are 
unconditionally appropriated to the contract and in a deliverable state, as required by both 
ss18-2 and 18-3. Goods could not have been unconditionally appropriated to the contracts 
in the present case until the hay in the stacks had been cut, tied, weighed and measured. 
Before then, the goods were in an unascertained state and the property could not be 
transferred to the buyer by merely a contract for the sale of such goods.  
Such arguments were accepted by Slesser L.J who upheld that parties’ intention must be 
supplemented by the interpretation of the implied condition under s18-3of the SGA. He 
stated that the goods were unascertained and the property had not passed to the buyer at the 
time of making the contract of sale because the goods had to be weighed in order to 
ascertain the price. He interpreted “weighing the goods” as the privilege of the seller, in 
order to ascertain what price he was entitled to receive from the buyer. The estimated value 
of the stacks of hay could not be implicitly translated into the actual price of the goods. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this rule does apply to cases where the goods have 
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been sold for a lump sum with an ascertained price,40 nor  where the goods have been 
weighed or measured before the contract of sale is made.41 
Additionally, the duty to weigh, measure, and test or to do something to the goods must be 
carried out by the seller, because it’s his/her duty42 and nobody else’s, unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise, which can be seen in Turley v Bates,43 where the re-seller was not 
relieved of such implied duty before the property being passed. Essentially, this rule 
involves the obligation of the seller who is bound to measure and test or to do something 
for the goods. Clearly, it is designed to deal with cases where the passing of property is 
conditional upon some further required acts or things related to placing the goods into a 
deliverable state.44 Consequently, the line between the requirement of doing something and 
a conditional contract seems being blurred.  
In fact, the conditional contract and obligation of the seller to do something are mostly 
similar, as both can be inferred from the circumstances of the case, as Cockburn's Tr v 
Bowe45 demonstrated. In this case, the seller agreed to sell growing potatoes and undertook 
to lift them and put them in pits before carrying them to the station. It was held that the 
goods were in a deliverable state at the time of putting them in the pits; however, the 
obligation of carrying them there related only to the actual delivery. It depends on the 
actual state of the goods at the date of the contract and the state in which they are to be 
delivered by the terms of the contract. Critically, inference of the circumstances of the 
cases when the parties intended the passing of property makes this rule may cause more 
uncertainties in sale of goods contracts than desired in the cases where the actual price has 
been paid.   
                                                 
40 Hanson v Meyer (1805) 6 East 614 
41 Hinde v Whitehouse (1806) 7 East 558 
42 Turley v Bates (1863) 2 H. & C. 200 
43 Ibid. 
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3.3 Passing of property in unascertained goods under the 
English law 
3.3.1 Objective ascertainment in in unascertained goods and parties’ 
intention  
Apart from the ascertainment of specific goods, the SGA also covers the sale of 
unascertained goods. In law, whether the goods are classified as specific or unascertained 
goods is a determining factor in terms of the nature of the contract of sale and legal 
implications. In the case where the goods are specific, the contract is termed a contract of 
sale when the goods are specific and ascertained. However, a contract is merely an 
agreement to sell, when the goods are unascertained.46 
In fact, when the contract for the sale of goods is made, it is at that point that one has to 
clarify whether the contract involves the sale of identified goods, which avails the parties 
the remedies available in the case of breach of a sale of goods contract. In contrast, if the 
goods are unascertained at the time the contract is made, then the contract is deemed as an 
agreement to sell, and no property can be transferred to the buyer until the goods become 
ascertained, and also until the parties intend for it to pass.47 Until the goods are ascertained, 
the parties’ intention is assumed to play a less important role in determining the passing of 
property. 
According to the SGA 1979, the meaning of ‘unascertained goods’ can be categorised into 
three sections: (i) manufactured goods which are grown by the seller48 (others call this 
category ‘future goods’); (ii) generic goods: that is to say, a certain quantity of goods in 
general without any specific identification of their content; (iii) an unidentified portion of a 
specified bulk or whole.49 Although the law does not distinguish between these categories, 
the rules relating to the passing of property in relation to the category of unascertained 
goods are different.50 Accordingly, s16 SGA states that, in cases relating to the contract for 
the sale of unascertained goods, no property can be deemed to have transferred to the buyer 
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unless and until the goods have been ascertained. This is the case even in situations where 
the parties have agreed otherwise.  
The importance of ascertainment can be seen in s18-5-1 of the SGA, which applies to such 
contracts: it outlines the basic requirements which allow for property to pass, confirming 
that the goods must be unconditionally appropriated by one of the parties within the 
contract, and with the assent of the other party. It appears that appropriation plays a key 
role in the process of converting goods from being unascertained to ascertained. However, 
it can be observed from the language of s18(5) (1) of the SGA 1979, that there is further 
evidence of party intention playing the primary role, where appropriation can be carried 
out before or after the parties’ consent being given expressly or impliedly.   
This raises a question about the relationship between appropriation and the party intention 
to pass the property, as well as whether ascertainment through appropriation or parties’ 
intention is the primary rule in determining the exact moment unascertained goods can be 
passed from the seller to the buyer, or whether an ascertainment can be interpreted as a tool 
to clarify the intention of the parties under the concept of certainty.  
3.3.2 Appropriation 
Appropriation or intention? 
 
S18-5-1 of the SGA provides: Where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained or future goods by description, and goods of that 
description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated 
to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the 
buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes 
to the buyer; and the assent may be express or implied, and may be given 
either before or after the appropriation is made. 
 
Such rules cover the process of converting the goods from being unascertained to 
ascertained. It seems to be a dynamic process, which allows the property to be passed to 
the buyer. Accordingly, no property passes until the goods have been appropriated, and the 
passing of unascertained or future goods should occur through their unconditional 
appropriation. Further, such appropriation by one party shall not be effected without the 
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consent of the other party. In fact, appropriation is a term related to the concept of 
certainty.51  Therefore, appropriation can be understood in different ways. 
Benjamin is of the opinion that appropriation involves selection on the part of the seller, in 
which he has the right to select and choose the article which has been agreed within the 
terms of the contract of the sale of goods. In principle, appropriation is an act by one party 
only: usually the responsibility falls on the seller to identify and select the goods which are 
to be sold, but this responsibility may also be placed on the buyer. In other words, an 
appropriation is a selection duty related to the transfer of property.  
The duty to appropriate carries with it an authorisation to select the goods which are to be 
delivered in order to fulfil the contract. It is apparent that there can be responsibility placed 
on the seller beyond the actual delivery of goods to the buyer, which involves the selection 
and appropriation of the particular goods to be sold in fulfilment of the contract irrevocable 
to those goods.52 This definition links appropriation to the act of selecting the goods. 
Namely, appropriation by the selection of goods depends on the intention of the party who 
is appropriating the goods. Critically, the element of common intention must always be 
borne in mind. 
 In other words, selecting the goods which the seller intends to pass is not sufficient. If that 
were the only issue, the seller could feasibly change his mind and use the selected goods to 
fulfil a different contract, thereafter using different goods to fulfil this contract. Therefore, 
appropriated goods within the contract must be reasonably supposed to attach to the 
contract irrevocably.  Quite simply, the contracted goods (and no other goods) are subject 
to the contract of sale.53 
The parties may agree upon a specific article of goods (and no other) to be sold in order for 
the property to pass. In addition, where the parties are agreed upon in relation to the 
specific article, nothing remains to be done in order for the property to pass. Furthermore, 
appropriation is to be understood as an overt act manifesting intent to identify specific 
goods as those to which the bargain of the parties shall apply.54 Nevertheless, the property 
may not pass, because the passing of property cannot depend solely on appropriation; it 
still requires the intention of both parties, as will be seen later. 
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Methods of appropriation 
In light of the above, unconditional appropriation is essential factor which allows the 
property of unascertained goods to pass, subject to the consent of the other party. Once this 
premise is established, the important question in this context is how unascertained goods 
become unconditionally appropriated within the contract. The goods could be appropriated 
unconditionally in different ways; this may take place through delivery, through a process 
of exhaustion of all other options, through consolidation, or by segregation. 
Thus, specific goods, partially identified as coming from a designated bulk, are not 
considered ‘ascertained’ until they have been separated from that bulk, which usually 
happens immediately before delivery. Appropriation can occur when the buyer's portion is 
physically isolated from the bulk. It may also occur through the withdrawal of the 
remaining portions owned by other buyers: ascertainment by process of exhaustion. It can 
also come about when the buyer purchases the remainder of the bulk, including his own 
unascertained portion.55 
The English law states that unascertained goods must be ascertained but does not offer a 
specific explanation of how appropriation could occur. This provides a wider field for the 
parties to express their intention as to how the goods can be unconditionally appropriated; 
at the same time, it gives freedom to the courts to interpret and infer appropriation from the 
facts and circumstances of individual cases. Therefore, a lot of possibilities can arise and 
cause confusion in applying this rule. 
Accordingly, appropriation may take place by action; delivery of goods would constitute 
appropriation under s18-5 of the SGA 1979, unless the seller reserves the right to dispose 
of the property. Namely, when the seller delivers the goods to the buyer, confirming the 
contract as described, this counts as appropriation, which is assumed to be unconditional 
and subject to the consent of the buyer.  However, it is clear that, should the seller deliver 
the goods which are then mixed with other goods, no property can be deemed to have 
passed, because the property, at that point, remains unascertained goods.  
This can be seen in Healy v Howlett & Sons,56 where the defendant ordered 20 boxes of 
mackerel from the plaintiff, and the plaintiff dispatched 190 boxes, instructing the railway 
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officials to assign 20 boxes for the defendant from those 190; it emerged that the fish had 
deteriorated because of the delay. Avory J, pointed out that, whether the twenty boxes of 
mackerel became the property of the buyer depends on whether there was an appropriation 
of the twenty boxes at the time when they were put on the train or not. The plaintiff’s 
instruction to assign 20 out of 190 boxes did not constitute appropriation. This is because 
there was no objective way of determining which 20 boxes assigned to the buyer.  
Suppose that, in relation to this case, twenty boxes had become bad. It is quite impossible 
to say, taking into consideration all the evidence available, which of the various purchasers 
would have been bound to take the twenty bad boxes. Moreover, the seller or the carrier 
could replace the boxes with other boxes. If it was so, it is impossible to determine which 
of the purchasers was bound to take the twenty unfit boxes; thus, it follows that no 
particular twenty boxes were the property of any particular purchaser at that time. It can 
only be said that 20 boxes were delivered to the buyer: they became identified and 
appropriated irrevocably through the delivery act when they became the possession of the 
buyer.    
A similar analogy can be applied in the sale of wine57 or bags of coal, where the goods 
were unconditionally appropriated by the contract when the seller unloads the bags into the 
buyer’s coal shed; once they were placed in the buyer’s coal shed, such bags then become 
known, and each can be distinguished from the rest of the bags of coal. Moreover, the 
seller could not replace them with other bags when they became the buyer’s possession.58   
A similar line of argument was made in Donaghy's Rope and Twine Co Ltd v Wight, 
Stephenson Co59, where the appropriation was completed when the goods (rope) were 
placed in a warehouse as requested. It follows that the property had passed, because the 
goods were sufficiently marked and identified, particularly when the seller placed them in 
the warehouse (agreed as the place of delivery) for the buyer.  
Seemingly, the main principle of appropriation of goods within a contract of sale is when 
the parties have - or could be reasonably supposed to have had - an intention to attach the 
contract irrevocably to those goods. In other words, at the time of delivery, when the goods 
enter into the possession of the buyer, then the seller becomes unable to replace them with 
other goods.  
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However, the decision in Re Ellis Son & Vidler Ltd 60 was different; the wine was sold on 
such terms that, after the sale, it would be stored for the buyers by the seller.  In this case, 
however, the wine was segregated in the seller’s warehouse. Namely, upon the contract of 
sale being agreed, the wine was segregated (by year and description) from all other trading 
stock by the seller, and thereafter stored together with other wine.   
The main point in the present case is the segregation of wine within the seller’s warehouse, 
which enabled the particular wine to be identified upon the contract of sale. This wine - 
detailing the appropriate year and description - was segregated from the seller’s general 
stock and so it was possible to identify who owned which bottles in the stock. It was held 
that, by segregating the wine in this way, it could be sufficiently appropriated and 
ascertained at the point when segregation occurred, and, subsequently, the property passed, 
subject to agreement from both parties.61   
Comparative analysis reveals that the key distinctions between Re Ellis & Son and Re 
London Wine were that, in Re Ellis Son, there was segregation of the wine by the seller 
which enabled the particular wine to be identified and appropriated under the contract of 
sale. In the Re London Wine case, On the other hand, the stock had been mixed with other 
bottles of wine by the seller, and it was thereby impossible to identify who owned which 
bottles of wine in the stock. Furthermore, the seller in the Re London Wine case was free to 
provide his customers with other available wine, unlike the seller in the Re Ellis Son case, 
who could not do so because the goods were segregated and appropriated to the contract of 
sale.  
Continuous Appropriation through third parties 
 
Actually, the property of unascertained goods passes by an unconditional appropriation 
which may be carried out by the seller, or by the buyer when they are in the possession of 
goods. However, in cases where goods are in the possession of a third party, such as a 
warehouse keeper or a carrier (i.e. when the seller delivers the goods to the carrier, and the 
third party sets the goods aside for delivery to the buyer), the goods in this situation 
become unconditionally appropriated, and the property can then pass subject to assent.62 
Often the seller delivers the goods to the carrier for transportation: in this context the time 
when the property of unascertained goods - which have been appropriated and are 
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irrevocably attached to the contract - passes is the same as when the goods are delivered to 
the carrier.  The carrier becomes an agent for the buyer, and if there exists a binding 
contract between the seller and buyer then the property passes (through such a delivery) to 
the carrier.63 
The difficulties which can arise where the buyer has to collect the goods not from the seller 
but from a third party lie in whether the goods can be unconditionally appropriated by the 
third party or not. Clearly, the goods can be appropriated by the delivery of the third party.  
However, that is subject to two limitations: the first is that no unconditional appropriation 
can take place when the seller reserves the right of disposal according to s19 of the SGA 
1979; the second is that the goods must be ascertained; in other words, the goods must be 
appropriated clearly and irrevocably.  
Therefore, in the Healy case, it was held that sending 190 boxes by rail was not an 
unconditional appropriation because no appropriation was carried out by the seller or the 
carrier; consequently, it was impossible to identify which of the 20 boxes had been 
dispatched to the defendant from the overall number of boxes. The seller had batched 190 
boxes of fish and instructed the railway company (i.e. the carrier) to signal which of the 20 
boxes were meant for the defendant, and make clear that the remaining boxes were for 
other buyers. Conversely, assuming that the 20 boxes intended for the defendant were 
unconditionally appropriated or segregated (i.e. set aside), it is almost impossible to hold 
that the property had not passed.64 
In fact, in cases where goods have to be dispatched by a carrier, it is usually the case that 
they will be unconditionally appropriated when handed over to the carrier. Obviously, 
there is an unconditional appropriation when the goods are identified, and the third party or 
carrier acknowledges that he now holds them for the buyer. In the sale of 600 cartons of 
frozen kidneys (out of a total bulk of 1500) which had been stored by the seller, the carrier 
found that 600 cartons had been set aside for the buyer. It was established that there had 
been an unconditional appropriation at the time when the order was accepted, and 
thereafter loading commenced.65 
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To sum up, one way of passing property in relation to unascertained goods is through an 
action which could occur by delivery, segregation or otherwise, whether by the seller or by 
a third party, such as a carrier. However, this is not the only way to pass property.  
Furthermore, property in relation to unascertained goods may pass to the buyer when they 
become ascertained through a process of exhaustion. This]’/ can be seen in Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker v Eastport Navigation Corp,66 when the seller sold 6000 tons of copra under a 
CIF contract, and shipped 16,000 tons on one ship in undivided bulk, with one part 
intended for the plaintiffs and the second for other buyers, such that a process of 
elimination took place. The ship called first of all at Rotterdam, then at Hamburg, 
discharging all the copra intended for other buyers, whilst retaining the copra destined for 
the plaintiffs. It was held that the property had passed to the plaintiffs, because the goods 
had become ascertained through a process of exhaustion. 
From a critical perspective, the real difficulty arising in this context lies in deciding 
whether the selection of goods made by the seller irrevocably determines his intention or 
not. In other words, the seller or carrier may change his mind and send such goods to 
someone else. The question in the last case is: how can we be sure that, out of 16, 000 tons 
of copra, the exact 6,000 tons which were intended for the plaintiffs were actually 
delivered? It cannot occur at the time of sending the goods; however, as outlined, it can 
occur by following a process of exhaustion. 
3.3.3 Unconditional Appropriation  
Apart from its irrevocable character, an intended appropriation must be unconditional in 
order to be effective. Namely, the party appropriating the goods must intend to appropriate 
the agreed goods unconditionally, and not upon some future event. Further, unconditional 
means that such appropriation is not subject to any express or implied condition, or 
performance of any future act.67  
Generally, the contract of sale must be unconditional, and appropriation must also be 
unconditional in order to allow the property to pass. Accordingly, a condition can be 
expressed or implied. It may be imposed on appropriation, even if it is not included under 
the terms of contract, showing that the seller intends to reserve certain rights upon the 
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goods until such conditions are fulfilled. This ensures that the appropriation is ineffective 
and prevents the property from passing, at least until the fulfilment of the aforementioned 
conditions. Actually, such conditions apply for both the appropriation of goods and the 
contract of sale, as well as the contract of sale in relation to both specific and unascertained 
goods. 
Merrett holds the view that the general and most important rule is that appropriation is not 
unconditional if the seller only intends to let the buyer have the goods on payment.  Any 
term showing that the seller intends to reserve certain rights over the goods until he has 
been fully paid makes the appropriation conditional and prevents the property from passing 
until that happens.68 Although payment may be an important rule, as well as a condition 
preventing the passing of property, it is not necessarily the only rule affecting the property. 
This is because the terms of unconditional appropriation also exist in the contract of sale. 
This may include anything done by the seller or the buyer, whether is related to the 
contract or to the goods. 
For instance, the seller’s actions in packing the goods into cases, marking them with the 
buyers' names, registering them for consignment, and ordering shipping space in a named 
ship were viewed as an unconditional appropriation in Carlos Federspiel & Co. SA v. 
Charles Twigg & Co. Ltd69,   as Pearson J viewed the goods as irrevocably earmarked for 
use in the performance of these actions.  
The researcher agrees that the goods could be unconditionally appropriated to the contract 
if they have been irrevocably marked for use under the contract of sale. In other words, this 
requires the seller to act in such a way that places the goods out of his control. Therefore, 
he cannot use them in the performance of a different contract. This corresponds with the 
requirement that the appropriation be unconditional, which means that the seller must not 
reserve the right of disposal of the goods for any reason, whether it is a condition, such as 
payment, or not putting the goods irrevocably within the contract.70  
Therefore, putting the goods irrevocably under the contract is an important condition 
which would affect the transfer of property, as well as payment, and any other conditions 
which would be effective upon the passing of property. Indeed, where a further decisive act 
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was required to be undertaken, this would constitute prima facie evidence that the property 
does not pass until the final act has been carried out irrevocably.71 
Expressed and implied intentions are both given effect and it is immaterial if the condition 
related to payment or otherwise. Therefore, when the seller reserves the right of disposal, 
the buyer cannot acquire the property. When the goods are sold under the terms of payment 
within seven days against the transfer term of order, it is the express term that a right of 
disposal is reserved by the seller, as he is not bound to deliver the order until payment has 
been made, and, consequently, no property is deemed to have passed to the buyer72.  
Furthermore, the implied requirement can be observed in the case of the Ollett v Jordan 73 
discussed above. This also applies to the reference previously made to s18 rule 3, which 
deals with the contract of the sale of specific goods where the seller is bound to weigh or 
measure or test the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price. Although rule 3 is 
confined to the sale of specific goods, it seems to apply to unascertained goods as well, as 
discussed in Lord Eldon v Hedley Bros.74 
Indeed, the normal meaning of the term ‘unconditional’ is that appropriation is not subject 
to any overt or implied condition upon fulfilment, or to any other point or act which 
prevents the passing of property. But does an unconditional appropriation sufficient for the 
transfer of property or is this not the case? This will be examined in the next section. 
3.4 Assent and appropriation: 
Assent, in fact, could be defined as the authority conferred by the buyer on the seller to 
pass the property by appropriation.75 Under s18 rule 5-1 of the SGA, such assent can often 
be difficult to infer. Nevertheless, it may be expressed or implied, and it can be given by 
the buyer when the goods are appropriated by the seller and by the seller when the goods 
are appropriated by the buyer. Further, it may be given in advance, before the 
appropriation is made, or afterwards.76 
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In fact, act of appropriation has no legal consequences, unless it has been assented to by 
another party in the contract. Subsequently, the party with assent of appropriation will in 
effect be an offeror,77 while the parties who carried out irrevocable appropriation will be 
seen as offeree/s. It is noteworthy that the property passes when the other party assents to 
such appropriation,.78 Accordingly, the act of assent is very important in relation to the 
passing of property.  
In other words, assent can play a significant role in determining the timing of the passing 
of property where the parties intended to pass the property at the time when the goods 
became unconditionally appropriated. Namely, the time of assent could coincide with the 
passing of property, or given after appropriation has taken place. In the case where the 
seller sold unascertained bags of rice, which he was to collect, and the buyer received the 
goods in a condition which signified that they were ready for collection, it emerged that the 
bags had been requested by the buyer for the delivery order, but the buyer did not collect 
the goods. In that case it was held that the property had passed to the buyer by his assent, 
which had been inferred from his failure to object after receiving the delivery order.79 
Indeed, where the buyer approved the appropriation - which was made by the seller, as he 
intended to deliver the goods in accordance with the contract of sale - it was felt that the 
buyer had subsequently assented, and the property passed without delivery, which was 
deemed immaterial.  
Therefore, the property of the bags of rice had passed to the buyer even though he was not 
in possession of them - i.e. property passed without delivery.80 This in fact, accords with 
the doctrine which distinguishes between the passing of property and the delivery of 
physical goods. Therefore, the seller may be in possession of goods although the property 
has passed to the buyer.81  
The time of assent could coincide with the passing of property when assent is made after 
appropriation. On the other hand, property may pass by the appropriation of goods under 
the contract when the assent of such appropriation was agreed previously.82 Essentially, the 
assent of the buyer is an authority conferred by the buyer on the seller in order to pass the 
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property of goods by appropriation.83 Therefore, it is necessary to enquire whether or not 
such authority has been given. In the case where the plaintiff agreed to buy quarters of 
barley he had seen, approved and taken a sample from, the buyer’s action in sending his 
own sacks for re-fills was an assent and had conferred authority onto the seller to pass the 
property of goods on appropriation, when he saw and approved the goods, before taking 
away a sample.84  
It is also necessary to enquire what the terms of such authority are. Thus, the terms of the 
assent in a contract of sale may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the 
contract. It has been held that the dispatch and receipt of invoices and delivery orders 
clearly identify that the property has passed, even if there is no assent to the appropriation 
by the buyer.85  Further, the implied assent may be inferred from the rule of the act itself. 
s18 5-1 states that, where the goods are delivered to the carrier for shipment to the buyer, 
the goods are taken to be unconditionally appropriated under the contract of sale. However, 
this rule disregards the assent of the buyer, and it is clear that such assent must be 
understood to have been given under these circumstances.86 
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3.5 Conclusion: Intention of the parties to pass property and 
the legal nature of appropriation: 
Article 16 SGA provides that: ‘Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained 
goods no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are 
ascertained.’ 
It is clear that this article provides the general principle and starting point when 
considering the passing of property in relation to unascertained goods. Accordingly, where 
there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is 
transferred to the buyer unless (and until) the goods are ascertained. Namely, no 
unascertained goods can pass ownership; indeed, the goods must be ascertained, even if the 
parties in the contract have intended otherwise.  
This is a provision which therefore takes priority over any wishes or intentions to the 
contrary by either party.87 It seems to be more a logical matter than a legal principle, i.e. 
whether the transfer of property relates only to ascertained goods or otherwise. In fact, the 
enforcement of s16 means that there is no field for the transfer of property unless the goods 
are ascertained. Obviously it restricts the transfer of ownership and makes it only apply to 
ascertained goods, which appears to be a mandatory provision. The question which has 
arisen in this context is whether the English law means that the property in ascertained 
goods can be passed, while no property passes in unascertained goods. 
In fact, English law highlights the intention of the parties to pass the property merely in 
relation to specific goods. There is no indication with respect to the intention of the parties 
to pass the property in relation to unascertained goods. Certainly, s17 of the SGA, which 
deals with the intention of the parties only, operates in the sale of specific goods. Thus, the 
parties must ascertain the goods through appropriation, making sure that the timing of the 
transfer process is both understood and agreed upon by both parties so that the property 
may pass. Accordingly, the parties have the right to agree the time when the property 
should pass, in addition to making sure that the goods are appropriated unconditionally 
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within the contract. Indeed, this section modifies s16, ensuring it is a matter of logic, as 
opposed to one of mere legal principle, as will be seen.88 
From the foregoing analysis, it would appear that there is a relationship between s16 and 
s17, in the sense that there are two fundamental factors required for the transfer of 
ownership: the first, pointed out in s16, is that the goods must be ascertained and consented 
to, subject to s18 -5; the second, pointed out in s17, involves the intention of the parties to 
pass the property (party autonomy principle).  
A further question arises in terms of whether the property passes when ascertained by 
unconditional appropriation, or through the intentions of both parties. Put another way, if 
there is intent by the parties, but no appropriation takes place, can we say that the property 
has passed?  
In the case of Ross T Smyth & Co Ltd v T D Bailey Son & Co,89 where a seller contracted to 
sale to buyer 15,000 units, 2 per cent more or less, of No 2 yellow American corn, with an 
option to the seller of shipping a further 3 per cent more or less on contract quantity. At the 
foot of the contract were the words: “Separate documents for each 1,000 units and each 
1,000 units to be considered a separate contract.” In pursuance of this contract, the sellers 
wrote to the buyers giving notice of appropriation of approximately 15,444 quarters of corn 
as per bill of lading, and sent a provisional invoice for 15,444 quarters, and the provisional 
invoice stated that there were 15 bills of lading, each for an amount of bushels equivalent 
to 1,000 units, and one for an amount equivalent to 444 units. The buyers rejected the 
provisional invoice as not being in accordance with the contract, and, on the same day, the 
sellers sent an amended provisional invoice for 15,000 quarters which was rejected by the 
buyer as well.  
The Court of Appeal held that the result of the appropriation was that the property (in the 
whole amount) of goods had passed to the buyers, and that there was nothing the seller 
could do or say which would undo such an appropriation. However, the House of Lords 
adopted that the notice of appropriation under an ordinary CIF contract is not intended to 
pass and should not prevail over the parties’ intention. To pass the property, it still need to 
intention of the parties, because the normal inference in CIF contracts, especially where the 
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bill of lading was made out to seller’s order, was that property passed on tender of 
documents.  
In analysis, the two opinions are not incompatible. The first view adopts the idea that 
although the property may pass through appropriation, this does not mean that the property 
transfers only through appropriation, regardless of the intention of the parties.  In contrast, 
the second view states that the passing of property cannot occur by appropriation, and that 
appropriation is not the main factor in the passing of property. In other words, the Court of 
Appeal held that the result of the appropriation was that the property of goods had been 
passed to the buyers, because the contract was CIF, and by employing a CIF contract the 
parties had already intended to pass the property when the documents were delivered to the 
buyer - this was in accordance with the terms of CIF contracts, where the document plays a 
very important role. However, the House of Lords made clear that the property was passed 
when the parties intended it to pass, and in the present case the parties intended to pass the 
property on tender of the documents relating to the CIF contract terms; therefore, 
appropriation under an ordinary CIF contract made clear that there was no intention to 
pass, and therefore the property did not pass. 
Actually, the intention of the parties appears clearly where the parties intend to pass the 
property of goods at a particular time. The courts readily draw inferences as to the parties' 
intention from the terms used in the sales contract. For instance, if the parties specify that 
the contract is FOB, the court can rely on a prima facie presumption that the parties 
intended title to pass on shipment.90. In Steel Co. of Canada Ltd. v. The Queen, the 
Supreme Court held that in a contract stipulating FOB, property of goods did not pass to 
the buyer until delivery was made at the chosen point (over the ship’s rail).91 
Generally, the cardinal rule in cases of FOB contracts is that the property passes on 
delivery (i.e. in this case, at that moment when the goods had passed over the ship’s rail) 
unless the goods were put over the ship’s rail as mixed with similar goods for a similar 
contract and were not appropriated specifically to any particular contract at the time of 
shipment, in which case the goods remain unascertained, which means that the property 
did not pass to the buyer.92 When this action has been carried out, the seller is deemed to 
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have delivered the goods to the buyer, since shipment of designated goods is an essential 
condition for the passing of property.93  
In the Carlos Federspiel case, the plaintiffs sued for the goods, contending that the 
property in the goods had passed to them. Pearson J held that the property should pass 
immediately upon shipment. Thus, it was judged that the property (a consignment of 
bicycles) did not pass until shipment had taken place, even though the consignment had 
been marked with the buyer’s name, due to the fact that s17 was deemed irrelevant, since 
both parties - by making an FOB contract - had indicated their intention that the property 
was to pass only at that point when the goods were loaded onto the ship.94 
In analysis, the goods must be ascertained in order for the property to pass, but such 
ascertainment, which may occur through unconditional appropriation, is no more than 
making it possible for the property to pass, and once goods are ascertained the property 
passes at the time when the parties intend it to pass, according to s17.1of the SGA, which 
is followed by a list of five rules, provided in s.18,for ascertaining the intention of the 
parties, depending on whether the goods sold are specific or unascertained goods.95 Lord 
Wright made clear that appropriation identifies the goods, and ties them irrevocably into 
the particular contract. That is the legal principle according to the SGA, but that does not 
necessarily result in the passing of property, which still requires the intention of both 
parties.96 
A different judgment was given by the case of Jenner v Smith97, however, where the 
plaintiff, at a fair, orally contracted to sell to the defendant at a given price per cwt. two 
packets of hops, which were on the spot and were inspected and approved by the 
defendant. There were two other packets , of which samples were shown, but which were 
lying in a warehouse. The defendant took away with him the first two packets , but the last 
two were to be forwarded to him at a future time. The plaintiff went to the warehouse and 
selected two out of three packets  which he had there, and marked them to wait the buyer's 
order without any alteration. A few days later the plaintiff sent the defendant an invoice 
describing the numbers, the weight, and the price of the two packets  delivered at the fair, 
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and also of the two which had been set apart at the warehouse, and at the same time 
enclosed a draft for acceptance. The defendant sent back the draft and refused to receive 
the last two packets  for the reason that there was no contract for them at all, and the 
contract was for the first two packets .   
Keating, J. stated that no property had passed to the buyer, stating that the general rule of 
law had not been contested on the part of the plaintiff; and pointed out that where goods 
are sold, but some condition remains to be met by the seller before it is dispatched to the 
buyer, no property is deemed to have passed according to the contract of sale.  
A close examination of the facts revealed that the condition that remained to be met for the 
appropriation of goods to take place was an extensive authority conferred by the defendant 
on the plaintiff to pass the property. In a sense, they never agreed to hold the two packets 
on behalf of the buyer; and, if they did, there is no evidence of any authority from the seller 
that they might do so. Assuming the defendant conferred such authority on the plaintiff, 
when he agreed to receive the last two packets , the property would have passed by such an 
appropriation.  
On the other hand, using the buyer’s own sacks to fill with the goods was seen as an 
implied intention to transfer the title from the seller to the buyer in Aldridge v. Johnson,98 It 
was held that the property in the 155 sacks of barley had passed to the buyer by the 
appropriation made by the seller (with the assent of the buyer). It also held that, where 
there is a sale of unascertained goods, in which some action remains to be undertaken by 
the seller before delivery to the buyer, no property can be deemed to have passed until that 
action has been undertaken.  
It appears that the buyer made the seller his agent for the purpose of weighing and 
performing all the other acts necessary for the appropriation to pass. Thus, such authority is 
interpreted as the intention between the parties that they intended to pass the property upon 
appropriation. In other words, in the absence of any expressed indication regarding the 
intention between the parties with respect to the timing of the passing of property in an 
award, the rules of s18 will be applied. Where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods in a deliverable state, which are unconditionally appropriated to the 
contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer, or by the buyer with the assent of 
the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer. Accordingly, when the buyer 
                                                 
98 Aldridge v. Johnson (1857) 119 E.R. 1476 
Chapter 3   
 
73 
 
gave such authority to the seller to appropriate the goods, this could signify that they 
intended the property to be passed at the time of appropriation.  
Analytically, it can be argued that, despite the different decisions in both cases, both 
agreed that the property passed by appropriation, on the grounds that the parties intended 
to pass the property by an appropriation according to s18 rule5-1 of SGA. However, in the 
case of Jenner v Smith, the property could not pass because the defendant never gave the 
plaintiff authority to make the selection, on the grounds that the defendant did not accept, 
indeed refused to receive the last two packets , due to the fact that there was no contract 
between them. On the other hand, in the second case, it appears that the buyer sent 200 
sacks to be filled by the seller, and such an action could be interpreted as authority being 
conferred onto the seller to pass the property by appropriation.   
Timing of the transfer of property and the legal nature of appropriation 
In light of the above discussions, it is clear there are different opinions regarding the 
factors which determine the timing of the transfer of property and the legal nature of 
appropriation. In the case of Ross T Smyth, property passed at the time when the parties 
intended it to pass and the function of appropriation was merely to identify the goods and 
tie them irrevocably into the particular contract. It did not necessarily result in the passing 
of property, but was still the intention of the parties (party autonomy principle) as the 
fundamental principle which determines the time of the passing of property.  
In other words, English statutory law has adopted the principle of party autonomy as an 
essential principle, demonstrated by the fact that it incorporated it into its provisions as a 
basic rule, meaning that the principle of appropriation and consent is just that, a general 
principle, not a basic rule or dogma.99 Supporting this view, Benjamin said that an 
appropriation is an overt act manifesting the intent to identify specific goods which have 
been agreed on in the bargain between the parties.100 Similarly, in the judgment of the 
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Carlos Federspiel case, although the goods were deemed to have been appropriated when 
the goods were marked with the buyer’s name, the property did not pass until shipment had 
taken place, because the type of contract indicated that the parties intended for the property 
to pass on shipment.   
Although these last two cases led to different decisions, they concluded with the same 
meaning, which is that the property passes by appropriation according to intention of the 
parties, and by authority given to the seller by the buyer to pass the property. It has been 
argued that appropriation must be more than an act of selection, and more than the simple 
contracting of goods, in order to answer the agreed terms of a contract.  It must be an act 
which is intended, and agreed upon, in terms of the contract, to signify the transfer of 
property to the buyer.101   
Indeed, although the basic standards of transfer of property in relation to specific goods are 
the time when the contract was made and the intention between the parties, the basic 
standards underpinning the transfer of property in relation to unascertained goods are the 
unconditional appropriation and intention of the parties. In other words, English Law  
introduces the distinction between absolute and conditional contracts of sale, where an 
absolute or unconditional contract of sale is a contract by virtue of which the seller 
transfers the property in goods to the buyer, while a conditional contract of sale is an 
agreement to sell by virtue of which the seller agrees to transfer the property in goods to 
the buyer at a future time or subject to some condition. The decisive criterion is the 
intention of the parties; however, where the parties do not agree on the issue, it is presumed 
that they wanted the ownership to pass at the time of the conclusion of the contract.102 
Accordingly, under English Common Law, the property in the goods sold could pass on 
different occasions: at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or at the time of the 
ascertainment of the goods, in addition to which, property passes at the moment chosen by 
the parties.103 
Section 17 states that the property will pass when the parties intend it to pass. Thus, the 
intention of the parties is paramount and overrides any other rules.104 However, s16 of the 
SGA states that no property in unascertained goods is transferred to the buyer unless and 
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until the goods are ascertained. In fact, in the case of specific goods, property passes when 
the contract is made, or at a later time, depending on the goods in question and the 
intention of the parties, according to s17. Namely, the goods do not need to be appropriated 
unconditionally, because they are already ascertained goods.  
However, in the case of unascertained goods, the situation is different, because the goods 
still need to be appropriated unconditionally. Obviously, if there is intent between the 
parties, but no appropriation takes place, the property cannot be deemed to have passed, 
because s16 prevents the property from passing; only when the goods became appropriated 
according to the intention of both parties is it deemed to have passed.  
Assuming that the goods are appropriated unconditionally under the contract, but the 
parties intended to pass the property at a specific time, such as in the case of Ross T Smyth, 
where the parties intended to pass the property on tender of documents according to the 
terms of the CIF contract, under such a contract, the property cannot pass until the bill of 
lading  is delivered to the buyer even if the goods are appropriated. Such rules apply to 
specific goods as well, where the goods have already been ascertained.  In this assumption 
there is no ground to apply the rule of s16; but rather s17. Indeed, this may explain why the 
English law highlights the intention of the parties to pass the property within s17 merely in 
relation to specific goods. 
On the other hand, where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods in a 
deliverable state which are unconditionally appropriated under the contract, with absence 
of any expressed indication regarding the intention between the parties with respect to the 
time of passing of property, in an award, the goods then pass to the buyer, according to s18 
rule 5-1. Due to the fact that no time has been specified for the passing of property, s18 
lays down various rules to help ascertain the intention of both parties. In light of the 
analysis above, it could be understood that the primary rule is that property passes when 
both parties intend that it should pass.105 
Although the English law does not mention expressly and there is no indication which 
takes priority over the intention of the parties in relation to the ascertainment of goods. The 
first view makes the intention of the parties the main factor in the passing of property. 
Indeed, the decision in the Ross T Smyth case provides a logical interpretation of s16 and 
s17 of SGA. Put simply, English law may signify that property in ascertained goods can be 
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passed;  however, no property passes in unascertained goods, where the intention of the 
parties is the main factor, and that property passes only at such times as both parties agree 
for it to pass.  
Accordingly, it seems to be that the main function of appropriation is to identify the goods, 
ascertain them, and tie them irrevocably into the particular contract in order to determine 
the price - thereafter the property cannot pass once it has been ascertained, but it can pass 
when the parties intend for it to pass. In other words, the goods may become ascertained, 
yet do not pass until such time as both parties intend for them to pass. 
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Chapter 4 – Passing of property under the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
4.1 Introduction 
It is important in the scope of contracts for the sale of goods to determine the time when 
property passes and when the buyer becomes the owner of goods. In fact, under a domestic 
sale, it is relatively easy for the parties in the contract to achieve such purposes, since their 
contract is often governed by a uniform domestic sales law based within a uniform legal 
system.1 
However, the passing of property becomes a more complicated issue when applied to 
modern commercial transactions, where the parties in the contract of sale are often located 
in different countries – which may have different social values and different legal systems. 
In deciding when the property of goods under an international sales contract passes from 
the seller to the buyer, it is first necessary to examine the rules on timing in relation to the 
passing of property.2  
It is common knowledge that the basic dichotomy as to the fundamental requirements to be 
fulfilled in order to transfer property is due to the existence of different legal systems. For 
example, within one legal context, property may pass from the seller to the buyer by mere 
consent at the conclusion of the contract,3 while under another legal system property would 
be deemed to have passed at the moment when the goods were delivered.4   For instance, in 
art 1804 of the French Civil Code5 property passes according to the intention of the parties 
or, if the contract is silent, property passes at the time of the conclusion of the contract,6 
notwithstanding whether the goods have been delivered or their price paid. Nevertheless, 
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the fact that the property has passed does not release the seller from the obligation to 
deliver the goods,7 nor does it release him from the obligation to keep the goods safe until 
delivery.8 It is noteworthy that the French approach towards the transfer of property is 
similar to that in many other countries, including: Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, Portugal, 
Denmark, Norway and – outside of Europe - Mexico, Canada (Quebec), the US 
(Louisiana)9, and some Arab countries such as Libya.10 
English statutory law, the SGA 1979, is founded on the same rule, but differs with respect 
to the question of distinction between absolute and conditional contracts of sale.11 It is 
assumed that the goods are in a deliverable state and the contract is unconditional when the 
property passes to the buyer when the contract is made, even if the time of payment or 
delivery (or both) is postponed as stipulated in s18.12 However, the crucial standard is the 
intention of the parties according to s17 of the SGA.13 It should be noted, that most legal 
systems have also adopted this principle, as well as the principle of party autonomy, which 
has been adopted and implemented in all member states of the European Union as well as 
in the United States, in particular by means of postponement of the time in which the 
property passes according to the intention of the parties.14 
However, according to the principle of delivery, the passing of property takes place at the 
time when the goods are delivered, and, primarily as an effect of delivery.15 The principle 
of delivery actually applies in several different legal systems, for example, Germany, 
Greece, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, as well as most former socialist countries, 
and - outside of Europe –most Latin American countries, including Brazil.16 Nonetheless, it 
is noteworthy that all legal systems which adhere to this rule, still adopt the principle of 
party autonomy, where the intention of the parties is necessary to determine the purpose of 
delivery, or timing in relation to the passing of property. For example, this is the case with 
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respect to the constitutum possessorium, the traditiobrevi manu, and the sale of goods held 
by a third party,17 where the delivery of goods may not coincide with an intention of the 
parties to transfer the property.18 Indeed, rules applied by different legal systems (and 
practices) often leads to uncertainty of the law as it is applicable to an international 
contract of sale, and thus, can create distrust among parties and seriously undermine 
international trade.19  
Reflecting upon this situation, Benjamin points out that “in any event, uniformity of 
international practice with regard to sales of goods in transit (notably CIF sales) means that 
the above rules are not likely to be called-on frequently.”20  However, this is far from the 
reality with the applications of party autonomy, where consent and delivery principles are 
adapted in various jurisdictions.21 The importance of identifying the time when the 
property is passed becomes paramount in international trade. Indeed, the absence of 
regulation in relation to the transfer of property under existing legal frameworks - 
including the CISG - may cause some legal problems, including those affecting uniformity 
of purpose, with rules related to the passing of risk, and issues related to third party 
complexities, such as title conflict, insolvency and tort (in addition to the possibility of 
overlap among these problems); moreover, this absence of regulation also has an effect on 
the purpose of the convention, either directly or indirectly.22 
Therefore, there is a justifiable need to unify the rules governing international trade.23 
However, a uniform law is not something which can be drafted in the same way as 
domestic law. Notwithstanding this, the main question no longer lies in the creation of such 
a uniform law, but the implementation of the so-called uniform law.24 Obviously, common 
methods related to the unification of law are set out either through unification of the rules 
of choice of law or through the unification of the rules of substantive law. Put simply, the 
former sets out uniform legal rules to refer the contract or dispute to be subject to the 
domestic law of a particular country; in other words, the parties within the contract would 
choose the applicable law, while the latter lays down uniform substantive law to be applied 
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to a particular contract or dispute.25 Against this background, the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for an International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: CISG) was 
created in the attempt to provide modern, uniform and fair rules of law representing 
compromises and solutions amenable to all legal systems in international sales of contract. 
Such rules, in fact, aim to govern the formation of contracts for the international sale of 
goods, as well as the rights and obligations of buyers and sellers26. However, unlike the 
English approach, the CISG does not directly regulate the issue of passing of property.   
 
4.2 The Passing of Property under the CISG - Is the Passing of 
Property Not Dealt with Expressly or Still Part of the 
Seller’s Obligation? 
 
Unlike ss16 and 17 of the SGA 1979, no direct provision is dedicated to the passing of the 
property in the CISG. In order to consider whether the CISG regulates the issue of the 
passing of property, one should start with the most basic question. Does the CISG consider 
the passing of property an issue which is based on the impact of the contract of sale, or is it 
one of obligations and rights. If the answer is negative, then two further questions arise. 
Firstly, would it be possible - and will it be possible in the future - to unify the rule on the 
passing of ownership; and secondly, will it be unnecessary to unify the rule on this matter. 
Debattista puts these questions in the context of the transfer of property and calls for the 
needs to distinguish between “contractual effects of the transfer” and “proprietary effects 
of the transfer”.27  
 
Contractual effects of the transfer  
The contractual effects of the transfer refer to the rights and obligations of the seller and 
the buyer connected to the property of the goods. In matters of contract, these essentially 
relate to the contractual relationship between the parties. In contrast, the proprietary effects 
of the passing of property refer to the validity of the transfer and its effects on the 
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proprietary rights of the seller, buyer and any related third parties.28  In other words, the 
characteristics of an international sale of goods contract consists of the obligation of the 
seller to deliver the goods and transfer the property in the goods to the buyer,29 who, for his 
part, agrees to pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them. The primary 
obligation of a buyer under the contract of sale is to pay the price for the goods delivered. 
According to art 6 of the CISG; a buyer is under the obligation to pay the purchase price at 
the deadline agreed and to take delivery of the goods.  The immediate question is whether 
the reading of this provision is sufficiently and essentially related to the timing of the 
passing of property (i.e. when property passes). 
As discussed, the issue of the passing of property is one of the seller's obligations and 
relates to the contractual relationship between the parties; it is governed by the provision 
dealing with the rights and obligations of the parties arising from such a contract of sale of 
goods.30 This was also confirmed in the explanatory note31 of the CISG (11 April 1980), 
which considered the transfer of property is one of the seller’s obligations, with the words 
that Obligations of the sellers include delivering goods in conformity with the quantity and 
quality stipulated in the contract, as well as related documents, and transferring the 
property in the goods. Furthermore, as the CISG is often viewed as the law governing this 
contractual area between both parties,32 it may be reasonable to conclude that the CISG 
intends to address this issue from the perspective of the obligations and rights of the parties 
of the contract.  
 
Over and above this, the CISG provides quite a number of rules governing  certain issues 
related to proprietary effects, where art 30 of CISG requires the seller to pass property to 
the buyer, and indirectly governs such issues as those included in arts 41 and 42 CISG (the 
seller's obligation to deliver goods free from any third-party rights or claims), art 53 (the 
buyer's obligation to pay the price), articles 66 – 70 (the passing of risk of the good's loss 
or damage ) and arts 85 – 88 (the obligation to preserve the goods). The property question 
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will, of course, remain very important but only for the purpose of determining the rights of 
buyer and seller vis-à-vis third parties and vice versa.33  
In other words, such relevant provisions govern the issue of property in general and are not 
concerned with the issue of passing of property (the time of passing of property). 
Following this logic, there is a difference between the issue of property in general and the 
issue of the time of passing of property, as a particular issue, as seen in art 30, which states 
that ‘The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents relating to them and 
transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this Convention.’ 
Obviously, the word “must” indicates and confirms that the passing of property is one of 
the seller's obligations.34  
It appears that art 30 obliges the seller not only to deliver the goods but also to hand over 
all documents relating to the goods and to transfer the property in them. However, the 
timing for such an obligatory duty to take place is not expressly provided in the CISG, 
Thus the question arises: Is the timing of such a duty of passing of property governed by 
the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law?35 as well as whether 
the domestic law can determine the time of passing of property according to the various 
standards, including the intention of the parties’ standard.36  
 
4.2.1 Scope of the Convention Regarding Transfer of property    
It seems there is an irreconcilable paradox between art 30 which considers the passing of 
property is one of the seller's obligations and art 4(b), with regard to the issue of the 
proprietary effects of the passing of property (timing of the passing of property). Nduo 
views the two principles as different, because of the clear language used in art 4(b) of the 
CISG,37 which states that:  
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This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights 
and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In 
particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not 
concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of 
any usage; (b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the 
goods sold. 
 
In other words, we should distinguish between 'contractual effects of the transfer' and 
'proprietary effects of the transfer’.38 The contractual effects of the transfer refer to the 
rights and obligations of each party relating to the property of the goods. Examples are: 
whether the seller has a duty to transfer good title to the buyer or whether the seller is 
liable to the buyer for defects in the quality of the goods. These mainly relate to the 
contractual relationship between the seller and the buyer and thus, are 'matters of 
contract’. In contrast, the proprietary effects of the transfer of property refer to the 
validity of the transfer and its effects on the proprietary rights of the seller and buyer 
and related third parties.39 
 
According to Lookofsky, art 30 governs only the formation of a sales contract and rights 
and obligations of the parties.40  The paradox is that the language used in art 4(b) seems 
to expressly exclude the issue of the timing of the passing of property from the scope of 
application of the CISG.41 Indeed, art 4(b) has been interpreted as expressly stating that 
the contractual validity and property effects of the contract are placed beyond the scope 
of the CISG. The Secretariat Commentary on the 1978 Draft of the CISG, supports such 
a view by stating subparagraph (b) makes it clear that the Convention does not govern 
the passing of property in the goods sold.42 
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Furthermore, with reference to the effect of a sales contract on the property in the goods 
sold, some court decisions provide evidence for such exclusion. For instance, a German 
court decision stated that the Convention did not cover the question of the validity of a 
retention of property clause in a contract where a Dutch seller, plaintiff, sold a yacht to a 
German company. Under the contract, the seller retained property in the yacht. The yacht 
was subsequently transferred to the defendant, a silent partner of the German company. 
When the German company was declared bankrupt, the parties disputed the validity of the 
retention of property clause. The court expressed that the CISG did not apply to the 
validity of a retention of property clause.43 In another decision, the Australian court, when 
applying the CISG to determine whether a retention of property clause had actually been 
agreed by the parties – and, if so, what its content were - ruled that the effect of such a 
clause on the property in the goods was to be determined according to the law applicable 
by virtue of the rules of private international law.44 
This echoes Ziegel’s statement that in view of the difficulty of reaching a consensus on a 
suitable set of rules, the UNCITRAL working group preparing the draft convention did not 
attempt to incorporate such rules into CISG,45 devoting its efforts especially into issues of 
fraud, duress, illegality, capacity to contract, and agent’s authority46. Exclusion of the 
passing of property was said to be justified on the basis that such an issue was not deemed 
serious enough to warrant codification.47 It was regarded as unnecessary, in the sense that 
the rules provided by this convention related to the issue of the passing of property can be 
based existing articles: for example, the obligation of the seller to transfer the property in 
goods free from any right or claim not accepted by the buyer, under Articles 39 and 40; the 
passing of risk, regarded in a number of legal systems as the essential consequence of the 
passing of property, under Articles 78 to 82; the obligation of the buyer to pay the price 
(Article 49), and the obligation to preserve the goods and to bear the cost of preservation, 
which are subsidiary aspects (Articles 74 and 77) .48  
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In this regard it has been argued that, in order to be feasible, the CISG should not regulate 
every matter in international trade; it would be better served to leave some issues to the 
general principles and the rules of private international law.49 This is because international 
conventions are mostly concerned with limited issues.  However, it is essential that 
research is undertaken in order to establish the feasible conventions50, as such issues may 
lead to changes in domestic legal concepts, where states will make reservations towards the 
parts relating to these issues, leading to a non-ratification process.  
Under the CISG, unlike the national sale of goods law, the rights and obligations of the 
parties do not turn on the locus of property. In this respect, it has been said that the CISG 
adopts the same approach as the American Uniform Commercial Code51 which is heavily 
influenced by the Hague Convention, sharing similar concerns and situation. In The Hague 
Convention of 1964, relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods 
[hereafter ULIS], also excludes the issue of the passing of the property, where art (8) of the 
ULIS corresponds to art 4 of the CISG.52 This article states that:  
The present Law shall govern only the obligations of the seller and the buyer 
arising from a contract of sale. In particular, the present Law shall not, 
except as otherwise expressly provided therein, be concerned with the 
formation of the contract, nor with the effect which the contract may have on 
the property in the goods sold, nor with the validity of the contract or of any 
of its provisions or of any usage. 
 
The explanation in the similarities between the ULIS and the CISG given by Tunc can also 
provide support for such a view. Tunc states that there was no significant change between 
the provisions of the ULIS and those of the CISG on this issue, the commentary on art 8 of 
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the ULIS would also be applied to art 4 of the CISG. In other words, art 8 of the ULIS is a 
good cross reference to CISG art 4(b). CISG art 4(b) carried forward without change a 
concept related in ULIS article 8. The Tunc Commentary on this ULIS counterpart to 
article 4(b) can be regarded as equally applicable to the CISG .53 In other words, the 
passing of property, of course, remains a very important issue under CISG, but only for the 
purpose of determining the rights of the buyer and the obligations of the seller vis-a-vis 
third parties, and vice versa.54 Tetley has argued that art 4(b) was legitimised – at least in 
part - based on the inflated size of the CISG. Moreover, the Convention concerns itself 
with risk rather than property.55  
However, in an international context, where the transaction can rarely be performed 
instantly and normally requires a complex performance under the CISG,56 involving the 
carriage of the goods and related risks,57 the issue of the passing of ownership is strictly 
related to the risk of accidental loss or damage of the goods and to the problem of the 
allocation of such risk.58 The traditional rules hold the view that the risk of loss follows the 
property (res perit domino) - a principle which is accepted in many different legal systems. 
However, this link between the passing of property and the passing of risk seems to be 
broken in the CISG. While the issue of the transfer of property is left unregulated, it has 
provided for a regulation of the transfer of the risk of loss or damage of the goods 
separately from the issue of the passing of property59. Under these circumstances, certain 
commentators have argued that property was not a very useful tool for allocating 
entitlements in sales transactions. In particular the tendency to treat property as a collective 
concept has been criticised, which ascribes all the incidents of property to one of the 
parties and precludes a sensible distribution of risk and benefits during the transitional 
stage of the sale.60 
It is an extremely attractive paradox, and to a large extent only an apparent paradox - at 
least in view of the reasoning frequently set forth to justify the lack of a uniform regulation 
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of this matter.61 So much so, that some scholars believe that the differences in various legal 
systems regarding the transfer of property are “too large to bridge”,62 and  should take into 
account that rules vary largely in respect to many aspects of the contract of the sale of 
goods, including issues relating to the passing of property, such as the timing of the 
passing63 and warranty for quality, which is a most material factor related to the contract of 
the sale of goods, where a wide divergence exists between different domestic laws.  
Thus, from the foregoing, it can be understood that the CISG only governs the contractual 
effects of the transfer of property, and seems to exclude the proprietary effects; this serves 
to leave the rules on property open, especially in regard to the rights and obligations of the 
parties.64 It was regarded as neither possible to unify the rule on this point, nor was it 
regarded as necessary to do so.65 On the other hand, others have regarded it is as both 
possible and necessary to unify the rule on the passing of property in the international 
context under the CISG, as will be seen.66 Accordingly, the question still arises: is it 
possible - or might it be possible in the future - to unify the rule on the point of the passing 
of property?  
Unify the rules in the future? 
In relation to the international context, the most recent tendency in the regulation provided 
for international uniform commercial law, shows that those responsible for drafting such 
regulations have abandoned the target of reaching uniformity across different legal 
systems, and have instead adopted the more realistic view of creating a uniform set of rules 
specifically formed in order to govern international trades.67 This is reflected clearly in the 
lack of texts covering the passing of property, whether under the ULIS, or in the CISG.68 
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However, the emphasis of the debates should not be on the possibility or impossibility of 
unified rules on the passing of property under the CISG, since the relevant issue is a more 
practical and logical matter, rather than a question of theoretical possibility. Therefore, the 
opposing arguments mentioned above - which regard as impossible the idea of a unified 
rule on the transfer of property under the CISG - have been criticized as subjective, 
because there are in fact no standards available to judge whether a certain difference 
between any two legal systems on this point of law is “too large” or “too small”.  
Accordingly, it has been argued that even where there is a large gap/difference between 
systems of common law and civil law regarding certain remedies, it was in fact possible to 
unify the rule on this point under the CISG.69 For instance, the principles of the lex 
mercatoria (law merchant) have been accepted in the common law system for many 
generations,70 when the autonomous mercantile courts began to decline in relative 
importance and the lex mercatoria began to merge with common law, where it became an 
integral part of the common law.71  Lord Mansfield said that ‘The mercantile law is the 
same all over the world. For, from the same premises, the sound conclusions of reason and 
justice must universally be the same.’72 Some may even adopt a more optimistic view 
maintaining that the unification of the rule on the passing of property in the international 
context is possible. They consider that the adoption of a uniform solution for international 
trade is more feasible, since it does not impose a modification of domestic legal rules, 
especially on international trade, which has its own specific regulations, which to a large 
extent overcomes national borders and domestic legal rules.73  
However, leaving the gaps to be filled by non-binding rules such as the lex mercatoria has 
its own risk in achieving unified interpretation. In this respect uniform rules are certainly 
desirable, notably because other rules related to the passing of property are not provided 
for in the CISG, nor are they provided for in other international uniform law conventions, 
especially those concerning the retention of property.74 Consequently, uniform legislation 
in relation to the passing of property is possible, and should be achieved in the 
international context. As David has argued, ‘today the problem is not whether international 
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unification of law will be achieved; it is how it can be achieved’.75 In this context, some 
legal scholars have argued that the solution to be adopted is the one in accordance with the 
principle of delivery, on the basis of exclusion of the principle of consent.76  
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4.2.2 Principle of delivery and transfer of property under the CISG 
Under the principle of consent, requiring merely the consent to transfer property with an 
outcome that,77 subject to the appropriation of goods and parties’ agreement otherwise,78 
property often passes at the conclusion of the contract. However, the major distinction 
between the delivery principle and the consent principle is that the former requires an act 
of delivery of the goods for the transfer of property, unlike the principle of consent, which 
requires merely the consent to transfer the property, and thus the outcome is that property 
often passes at the conclusion of the contract79, subject to the appropriation of goods, 
where the property could be passed even without an act of delivery, and when the parties 
agree otherwise, in which case property passes according to such an agreement.80  
Indeed, in some countries, the passing of property is related to the physical delivery of 
goods. where property passes at the time of delivery unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise.81 This indicates that delivery does not form a compulsory requirement for the 
passing of property, since the parties may agree otherwise. Meanwhile, this can be 
interpreted as meaning that in the absence of agreement between the parties, property will 
pass at the time of delivery, signifying that the intention of the parties is necessary in order 
to determine the purpose of delivery and the passing of property.82  
 
Had the principle of delivery – a principle which has already been adopted by many legal 
systems83– been adopted, the interpretative issue could have been be avoided, on the 
grounds that in the CISG, risk passes at the time of delivery, which may create a balance 
regarding the issue of the link between the time of passing of risk and time of passing of 
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property and confirm that the transfer of property would occur at the same time as the 
delivery. Undoubtedly, this corresponds with the principle res perit domino, which is 
evidently contained in many legal systems, and would avoid what might be labelled   favor 
emptoris  
It should be noted that some rules are provided by the CISG regarding the passing of 
property. In the previously mentioned arts 39, 40, 49, 74, 77, 78, and 82, specific reference 
is made to the issue of the passing of property.84 Critically, although such provisions are 
linked to the passing of property, these provisions did not address the issue of timing of 
passing of property, whether explicitly or by implication.  
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, the adoption of the principle of delivery 
may allow a role to be played by the appropriation of goods, where, in practice, such 
appropriation often happens upon delivery. Thus, property often passes upon delivery, 
where the goods become ascertained.85 In other words, the goods could be appropriated 
unconditionally in different ways and one of these ways is delivery. Namely, specific 
goods, partially identified as coming from a designated bulk, are not considered 
‘ascertained’ until they have been separated from that bulk, which usually occurs through 
physical delivery. Appropriation can occur when the buyer's portion is physically isolated 
from the bulk. It may also occur through the withdrawal of the remaining portions owned 
by other buyers, and ascertainment by a process of exhaustion. It can also come about 
when the buyer purchases the remainder of the bulk, including his own unascertained 
portion.86 
Typically, the physical possession of goods and passing of property do not occur 
simultaneously under the consent principle, such as in English law, unless the parties agree 
otherwise, where the physical possession of goods can be transferred simultaneously with 
the property, if the parties intend to pass it, or in the case of the appropriation of goods, 
where property passes at the time of appropriation, when such appropriation occurs 
through delivery.87 This is in contrast to the principles of delivery, where it is generally the 
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case that the passing of property and the physical possession of goods occur 
simultaneously at the time of delivery.    
Indeed, even though there is a significant difference between the various legal systems 
regarding the time of passing of property, it is still possible to unify the rule on this point 
under the CISG. In fact, supporters of this view believe that the principle of delivery offers 
a solution which not only bridges such a gap, but is also clearer and less subject to 
exceptions. On the other hand, it is noticeable that the supporters of the principle of 
delivery clearly rely upon the advantages of such an idea as being best suited under CISG. 
In other words, the principle of delivery corresponds to the concept of the passing of risk, 
where property and risk could be passed at the same time on the grounds that the risk under 
CISG passes at the time of delivery.  
From the aforementioned, it can be said that, in spite of the variation of views and 
dichotomies in relation to the unification of the rules on the issue of the passing of 
property, the consensus is that the CISG does not govern the passing of property. While 
some scholars and the drafters of the CISG tend to assert that it is not possible to unify the 
rule on this point (nor was it regarded necessary to do), others disagree with them, 
stressing that possibility and necessity will see the eventual codification on the passing of 
property under CISG. In their view, the solution to be adopted is one in accordance with 
the principle of delivery, where they exclude the principle of consent, as it is not only 
inapplicable directly to most modern commercial transactions involving transfer of 
ownership, but an unhelpful and misleading distinction between validity among the parties 
to the contract can be undesirably implied.88  Nonetheless, this suggestion seems to be 
detached from the principle of party autonomy in contract law, therefore, it becomes 
necessary to focus on the legal nature of the CISG and its relationship to principle of party 
autonomy. 
4.3 Party autonomy principle and the basis of the CISG 
In this section, the examination will focus on whether party autonomy plays a role in filling  
the gap of the passing of property in the CISG. In order to understand the basis of the 
CISG, an in-depth legal analysis of some relevant provisions must be undertaken, 
especially those provisions related to the property issue, highlighting other domestic laws. 
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In fact, all the previously mentioned legal systems, whether based upon the principle of 
delivery or of consent, defer to the parties' contractual autonomy to regulate and determine 
the time at which the property passes from the seller to the buyer.89 The principle of 
freedom of contract is rooted primarily in the laissez faire doctrine - a doctrine which 
received support from Adam Smith.90 However, the modern freedom of contract is not 
without limitation.  There are several examples of legislative interference with the freedom 
of contract, and a wide range of legislation has been passed that altered the UK contract 
law in terms of how it incorporates the freedom of contract. Two examples of such 
legislation are  s17 of the SGA 1979 and the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977.91   
As discussed in the introduction, despite the limitations to party autonomy, in general, the 
parties are given the possibility to identify the time when the property will be deemed to 
have passed.  As a result, the principles of consent and delivery are merely a substitutional 
principle, not a dogma.92 In other words, the intention of the parties is the basic rule which 
takes precedence over principles of consent and delivery in the application. The 
importance of party autonomy is also reflected in the rule of delivery, where recourse to 
the intention of the parties is necessary in order to determine the purpose of a delivery and 
thereafter to determine the time of the passing of property. On the other hand, the delivery 
may not occur simultaneously with the intention of the parties to transfer property, which 
may occur separately; the parties may therefore intend to pass the property at a different 
time from the time of delivery.93   
It could be understood that, even under the legal systems that follow the principle of 
delivery, the parties in the contract have an absolute right to identify the time of delivery, 
as well as the time of the passing of property - whether through determining the time of a 
delivery according to the general rule, or separately from the time of delivery according to 
their intention in the terms of the contract of sale. Similarly, under English law,  s17 of the 
SGA states that the property passes when the parties intend it to pass. Hence, the intention 
of the parties is paramount and overrides any other rules.94 Thus, property of goods may 
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pass at the time of the conclusion of the contract, or at the time chosen by the parties 
(according to the intention of the parties).95 
It seems that most legal systems have adopted both these legal rules regarding the passing 
of property: a basic rule, which overrides any other rules in application, and a 
substitutional rule, which applies in the case of the absence of a basic rule. In other words, 
they have adopted the principle of the intention of the contracted parties. However, they 
have adopted different principles as to whether the principle of consent or the principle of 
delivery applies in the case of absence of any expressed indication regarding the intention 
between the parties with respect to the timing of the passing of property, regardless of 
which is considered the basic rule and which is the exception .  
However, due to the absence of a rule governing the passing of property, the situation 
under the CISG may be different. As seen above, all the interpretations are agreed that the 
CISG does not govern this issue. Consequently, the exclusion of the issue of the passing of 
property from the scope of the convention leaves gaps which must be filled in conformity 
with other provisions of CISG.  
 
4.3.1 Party autonomy principle under the CISG 
In order to answer the last question, we must further explore the analysis and interpretation 
of some relevant provisions under the CISG. The CISG is one type of international 
convention on the unification of substantial law, which has binding force upon the parties 
concerned – unless, of course, the parties in question have agreed to exclude the rules of 
the convention and incorporate or refer to different rules in their sales contract. In other 
words, when speaking of the binding force of the convention, it is worth bearing in mind 
some provisions of the CISG, led by art 6, where one should note that the application of 
the CISG has no mandatory force for the parties and is subject to the party autonomy 
principle96 as one of the important parts of the contract law, which is the first step to 
comply with party autonomy principle. This is because it allows parties to exercise 
bargaining power with freedom and flexibility to decide the terms of the contract to 
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achieve the best interest for both parties, either under the domestic laws or international 
laws.97 
Article 6 of the CISG states:  ‘The parties may exclude the application of this Convention 
or, subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provision.’ The 
convention is non-mandatory in nature, in the sense that parties who desire not to apply the 
provisions of the CISG upon their commercial relationships are expressly empowered by 
Article 6 to reject the convention in its entirety, or derogate from (or vary) the effect of any 
of its rules.98 Accordingly, where it allows, the parties may exclude the convention's 
application entirely or partially, or derogate from its provisions.99 In this sense, the relevant 
rules can be excluded by the parties’ choice of law, under art 7 (2). In addition, it is 
possible simply to reject the CISG without choosing an applicable law, where agreement 
between the parties becomes the basic rule. Namely, art 6 allows the parties not only to 
exclude the Convention but also "vary the effect" of its provisions.' Art 6 also enables 
parties to shape their own agreements according to their wishes. Practically, any rule of the 
Convention can be altered or rejected by the parties; further, by the Convention, the parties 
are given the freedom to derogate from the CISG, or from the rules provided for in their 
domestic legal system.100 
Indeed, it appears that one of the purposes of art 6 of the Convention is that it gives the 
parties absolute freedom to exclude the application of the convention, or derogate from or 
vary the effect of any of its provisions, by allowing the parties to exclude the convention 
entirely or partially (or, once again, derogate from its provisions). Moreover, it 
incorporates the principle of contractual freedom into its provisions as an essential 
principle; this may be attributed to art 6, which established one of the fundamental 
principles of the convention, namely, contractual freedom.101  
It is noteworthy that art 6 is not the only provision to emphasize party autonomy. Article 
19 further provides freedom to parties to negotiate the terms which would govern their 
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contract according to their intention, where art 19(1) stipulates: ‘A reply to an offer which 
purports to be an acceptance but contains additions, limitations or other modifications is a 
rejection of the offer and constitutes a counter-offer’102 and provides bargaining power to 
parties by letting them negotiate the terms of contract in line with their interest.  Article 19, 
in fact, sets requirements to form the enforceable contract, where one party proposes 
his/her intention, while the other party gives consent to what has been proposed if he/she 
satisfies it, otherwise it is possible negotiate different terms.103 Article 19 purports to give 
the parties absolute and unlimited power to agree and replace their own negotiations with 
each other.104 
It has been said that one of the greatest characteristics of the CISG is that it offers modern 
and flexible rules, and always allows for modification and/or exclusion. In this regard, 
Chief Justice Erle reported that, ‘every man is the master of the contract he may choose to 
make: and it is of the highest importance that every contract should be construed 
according to the intention of the contracting parties’.105 Support for this principle is found 
in the CISG, where the CISG gives greater significance and encourages the principle of 
freedom of contract, as it allows parties to opt in and out of its standards or even choose 
the application of an utterly different legal system.106  
In this sense, those who drafted the convention clearly acknowledged its non-mandatory 
nature; as a result, party autonomy plays a crucial role in international commerce.107 It can 
be understood that the CISG recognises that party autonomy is the essential principle.108 It 
could even be said that it has adopted the freedom of contract principle, as well as giving 
express recognition which serves to protect this right in the international sale of goods.109 
Clearly, arts 6 and 19 together create a freedom of contract principle under the CISG: 
while art 19 extends absolute freedom to the parties in order to negotiate the terms of 
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contract in line with their interests, art 6 gives the parties the freedom to reject the 
convention in its entirety or derogate from or vary the effect of any of its rules. 
However, such a relationship between arts 19 and 6 should be aligned to an interventional 
relationship between arts 4 and 6 of the CISG, where art 6 purports to give to the parties an 
absolute and unlimited power to vary the effect of the Convention by their agreement; 
whereas, on the other hand, art 4 makes it clear that, in the absence of contrary provision, 
the CISG does not affect any rule of domestic law dealing with the "validity" of a contract 
provision. Reading them together, arts 6 and 4 create a tripartite hierarchy, together with 
domestic law provided in article 7, with validity at the top, the agreement of the parties in 
the middle, and the Convention at the bottom. The domestic law on validity continues to 
control the agreement of the parties, and both control the Convention.110  
Nevertheless, art 7(2) of the CISG clearly shows that general principles can only be 
applied when issues are governed by the CISG but are not expressly settled by the CISG. 
Accordingly, it must ascertain whether or not a specific issue is governed by the CISG. 
Each case will have to be examined individually to ascertain whether or not art 7(2) of the 
CISG can be applied. Thus, if a matter is expressly outside the scope of application of the 
CISG, art 7(2) the CISG and the Convention’s general principles must not be referred to. 
This means that issues concerning the passing of property of the goods sold or issues 
concerning the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions are beyond the reach of 
"gap-filling" under art 7(2). Put simply, this is because art 4(2) CISG expressly put this 
issue outside the scope of the Convention.111  
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4.3.2 The issue of passing of property and party autonomy principle 
under the CISG:  
 
By parties’ choice of law 
 
It is notable that the principle of party autonomy plays a significant role within the passing 
of property, where such issues will ultimately be referred to the domestic sales law. Such 
chosen applicable laws may lead to the inapplicability of the Convention under art 6. 
Despite this, the parties still have freedom to identify the time of the passing of property 
based on the principle of party autonomy; as pointed out previously, most legal systems if 
not all, allow for contractual autonomy between the parties to regulate their contract by 
determining the time at which the property passes from the seller to the buyer.112 For 
instance, the property of goods will be passed at the time when the parties intend to pass, 
based on s17-1 of the SGA. 
Moreover, the parties also have absolute freedom to determine the exact timing of the 
transfer of ownership by choosing an applicable law which is consistent with their interest, 
whether at the time of delivery or at the time of making the contract.  
Party autonomy in an international sale of goods contract permits parties to choose the law 
of a particular country or sovereignty to govern their contract (where the contract involves 
two or more jurisdictions).113 It seems evident that the parties’ freedom must be recognized 
when determining applicable law to which the parties are willing to be subject, through 
either a choice of law clause in the contract or the preference of the parties.114 Namely, they 
have to choose the law in order to signal whether they intend to pass the property at the 
time of delivery, or adopt the consent principle, i.e. if they intend to pass the property at 
the time of making the contract. 
By parties’ choice  
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However, it is clear that, according to arts 6 and 19 of the CISG, that the domestic rules, 
whether the law chosen by the parties or according to private international law rules, is not 
the only remedy to determine the time of the passing property. In this sense, according to 
the articles mentioned above, the parties may exclude the convention's application entirely 
or partially or derogate from its provisions under art 6, in which case they have absolute 
freedom to negotiate the terms of contract and to determine the timing of the passing of 
property according to their intention and in line with their interests, under art 19 of the 
CISG.115  
Indeed, the intention of the parties seems to be the crucial factor with respect to 
determining the timing of the transfer of property from the seller to the buyer. It was 
stated in Koblenz  that the agreement would regulate property if the parties had reached 
an agreement. Therefore, according to the court, in the absence of the agreement and 
given the CISG’s exclusion of the issue of the passing of property, the applicable law 
has to be determined by parties’ intention, through conflict of laws rules.116 In other 
words, the party autonomy principle plays a significant role in such issues, where the 
parties have an absolute freedom to fill the gaps left by the CISG, including the freedom 
to choose the time when the property passes, whether in accordance to the principle of 
delivery, or the principle of consent, or even according to the intention of the parties, 
where the property may pass at the time intended by the parties.117  
 
From the foregoing, it can be said that, although the Convention expressly excludes the 
issue of the transfer of property, by art 4 (2), in the sense that there are no default rules 
regarding the issue of transfer of property to derogate from it or vary its effect, 
nevertheless, according to arts 6 and 19, it is still possible for the parties, with or without a 
chosen applicable law, to fill in such gaps left open by the CISG and to determine the 
timing of the passing of property according to their own intention. This is simply because 
the freedom of contract principle exists in contract law, and no provision in the Convention 
prevents the parties from shaping the agreement according to their wishes/interests.  
It could be understood that the legal basis of the CISG may signify that property in goods 
can be passed according to the intention of the parties, where the intention of the parties is 
the main factor in identifying the time of the passing of property. Consequently, property 
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passes at such times as both parties agree for it to pass. Accordingly, it can be said that, 
although art 4(2) expressly excludes the issue of the transfer of property from the scope of 
the application of the convention, it seems that the CISG covered the issue of the passing 
of property by ensuring it was implicit in the party autonomy principle. 
To summarise, the exclusion of the issue of the passing of property by art 4(2) left the 
remedy of such an issue open, and, in many cases, the remedies rely on the intention of the 
parties involved. Furthermore, arts 6 and 19 gave the parties an absolute freedom to 
identify the terms of their contract, including the ability to determine the time at which the 
property is transferred from the seller to the buyer. It is worth noting that, despite the basic 
idea of party autonomy, certain limits upon the party autonomy doctrine and the issue of 
appropriation must be taken into account.118 In the issue of appropriation, apart from the 
potential complications between party autonomy and the various interpretations on the 
timing of the passing of specific property under domestic laws, party autonomy may be 
further complicated by the passing of unascertained goods, where the goods have not yet to 
be appropriated.  In other words, with the absence of any indication in the CISG regarding 
such an issue, the question which arises is whether the property could pass in such cases 
where the goods are unascertained, based on the intention of the parties? Unlike most 
domestic laws, including English law, which prevents the transfer of property from the 
seller to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained,119 the situation in the CISG 
seems to be different, in the sense that the domestic laws cover the passing of property in 
detail - including the issue of the passing of property in the case of unascertained goodsbut 
the CISG disregards this issue in its entirety. 
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4.4 Conclusion  
By undertaking a comparative analysis between English law and the CISG, it is clear that, 
as seen, the property of goods under English law passes from the seller to the buyer 
according to the intention of the parties or, in the absence of such intention, at the same 
time as the contract is made. The research undertaken in Chapter Three showed that the 
provision of s16 of SGA prevents the transfer of property from the seller to the buyer 
unless the goods are ascertained. Namely, it restricts the transfer of ownership and makes it 
only apply to ascertained goods, which appears to be a mandatory provision120. In other 
words, English statutory law adopts the party autonomy principle as a basic rule, at the 
same time providing substitutional provision as exemplified in the principle of consent, 
while both principles are subject to the rule of s16 of SGA, where the goods must be 
ascertained. 
However, the current chapter has demonstrated that the key distinction between English 
law and the CISG lies in the substitutional rule. In other words, while English law provides 
a substitutional rule, which applies in the case of absence of any indication regarding the 
intention between the parties with respect to the timing of the passing of property, the 
CISG expressly excludes this issue by art 4(2) and leaves the remedy of such issues wide 
open and depending upon the intention of the parties. Put simply, the CISG does not 
provide any substitutional or detailed provision to govern the issue of the passing of 
property, whether in relation to specified or unascertained goods. Conversely, on the issue 
of risk, it covers such issues and provides detailed provisions to govern the passing of risk 
whether in relation to specific or unascertained goods, as will be seen in arts 66 to 70, 
examined in Chapter Six, which provide explicit rules on the time of the passing of risk, 
stipulating that such risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly ascertained.  
According to this logic it is possible for the parties to pass the property of unascertained 
goods, where they reject CISG, without any applicable law agreed with the parties to shape 
their own agreements according to their wishes.121 In short, there is no provision in the 
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Convention which prevents the parties in the contract from agreeing to pass the property, 
even if the said goods are unascertained. This may be avoided by adoption of the principle 
of delivery, where the goods could be appropriated unconditionally through the act of 
delivery.122 On the other hand, it seems to be impossible to assume the passage of property 
in unascertained goods through the principle of consent or principle of intention of the 
parties; this is simply because the rules of domestic laws may prevent transfer of property 
from the seller to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. 
Thus, though the Convention and most domestic laws - including English law - come 
together with regard to the principle of party autonomy, they differ on the issue of the 
substitutional rule. In this sense, there seems to be no significant difference between the 
legal nature of the Convention and that of English law, where both have adopted the party 
autonomy principle in order to determine the time of the transfer of property. However, the 
difference lies in relation to the substitutional rule, where English law - and most other 
domestic laws – have incorporated such a rule in their provisions in order to avoid 
complications arising in relation to the passing of property in unascertained goods, as well 
as the cases where the parties’ intention is absent. 
Hence, the answers to such unresolved issues under the CISG seem to have to rely on the 
legal effects of the substitutional rule, or at least highlighting unascertained goods, as 
English law has done. Such difficulties could be avoided and the passing of property may 
be regulated under the Convention implicitly on the grounds that the principle of party 
autonomy is the basic rule allowing the property of goods to be transferred to the buyer at 
such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. In the absence of any 
such intention between the parties, conflict of law rules will be applied to determine the 
applicable rules, and consequently the timing of the passing of property will be determined 
in accordance with the rules of the applicable domestic law, which will revert to the 
delivery principle, the consent principle or even in accordance with the party autonomy 
principle as examined in this chapter.    
 It is important to determine if the property in the goods has passed to the buyers in their 
respective situations and with which party  the risk is present. Therefore, it is necessary 
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to discuss the issue of passing of risk along with the issue of passing of property, 
because of the close link between them.  
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Chapter 5 – Passing of risk under the English law 
5.1 Introduction 
The passing of property cannot be understood fully without considering the issue of the 
passing of risk in the property involved in the sale of goods contract. In a contract of sale, 
the exact time when the passing of risk takes place is very important to the parties under 
contract, because, in most cases, it determines who bears the consequences should there be 
any loss or damage. Generally, risk can be understood to describe the position of the party 
who bears the risk when goods are lost or damaged. In other words, when one party within 
the contract is discharged from having to perform his obligations, the other bears the risk. 
However, determining which party is bearing the risk, depends on knowing the actual 
timing of the passing of risk. Apparently, the general principle in English law is that the 
risk of accidental loss or damage falls on the owner of the goods, in the sense that the risk 
passes at the same time as the property. However, in special circumstances the SGA 
provides that risk does not always follow ownership directly, so that some other person 
besides the owner may have to cover the cost of accidental loss or damage. 
Nevertheless, this rule can be modified, and passing of property and passing of risk may be 
separated by agreement between the parties. That means that passing of risk is a matter of 
intention. Under s20 (1), the goods remain at the seller’s risk until property is transferred to 
the buyer. This rule applies irrespective of which party has possession of the goods. 
However, the general rule will not apply where the parties have agreed when risk should 
pass.1 Based on this, further complications may arise in circumstances where the parties 
intend, explicitly or implicitly, to pass the risk before the property,2 even if the goods 
remain unascertained, based on s.17 and s 20 (1), as will be discussed later.  
5.2 The basic rule- “unless otherwise agreed” or “risk being 
passed with the property”? 
Section 20 (1) of the SGA 1979 states: Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the 
seller's risk until the property in them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in 
                                                 
1 S. 20 (1) SGA, 1979 
2 S.17 SGA, 1979 
Chapter 5   
 
105 
 
them is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether the delivery has 
been made or not. As a general rule, the prima facie risk of loss transfers with the property. 
Namely, if the goods are damaged or lost before the property has passed, the seller bears 
the risk. Following the same rule, the risk falls upon the buyer when the property passes, 
irrespective of whose actual possession the goods were in at the time.  
In principle, as explained above, English law links the passing of risk to the passing of 
property. as provided in s20-1. However, the parties may, by agreement, separate the 
passing of risk from the passing of property and an argument departing from the general 
rule indicating that one party should bear the risk may be inferred from their transaction or 
by usage. Although risk can be transferred before or after the property changes hands, the 
goods must be specified or easily ascertained.3 In other words, if there is an agreement 
between the parties which stipulates that one of them is to bear the loss or damage of risk - 
even if he or she has no possession of the property4 (for example, in cases where the seller 
reserves the right of disposal) - the priority must be given to the terms of agreement.5   
Thus, as with the questions examined in Chapters Three and Four, questions arise as to 
whether “unless otherwise agreed” or “risk being passed with the property” is the basic 
rule; i.e. why English law links the passing of risk to the passing of property, and why 
English law does not leave the timing in relation to the passing of risk to the parties 
involved. 
In terms of the first question, the wordings of the SGA appear to be sufficiently wide and 
detailed, in the sense that, where there is an express or implied agreement that means one 
party is to bear the risk according to the agreement made between the parties, even though 
he has no property. In other words, the precedence undoubtedly must be given to the 
agreement. Nevertheless, in the absence of an agreed time in relation to the passing of risk, 
the general rule of s20-1 will be applied and the risk therefore passes with the property, 
namely, the risk of accidental loss or damage falls on the owner of the goods. This means 
the English statutory law adopts the principle of res perit domino. The rule of res perit 
domino is, in fact, generally an unbending rule of law, arising from the very nature of 
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property6. Thus, it could be understood that English law gives precedence to the intention 
of the parties over any other rule. This makes it more flexible with respect to the passing of 
risk. In addition, the term “unless otherwise agreed’’ is clearly expressed in s20.  
Accordingly, the rule of res perit domino constitutes a general rule, but the intention of the 
parties remains the cornerstone regarding the timing in relation to the passing of risk.  On 
the other hand, the lack of agreement between the parties on the timing of the passing of 
risk can be objectively interpreted as implying that the parties intend to follow s20-1 and to 
have the risk being passed at the same time as the passing of property- so their silence can 
be implicitly  understood as an implied intention to pass the risk at the time as the passing 
of property. 
The issue of the passing of risk, according to the provision of s20-1, appears to be linked to 
the rules of ss17 and 18 of the SGA.7 Put simply, when such rules govern the passing of 
property, so long as the risk follows, the property will be passed intuitively, according to 
the rules underpinning the passing of property. In analysis, it seems that s20 does not 
provide any new rule; it apparently refers the issue of timing in relation to the passing of 
risk to the rules on the passing of property contained in s17 and s18 of the SGA. This 
interpretation is evident in Pignataro v Gilroy,8  where the defendants sold 140 bags of rice 
to the plaintiff. The goods were unascertained by description, and the particular bags 
required to satisfy the contract were not then ascertained; the plaintiff was told that 125 
bags would be delivered at Chambers' Wharf, and that the remaining 15 bags would be 
delivered to the defendants' place of business. The plaintiff sent a cheque to meet the price 
of the goods, and asked for a delivery order as arranged. On the following day, the 
defendants wrote to the plaintiff enclosing a delivery order for only 125 bags from 
Chambers' Wharf, and stating that the 15 bags were ready for delivery. However, the 
defendants failed to send the 15 bags, which had been stolen some time shortly before that 
agreed date of delivery.  On the issue whether the property of 15 bags of rice became the 
property of the buyer, the court, relying on “risk being passed with the property”, found for 
the plaintiff upon the grounds that the subject-matter of the sale had involved 
unascertained goods and there was no evidence of appropriation by either party with the 
assent of the other, and that, consequently, the property had not passed to the plaintiff at 
the time of the loss. Hence, the seller bore the risk.  
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However, Rowlatt J of the Divisional Court focused on the element of assent and stated 
that, under the above contract, it would be the duty of the sellers to appropriate the goods 
to the contract; and if such appropriation were assented to, expressly or impliedly by the 
buyer, the property would have passed. In the current case, the implied assent was 
considered by Rowlatt J. He pointed out that when the seller received the cheque for the 
goods and was asked for a delivery order it was right and proper for them to appropriate 
and place at the disposal of the buyer the goods for which he thus paid in order to 
effectuate a delivery or its equivalent concurrently with the receipt of the money. They did 
send a delivery order for the goods at Chambers' Wharf, and as to the 15 bags, told the 
plaintiff that they were ready, and asked that they should be taken away. It might well be 
contended that not only as regards the goods covered by the delivery order, but also as 
regards the goods at the defendants' own premises, which they told the plaintiff were ready 
to be taken away, there was an appropriation, to which, by asking for the delivery order, 
the plaintiff had assented in advance. Rowlatt J held that assent can be implied or 
expressed. The possibility of an implied assent was overlooked by the county court. As the 
assent can be implied, the 15 bags of rice were appropriated and the property passed to the 
buyer, thus the risk passed to the buyer as well. 
It is not clear whether the judge reached his judgment on the grounds that the subject 
matter involved the sale of unascertained goods, and that, consequently, as the property 
had not passed to the buyer, nor had the risk. In contrast, applying the same provision, 
Rowlatt J reached a completely different conclusion and stated that: ‘Under the above 
contract it would be the duty of the sellers to appropriate the goods to the contract; and if 
such appropriation were assented to, expressly or impliedly, by the buyer, the property 
would have passed when they received the cheque for the goods and were asked for a 
delivery order.’ It is noticeable that the subject matter in this case is who will bear the risk 
of stolen goods. However, the discussion was focused upon the question of whether the 
property has been passed or not according to the rules of passing of property, without 
discussing the question of the risk. This explains, without any doubt, that the issue of the 
passing of risk in s20 is based on and linked to the rules pertaining to the passing of 
property – that is, the rules detailed in s16, s17 and 18. Thus, while s20 ostensibly governs 
the process of passing of risk, an in-depth analysis reveals that the rules governing the 
issue of the passing of risk are the same rules as that governing the issue of the passing of 
property, as Pignataro has demonstrated.  
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Therefore, when Rowlatt J decided that the goods must be appropriated and assented by 
the buyer in order to pass the property, the risk is interpreted as being passed consequently. 
Corresponding with s16 of the SGA which prevents the transfer of property until the goods 
are ascertained, the risk will be passed simultaneously with property, where the passing of 
property occurred according to s17 and s18 of the SGA.  
Practically, it seems that s20 is no more than just an illustrative article and refers to the 
rules of passing of property. In other words, it is only a presumptive one, so any statutory 
reform that links the risk without the property would yield modest improvements in 
practice.9 Critically, there is a distinction between the passing of property and the delivery 
of physical possession of goods. Therefore, the seller may be in possession of goods 
although the property and risk have passed to the buyer.10  
It seems that the general rule of s20 is an unfair rule on the buyer because sometimes the 
buyer could bear the risk of goods and at the same time the seller is still at possession of 
them. However, one must understand that the general rule stated in s20-1 of the SGA 1979 
should not be read alone and is subject to the qualifications contained in sub-ss (2) and (3), 
meaning that sub-sections (2) and (3) are really specific examples of the general principle 
that the passing of risk is to do with the allocation of the risk of damage which is not the 
fault of either party. It may modify subsection (1) and provide a balance between the 
parties. The most important example of this is where the risk is on one party, but the other 
party is in possession of the goods and fails to take good care of them. Accordingly, the 
party who is in possession of goods must take care of goods even when the property and 
risk have been passed to the other party. It is worth noting that the determination of risk 
can be different in the case of delayed delivery from what it would otherwise have been.11   
Although the general rule res perit domino is a prima facie rule; there seem certain cases 
and possibilities where risk may pass at a different time from the property. In other words, 
where it is expressed by “unless otherwise agreed”. It is therefore possible to make 
provisions in the contract of sale to determine that risk passes at a different time from the 
property. Undoubtedly, phrase “unless otherwise agreed” points to the party autonomy 
principle. Accordingly, it could be passed before or after the property has been passed, 
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according to an agreement of the parties, as will be seen. Moreover, in some cases the risk 
may pass at a different time from the property, even in cases where there is no expressed or 
implied agreement.12 
5.3  Exceptions to the Default Rule 
In certain cases, exceptions from the general rule, where the risk may pass separately from 
the property, can be allowed to remain in the absence of any expressed or implied 
agreement between the parties. The risk however, may pass exceptionally to the general 
rule; this can be inferred by the authorities (court) from the circumstances of the case. 
Although English statutory law does not indicate that the risk may pass separately from the 
property in the absence of any expressed or implied agreement between the parties, it is 
clear that the principle has been adopted in the common law.  
5.3.1 Buyer’s immediate right and interest may overwrite the default 
rule and assent – risk may pass before the passing of property  
In common law, the risk may pass before or after the property has passed, according to 
various cases involving the effects of immediate interest. In the case of Sterns V. Vickers,13 
the defendants sold the plaintiffs 120,000 gallons of white spirit, which was part of a larger 
quantity then lying in a certain tank belonging to a storage company. They and later 
handed the buyers a delivery warrant, in which the company undertook to deliver that 
quantity of the spirit according to the buyer’s order. Subsequent to the buyer’s acceptance 
of that warrant and before the quantity purchased had been separated from the bulk, the 
spirit in the tank deteriorated in quality. It was determined that the property did not pass, 
on the grounds that the goods were still unascertained goods. 
Shearman J decided that the goods were still unascertained goods and so long as the 
property did not pass to the buyer, then the risk supposed to be borne by the seller. 
Obviously, the grounds of this judgment in relation to the passing of property accords with 
the general rule relating to the passing of risk. In fact, according to the general rule in 
relation to the passing of risk, the questions to be discussed in the present case are whether 
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13 Sterns V. Vickers [1923] 1 K.B. 78 
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the property in the undivided portion of the larger bulk had been passed to the buyer and 
whether there was any agreement between the parties regarding the passing of risk?  
It is clear that there was no evidence of any such agreement in this case. The goods 
remained unascertained and the buyer did not wish to take delivery at that time, but made 
his own arrangements for further storage with the company, and paid them storage rent. 
Having left the spirit in storage for some months, he subsequently found that the spirit in 
the tank had deteriorated in quality. Based on s20 -2 in the SGA, no property had passed to 
the buyer, hence it could be assumed no risk had passed.  
Nevertheless, the judgement of Shearman J. was reversed by the Court of Appeal, which 
found that the risk had passed to the buyers, and the loss must be borne by them. Such a 
view was subsequently upheld by the House of Lords. Lord Normand stated that the risk 
was actually passed to the buyer without the property, due to the fact that the buyers 
indirectly paid for the storage rent and this meant they had an immediate interest in it. The 
action of paying for the storage acted as the catalyst to allow the buyers rather than the 
seller a practical and immediate interest in the goods. Thus, the acceptance of the delivery 
warranty by the buyer in the present case was regarded as the crucial factor, since it was 
this that gave the buyer an immediate right and interest to the possession of the goods even 
though the property had not yet passed.14 It is clear that the Court of Appeal relied on the 
acceptance of the delivery warranty by the buyer, stating that  as the buyer had accepted 
the delivery warranty he was bound to take reasonable care of the goods or bear the risk.  
However, acceptance of the delivery warrant and possession by the buyer cannot be 
considered as actual delivery in all circumstances , because it would mean that the property 
passed to the buyer on the grounds that the goods became ascertained goods by action of 
delivery; as we have seen, risk would pass as well. However, the court did not address this 
issue but relied upon acceptance of the delivery warranty as an exceptional circumstance in 
the passing of risk before the property.  
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5.3.2 Seller’s absolute warranty may overwrite the default rule and 
assent – risk may pass after the passing of property  
From the foregoing analysis, it can be observed that the risk may pass before the property, 
regardless of whether the goods are specific or unascertained. Indeed, as it is difficult to 
see how the goods remain at the buyers' risk when he has neither the property nor 
possession,15 similarly, it is not easy to imagine circumstances in which the risk remains 
with the seller after the property has passed to the buyer in the absence of an expressed 
agreement relating to the passing of risk.16 s20 states that the risk prima facie passes at the 
same time as the property; consequently, according to the general rule, the buyer would 
bear the loss of risk which occurred before he disapproved them.17  
Nevertheless, the common law provided a different opinion, where the risk could pass after 
the property, which can be seen in Head v Tattersall.18 The contract of sale stated that the 
horse was warranted to have been hunted with the Bicester hounds, and that if it did not 
answer to its description the buyer should be at liberty to return it by the evening of a 
specified date. The horse did not answer to its description, as it had never hunted with the 
Bicester hounds. It was returned by the date named and the court found that the buyer was 
induced by the warranty to buy the horse, and that the injury sustained by the horse was not 
caused through any negligence or default of the buyer's servant. Obviously, the property of 
the horse has been passed to the buyer, without any express agreement related to the 
passing of risk. This means that the risk should be passed as well, according to the general 
rule; however, in this case, the court held that the risk must be borne by the seller.  
According to the court, the seller warranted the goods, which gives the buyer the right to 
return the horse, according to the subsequent condition in the contract. In the contract, 
there was an express condition in the contract giving the buyer an absolute right, under 
certain circumstances, to return the horse. Therefore, the buyer was entitled to recover the 
costs, while the seller must therefore bear the loss. 
                                                 
15 Comptoir d'Achat et de Vente du Boerenbond Belge S/A v. Luis de Ridder Limitada (The Julia), 1949 
A.C. 293 (1949) 
16 (n 3 )365 
17 Ibid ,307. 
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In this case, the seller’s warranty, in the form of an express condition in the contract, gave 
the buyer an absolute right to return the horse. Because of this absolute right, the court held 
that the risk did not pass to the buyer until he was satisfied with the fulfilment of the 
warranty. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the seller had accepted to bear liability for the 
horse if it did not answer to its description, and that could be understood as an implied 
agreement between the parties that the seller would be liable to bear all the consequences 
of the contract of sale, including the risk. In other words, the warrant note serves as an 
implied agreement in risk passing.  
The researcher agrees that it was logical for the court to hold that the risk did not pass to 
the buyer, according to the fact of existing agreement between the parties. In support of 
that, the Scottish Law Commission reported that the common law provides that such risk 
passes to the buyer at the date when there is a binding contract for sale (when the buyer is 
satisfied with the goods) and not when he acquires ownership of the property, which might 
take place at a future time.19  
Although both Vickers and Tatterall reached the same conclusion, namely, that the risk 
passes at a different time from the property, Vickers adopted the principle that acceptance 
of the delivery warranty by the buyer was evidence of the passing of risk, while Tattersall 
adopted the circumstance of the risk of warranted goods to be revisited, and held that the 
risk remains with the seller even if the property has passed to the buyer. Indeed, Vickers 
concluded that the risk passed to the buyer before the property, when he accepted the 
delivery warranty. In other words, the buyer would assume the risk even when the property 
had not been passed due to the goods being unascertained.  
 
Some problems which arose in this case are closely related to the difficulties arising with 
respect to the passing of property; namely, the assumption that the sale of goods in this 
case involved the sale of unidentified parts of an identified bulk. This issue was addressed 
in the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, which allows the property in an unidentified 
part of an identified bulk to be passed to the buyer who has paid for some or all of goods 
forming part of an identified bulk. In fact, in the sale of an unidentified part of an identified 
bulk, it can never be held that the risk passes before the property in the sale of such 
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unascertained goods, otherwise the passing of property and therefore, passing of risk, is 
still governed by s18 Rule 5 as discussed earlier.20  
The timing in these cases may also shed light on the discrepancy between the common law 
rules and s20-1 of the SGA. In the case of Vickers, where it was held that the risk (without 
the property) had passed to the buyer, it was because the buyer rather than the seller was 
seen to have an immediate and practical interest in the goods; as, for example, when he had 
an immediate right under the storekeeper’s delivery warrant to the delivery of a portion of 
an undivided bulk in the store, or an immediate right under several contracts with different 
persons to the whole of a bulk not yet appropriated to the several contracts. The same 
conclusion must be drawn by English law, but on a different basis, which is the passing of 
risk with property, according to s20 and s20A, which may be referred to the fact that the 
case occurred before the promulgation of that act. However, in Tattersall the property 
passed while the risk remained with the seller, on the grounds that the warranty of goods 
by the seller was an express condition – thus the same conclusion was drawn in English 
law but on a different basis, which is that risk can pass according to the implied agreement 
between the parties, because they have an absolute right to agree and determine the time 
when the risk will pass.  
 
5.4 Intention of the parties to pass the risk and the legal nature 
of the rule of res perit domino principle under the SGA 
It is important to understand the basic rules which govern the process surrounding the 
passing of risk from the seller to the buyer in a transaction. It seems that the English 
statutory law adopts the principle of res perit domino with regards to the time in which 
transfer of risk takes place. Consequently, as general rule, the prima facie risk of loss 
transfers with the property. Namely, if the goods are damaged or lost before the property 
has passed, the seller bears the risk and vice versa.  
However, the point which should be discussed is relevant to the term of ‘unless otherwise 
agreed’ set out in s20 of the SGA. The concept of ‘unless otherwise agreed’ actually 
means that the parties within the contract have an absolute right to agree upon the time in 
which the passing of risk takes place.  
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Accordingly, it can be observed that the passing of risk may be governed by more than one 
rule: according to these criteria, English statutory law appears to be a mixed system, and 
one which does not strictly follow the res perit domino rule. As already pointed out, it 
appears that the risk could pass with the property at that point when the property passes to 
the buyer, or at a different time, according to the agreement existing between the parties. 
With an express or implied agreement otherwise than the basic rule, one party may bear the 
risk according to the agreement, even though the property is not in their possession. In the 
absence of such an agreement determining the time in relation to the passing of risk, the 
rule of s20-2 will be applied and the risk therefore passes with the property. However, the 
question which arises in this context is whether any of these rules represent the general and 
basic rule. Put another way, which of them is the principle and which the exception? 
The difference is, in fact, clear regarding the basic rule surrounding the passing of risk. It 
has been noted that the basic rule is that the owner of the property bears the risk, according 
to s20-2 of the SGA, res perit domino; the presumption, therefore, is that the risk and 
property pass together.21 However, others have relied on the same section but reached a 
different conclusion, when they said that the basic rule is that the risk passes at the time 
agreed upon by the parties, where the parties may agree to separate the passing of risk from 
the passing of property, s20-1 of the SGA 1979.22   
In more detail, s20-2 of the SGA 1979 connects risk with passing of property.23  If the sale 
does not involve carriage of goods, risk may be summarized according to the rules of 
passing of property, where property passes then the risk will pass at the same time.  
Nevertheless, the situation will be different according to part one of s20-1, (unless 
otherwise agreed) where the parties agree to passes the risk at different time. In other 
words, in a shipment contracts such as in CIF contracts risk may pass on shipment or as 
from shipment and is commonly separated from property, as property may not pass before 
                                                 
21 Benjamin's Sale of Goods (8th Edition edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010). P302.See also, Fidelma 
White & Robert Bradgate, Commercial Law (Blackstone Legal Practice Course Guide) (Exford 
University Press, Exford UK OX2 6DP 2007)P180. Also see Andreas Alsterberg '  Transfer of risk In sale 
of goods on shipment terms' (2006/2007)(Maritime Law) 18 
22 Prof. Tetley, William, Q.C. Sale of Goods-The Passing of Title and Risk. Faculty of Law 
McGill University. See also Dionysios Flambouras, 'Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving 
Carriage of Goods: A Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods ' ((2001)) VI 87-149. Number 39 
23 Martineau v Kitching(1872) LR 7 QB 436, 456 
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appropriation and in many cases appropriation takes place on dispatch of notice of 
appropriation or on arrival of the ship24or may passes on tender of the shipping documents.  
Moreover, the rule that risk in transit loss in shipment sales passes on or as from shipment 
according to intention of the parties, appears to allow the seller to passes the risk in goods 
which have been lost or damaged before property passes25. Similarly, in FOB contracts 
property is separated from risk. Then the risk will be passed according to intention of the 
parties, separately from property.26  
Although both opinions rely upon the same section, they differ with respect to determining 
the basic rule relating to the passing of risk. The first view relies on the second part of s20, 
which provides that goods remain at the seller's risk until the property in them is 
transferred to the buyer, but when the property in them is transferred to the buyer the 
goods are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has been made or not. Namely, this view 
adopts the rule of res perit domino, where the risk passes with the property. On the other 
hand, the first part of s20 also states unless otherwise agreed, which can then be 
interpreted as a principle and assumed as basic rule in which the parties can agree when the 
risk shall pass. They have the absolute right to select the time when the risk passes; and 
this could occur before or after the time at which the property passes.27 
Atiyah maintains that, if there is an express agreement that one party is to bear the risk, 
even though he has no property, the effect must undoubtedly to be given to the agreement, 
but in the absence of such an express contract the rule res perit domino, generally 
speaking, is an unbending rule of law arising from the very nature of property. Thus, there 
is nothing peculiar about separating the transfer of risk from the transfer of property.28 
Actually, the intention of the parties appears clearly where the parties intend to pass the 
risk of goods at a particular time; thud, the parties can separate the passing of risk and 
property.  
                                                 
24 Benjamin’s Sale of Goods, 5th Edn., Sweet and Maxwell, (1997),  19-082 
25  Debattista, Charles.The Sale of Goods Carried by Sea. (Second ed. London : Butterworths.  1998) ,74 
26 Dionysios Flambouras, 'Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A 
Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ' ((2001)) VI 87-149.  http://www.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio  
27 Paul Dobson, Sale of Goods and Consumer Credit (6th edn Sweet & Maxwell Limited, London UK 
2000),45 
28 P.S. Atiyah, John N. Adams; with sections on Scots law by Hector MacQueen, Atiyah’s Sale of goods, 
(Harlow: Longman, Twelfth edition 2010 ),343 
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The link between risk and property under English statutory law applies unless the parties 
agree otherwise. Therefore, the second part of s20 of SGA cannot apply to the sales 
contracts on shipment terms, where the parties of the contract are contracting 
autonomously and make special provisions in their contract whereby a risk may pass 
separately from the property.29 Certainly, where the parties agree that the risk passes to the 
buyer on shipment contracts, the priority will be given to the intention of the parties, and 
the risk will be supposed to have been passed according to their agreement, and then the 
buyer would bear the risk of any loss or damage which precedes the contract under which 
he bought the goods.  
In other words, where the goods are sold on shipment terms and are lost or damaged after 
shipment but before property in identifiable goods passes to a particular buyer through 
ascertainment and appropriation, the rule in shipment sales would appear to put the risk of 
transit loss or damage onto the buyer, who would need to look elsewhere for his remedy, if 
any, for such loss or damage.30  
In practice, this can be seen clearly in the case of Inglis v. Stock,31  where the seller agreed 
to sell 200 tons of sugar of a certain description to the plaintiff,  to be shipped from 
Hamburg to Bristol on a FOB basis, and also made a similar contract for the sale of sugar 
to another Bristol merchant. Forwarding agents at Hamburg shipped about 400 tons of 
sugar of the description contracted for in 3900 bags, and consigned the same to “order 
Bristol”. The plaintiff did not appropriate specific bags of sugar to any particular contract 
at the time of shipment. Later, the entire consignment was lost during the voyage, before 
the goods became appropriated, and the buyer shouldered the risk under the terms of FOB.  
Reviewing this decision, it is worth noting that, had the contract been for specific goods, 
no issue would have arisen, because the property would be supposed to have passed, which 
would mean the risk had passed as well. However, as the goods were unascertained, the 
property could not have passed by the time the damage occurred. It is clear that the passing 
of property was postponed because the cargo was part of unascertained goods.  
In analysis, the goods remain unascertained, which means that the property did not pass to 
the buyer. Consequently, according to the res perit domino rule of s20 of the SGA, it can 
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be assumed that the risk did not pass to the buyer as either, on the basis that the property 
and risk should pass at the same time. However, in the present case the court ruled that the 
risk had been passed to the buyer before the property; it is clear, however, that such a 
judgment does not comply with the rule of res perit domino, where the risk passes with the 
property. Nevertheless, it does comply with the rule of part one of s20 of SGA which states 
unless otherwise agreed, with the intention of the parties to pass the risk from shipment 
even if the property has not passed. 
 In other words, the choice of employing an ordinary FOB contract can be seen as a case of 
“unless otherwise agreed”, as the parties make special provisions in their contract whereby 
a risk may pass on shipment. Thus, regardless of whether the property has passed to the 
buyer or not, a seller would not be responsible for any damages or losses after delivering 
the goods over a ship’s rail in such a type of shipping contract. 
From the previous analysis, it would appear that the court gave effect to the parties’ 
intention where they agreed to pass the risk on shipment according to the FOB terms. The 
parties’ intention supersedes any other rules, such as res perit domino, since it could be 
viewed as the basic rule in relation to the passing of risk under FOB contract. Moreover, 
according to any agreement between the parties, risk can clearly pass before the property, 
where the goods are specific or ascertained. Therefore, in principle, goods should be 
ascertained before risk passes.  
However, such a principle may not be necessarily the case. In certain situations, the risk for 
goods not yet separated from bulk may be passed notwithstanding that the property is still 
vested in the seller.32 In this sense, despite an ordinary CIF contract, risk passes on 
shipment to the buyer when property in them passed, or as from shipment. This rule 
indicates two different methods of passing of risk under the CIF contract. The first one is 
that, when the seller has completed his contractual duty on CIF terms and delivered the 
goods on board the vessel, and then risk passes to the buyer on shipment. The second one 
is that the seller bought the goods which are already afloat; on this ground, he can make the 
goods subject of the contract with the buyer, in which case  the risk passed “as from 
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shipment.” In this sense, it can be said that risk passed before the shipment, because of the 
intention of the parties.33  
The issue arising in this context is whether the parties agreed that the risk would be passed 
to the buyer before the property, presuming that the goods are specific goods, or 
sufficiently identifiable as those to which the risk relates, or, if they were for the sale of 
unascertained goods, that the goods should become ascertained before the risk passes. 
However, such a presumption is not necessarily the case, because the risk in goods not yet 
ascertained or separated from bulk may be passed to the buyer, despite the property in the 
goods still resting with the seller.34  
This can be seen in Sterns v. Vickers35where the goods remained unascertained and the 
Court of Appeal held that whether the property in the undivided portion of the larger bulk 
had passed or not upon the acceptance of the delivery warrant, the risk had passed to the 
buyers, and thus the loss must be borne by them. According to this view, the buyer bears 
the risk for goods according to the implied agreement between the parties at the point when 
the buyer accepts the delivery note.36 
It appears that the relationship between parts one and two of s20 with regard to 
determining the timing of the passing of risk, is one of the relationship between a basic rule 
and an exception. Put simply, where the parties agree to pass the risk at a particular time, 
the precedence of an enforcement will be given for the intention of the parties; the risk will 
then be passed at an agreed time, regardless of whether the property has been passed or 
not. In other words, where the parties agree to pass the risk at a particular time, the risk 
must pass in accordance with the agreement; otherwise the risk will pass with the property, 
according to part two of s20 of the SGA (res perit domino).This means the intention of the 
parties with regard to the passing of risk plays a significant role in terms of defining the 
moment when the passing of risk takes place.  
In the application of the principle of “unless otherwise agreed”, it is possible to say that the 
intention of the parties “to agree otherwise”, where they agree to passes the risk in a 
                                                 
33 Zorlu  Ramazan , The main dfferences between CIF and FOB contractes under English law,6, Available at 
http://www.akellawfirm.com/yayinlar/THE_MAIN_DIFFERENCES_BETWEEN_CIF_AND_FOB_CO
NTRACTS_UNDER_ENGLISH_LAW.pdf.  See also, Wiebe v Dennis Bros [1913] 29 TLR. 250 
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different way from that stipulated in part two of s.20 -1, is the basic rule underpinning the 
passing of risk, so long as the parties agree to pass the risk separately from the property. 
On the other hand, in the absence of any expressed or implied agreement between the 
parties with respect to the passing of risk separately from property, prima facie the risk will 
be passed with the property under res perit domino, according to part two of s20-1.37  
In cases where the parties intend to pass the risk with the property, whether by expressed 
or implied agreement, the risk is transferred with the property where the property passes 
according to s17 and s18 of the SGA. In this sense, the passing of risk is linked to the 
passing of property. Furthermore, the issue of the intention of the parties to pass the 
property according to s.17 and S.18 may play a multiple role, including issues relating to 
the passing of property and risk simultaneously.  
In other words, where by an express or implied agreement the parties’ intention is to pass 
the property at a particular time, this agreement will govern the issue relating to the passing 
of risk as well, and the risk will be passed at the agreed time. Thus, it can be seen that the 
actual time at which the risk passes may be based on the issue of determining whether the 
passing of property occurs according to s17 or s18. Thus the risk and the property will pass 
at the same time according to an agreement regarding the passing of property, where the 
rule of res perit domino will be implied, although the passing of risk is not made explicit in 
such an agreement.  
It may be difficult to determine whether the intention of the parties is the basic rule or not. 
However, from the previous analysis, it seems that the English law offers a system which 
is governed by the rule that the risk passes when the contracting parties intend for it to 
pass. If, however, the intention of the parties is being  overlooked by the parties, the court 
will resort to other criteria to supplement the parties' intention with a default rule, such as 
res perit domino.38 Considering that the principle of precedence is a standard in 
determining the basic rule (namely, the basic rule is the applicable principle which must be 
taken into consideration over all other rules) Stock clearly demonstrates that the court gave 
priority in the application to the agreement between the parties over all other rules and 
placed the risk on the buyer as occurring from the shipment. In other words, the agreement 
between the parties was the basic principle; however, in the absence of such an agreement, 
other rules, such as res perit domino rule, will be applied.  
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Giving priority to an agreement between the parties may refer to the principle of the 
freedom of parties to contract and create the terms of their agreement as they desire (party 
autonomy principle), in which case the parties have an absolute right to create the terms of 
the contract according to their intention.  Although English statutory law does not mention 
it expressly, it has been indicated that the intention of the parties with regard to the passing 
of risk takes precedence over the res perit domino rule, and might even be adopted within 
the English law rules.39 
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the priority in the performance is always 
given to the agreement of the parties. In other words, intention between the parties has the 
priority; which is the basic rule with regards to the passing of risk; and the res perit domino 
rule is the default rule in the absence of parties’ intention.  
 
5.5 Passing of risk in relation to specific and unascertained 
goods 
In general, English statutory law distinguishes between specific and unascertained goods 
with regard to the issue of timing in relation to the passing of property. As examined in 
Chapter Three, s16 of the SGA points out that, in a contract for the sale of specific goods, 
the property passes at the time the contract is made, or when the parties intend it to pass, 
according to s17 of the SGA. Furthermore, if no time is specified for the passing of the 
property, s18 provides rules for ascertaining when the goods becomes specific goods and 
the parties’ intention has been ascertained. This means that where there is a contract for the 
sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and 
until the goods are ascertained. From this we can conclude that there is distinction between 
specific and unascertained goods with regard to timing in the passing of property, and thus 
the timing in relation to the passing of property will differ depending on whether the goods 
are specific or unascertained goods.   
However, in s 20-1 SGA, which states that Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at 
the seller's risk until the property in them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property 
in them is transferred to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk whether delivery has 
been made or not, there is no indication of an issue relating to the passing of risk with 
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regard to whether the goods are specific or unascertained. It would appear that there is no 
problem regarding part two, where the risk passes at the same time as the property, because 
timing in relation to the passing of risk would be subject to the passing of property in the 
case of specific goods; consequently, no property would be transferred to the buyer unless 
and until the goods were ascertained. For example, in a FOB contract, where the property 
can be passed even though the goods are still in transit, this means if the goods already 
ascertained then the risk will be passed at the same time as the property, based on the terms 
of a FOB contract, where the property and risk are passes from shipment in the case where 
the goods are ascertained.  
 
 
5.5.1 Unless otherwise agreed 
As with other aspects of these laws, the difficulty lies in the phrase ‘unless otherwise 
agreed’ set out in part one of s20 of SGA. It is clear that where there is an express or 
implied agreement one party will bear the risk according to the agreement, even though 
they have no property, and regardless of whether he/she is in possession of goods. 
Accordingly, when the parties intend to pass the risk at a specific time, the risk may pass 
separately, that is, before or after the property. Where the parties intend to pass the risk 
separately, i.e. before or after property, it is clear and logical that the goods must be 
sufficiently identifiable as those to which the risk relates. It might therefore be assumed 
that the contract must be one for the sale of specific goods, or if it was one for the sale of 
unascertained goods, the goods should have become ascertained before the risk could 
pass.40  
Nevertheless, despite the existence of an English statutory law, there is no provision 
highlighting the passing of risk with regard to whether the goods are specific or 
unascertained; it appears that the goods must be sufficiently identifiable as those to which 
the risk relates. The identity of the goods to which the risk relates, seems to be an implied 
standard in the issue of determining the passing of risk, as will be seen. Therefore, in the 
contract of a sale of specific goods, the risk could be passed from the seller to the buyer 
separately, before or after property, especially in cases involving the passing of risk after 
property, as this indicates clearly that the goods are specific goods, because according to 
s16 of the SGA no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the 
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"Issues in the Tranfer of Risk in CIF Contracts." Sing. L. Rev. 14 (1993),151 
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goods are ascertained. It appears that there is no difficulty with passing risk separately in 
accordance with the intention of the parties involved, whether before or after property, so 
long as the contract is for the sale of specific goods. The germane question relates to 
unascertained goods, where the parties intend to pass the risk before the property, by 
reason of whether the goods are still unascertained or where the seller reserves the right of 
disposal: do the same rules apply? 
 
5.5.2 Passing of risk in unascertained goods 
English statutory law adopts the principle of res perit domino, where the risk passes at the 
same time as the property, or when the parties intend and agree to pass the risk at the same 
time as the property. However, this can occur only in the circumstance of ascertained 
goods and not in the circumstance of unascertained goods.  
In support of that, Benjamin states that the goods must be sufficiently identifiable as those 
to which the risk relates and points out that the contract must be one for the sale of specific 
goods41. Presumably, if the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods, that means 
goods should have been ascertained before the risk passes.  
Accordingly, it seems to be difficult or even impossible according to part two of s20-1 of 
the SGA, to comprehend that, where the goods are unascertained, the risk could transfer at 
the same time in which the property passes. This is because s16 of the SGA prevents the 
transfer of property from the seller to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained; 
consequently, no risk passes so long as the risk is linked to the property. On the other hand, 
with regard to the passing of risk after the passing of property, clearly there is no problem, 
because it is logical that the risk passes after the property when the property has already 
passed, which means it is inevitably specific goods. 
However a further question which is most likely to arise in such circumstances is whether 
the risk can pass before the property in relation to unascertained goods? 
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Chapter 5   
 
123 
 
5.6 The possibility of the passing of risk before the passing of 
property 
Without a clear provision, it seems to be the case that an argument may be restricted in 
relation to the passing of risk before the property, where the goods are unascertained 
goods.  This may occur in circumstances where the parties intend, explicitly or implicitly, 
to pass the risk before the property, even if the goods remain unascertained, or 
alternatively, when the seller reserves the right of disposal. Furthermore, in CIF contracts, 
the position will be different, for it is “otherwise agreed”. Property does not usually pass 
until tender of documents, which usually occurs after the goods have been shipped. The 
rule is that risk is to pass on shipment or as from shipment.42 Accordingly, risk is thus 
separated from property and could be passed before property being passed regardless the 
goods are specific or unascertained goods. 
In fact, as we have noted, there is no expressed provision in English statutory law which 
prevents the parties in the contract from agreeing to pass the risk before the property, even 
if the goods are unascertained. Accordingly, under party autonomy and English law. risk 
may theoretically pass on shipment without identification being necessary.43 However, we 
could assume that the prima facie and general standard of the English law is the 
sufficiently identifiable goods which the risk relates, and the contract must then be one for 
the sale of specific goods. As a result, it is illogical to rely upon such standards, due to the 
fact that they are impossible to apply, because the goods remain unascertained and are not 
sufficiently identifiable as those to which the risk relates (unknown goods). Accordingly, 
the risk could be said not be able to be passed before the property in relation to 
unascertained goods.  
On the face of it, this conclusion appears to be in conflict with Inglis v Stock. 44 However, 
the situation was different in Inglis v. Stock, where the goods were unascertained; hence, 
the property could not have passed by the time the damage occurred; however, the court 
held that the buyer had responsibility for the risk of the goods from the moment of 
shipment, under the terms of FOB. It was noteworthy that the courts held that the buyer 
was at risk even though the goods were unascertained. Actually, if a contract had been for 
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specific goods, no issue would have arisen, but the goods were unascertained and therefore 
the property could not have passed by the time the damage occurred, according to the 
standard of sufficiently identifiable goods of which the risk relates and res perit domino. 
Consequently, it would be assumed that the risk did not pass to the buyer as well. 
Nevertheless, in the current case, the risk passed to the buyer separately, before property, 
and before the goods became appropriated. The agreement of the parties is the basic rule in 
the passing of risk under an FOB contract, where they agree to pass the risk from shipment 
and furthermore, property supposed to be passed at such time, but the paradox in the 
current case is that the court held that property had not passed by the time the damage 
occurred. Similarly, this can be seen in the case of Sterns v. Vickers45 where the goods 
remained unascertained and the Court of Appeal held that the risk had passed to the buyers 
upon the acceptance of the delivery warrant, even though no property had passed.  
In both cases the risk was held to have passed before the property. However, the difficulty 
in relation to ascertaining which unproportioned goods are at the buyer’s risk is highlighted 
by Dobson.  Dobson is of the view that, presumably, it would be decided by the 
proportionality standard (pro rata).46 This can clearly be seen in the Sterns case, where the 
buyer should bear the risk of 120,000 from 200,000 gallons, which presumably would be 
on a pro rata basis, where the buyer would bear 120,000/200,000=3/5 of the loss.47 Indeed, 
this is possible, as in current cases where the contracts are for the sale of unascertained 
goods out of a specified bulk. It is possible to identify the bulk, calculate the total loss and 
ensure the buyer bears a proportion according to his share of the bulk. However, the author 
is of the opinion that this could not occur where the contract of sale concerns the sale of 
purely generic goods, because it would be impossible to identify those goods which were 
at the buyer’s risk. It follows that it would therefore be impossible to identify any goods 
which were pro rata at his risk. As a result, it is impossible for the risk to pass.48 
This view is supported by the amendment introduced by s20A of Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 which points out  that, property in an undivided share in the bulk 
is transferred to the buyer, and the buyer becomes an owner in common of the bulk and the 
goods at the buyer’s risk on a pro rata basis.49   Nevertheless, the pro rata solution has been 
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47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid.  
49 Martineau v. Kitching (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B 436, 453-454. 
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criticised, especially in large bulk commodity shipments where part of the cargo had 
deteriorated, as it would be inefficient and result in time consuming litigation. It would 
work only if the seller has not clearly appropriated or the carrier had not delivered the 
goods to a particular buyer.50 
Critical analysis shows that risk in a specified quantity of unascertained goods, according 
to the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, will be passed simultaneously with the 
property, where the Act allows the property to pass in relation to such goods. However, it 
has been noted that the risk would pass when the property passes, namely, the act seems 
link the passing of risk to the passing of property. In fact, the Sale of Goods (Amendment) 
Act 1995 mentions property instead of risk. There is no indication of the passing of risk 
separate from property, whether the goods are unascertained or of an unspecified quantity. 
Nevertheless, the difficulty of passing risk in relation to a specified quantity of 
unascertained goods seems to be have been solved, in the sense that, where property can be 
passed, the risk could be passed as well. However, issues can still arise where the parties 
intend to pass the risk separately, before the property, if the goods are unascertained or 
relate to a specified quantity of unascertained goods, as will be seen.  
 
5.6.1 Should risk be linked to the passing of property or to the situation 
of the goods? 
 
According to the discussion in the previous section, the issue of the passing of risk in 
unascertained goods remains debatable. In other words, although the statute does not 
mention unspecified goods, the negative interpretation of the provision can mean that the 
risk cannot pass until they are  specified as, neither the SGA 1979, nor the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995 specifically deal with the passing of risk in relation to 
unascertained goods. Nevertheless, both are linked to the issue of the passing of risk to the 
passing of property, in that the property is never to pass until goods are specific goods, in 
SGA 1979, or a specified quantity of unascertained goods, in the Sale of Goods 
(Amendment) Act 1995.  
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Thus the question is whether English statutory law prevents the transfer of risk in relation 
to unascertained goods, or is restricted merely to the passing of property in cases where the 
goods are undivided shares in goods forming part of a bulk, according to the conditions set 
out in s20A. In particular, unlike property, risk can pass before the goods have been 
ascertained, at any rate, where the goods form part of a larger, but identified, bulk. In most 
FOB contracts, risk may pass on shipment, regardless of whether property passes at that 
stage; and this is so even where the goods have been shipped in unsegregated parcels,51 as 
Stock clearly demonstrates the influence of parties’ choice of FOB contract on the 
interpretation of the passing of risk. 
In fact, this leads us back to the previous argument regarding intention of the parties to 
pass the risk and the legal nature of the rule of res perit domino. With an intertwined 
relationship between the parties’ intention and the general rule on the passing of risk, a 
difficulty may arise whether the precedence should be given to the intention of the 
parties.52 In other words, assuming the parties agree to transfer the risk regardless of the 
situation of the goods, whether they are ascertained or unascertained, and precedence is 
given to their intention, the risk will be passed in the case of unascertained goods 
separately, before the property, according to agreement of the parties as seen in Inglis v. 
Stock53. This is contrary to the principle of res perit domino, because the English statutory 
law linked issue of passing of risk to the passing of property, where no property passes in 
the case of unascertained goods, and not to the situation of the goods.  
On the other hand, suppose that English statutory law linked the risk to the situation of the 
goods, where no risk passes to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified within the 
contract, then the risk could never be passed until the goods are ascertained, nor could risk 
could be passed before property. This is because linking the risk to the situation of the 
goods extends to property as well. In other words, no property could be passed until the 
goods are ascertained, and then no risk could be passed until property is passed. Despite 
the different perspectives, the results were identical, as discussed in Stock and Vickers: the 
risk was deemed to have passed separately and before the property, where the goods 
remained unascertained or a specified quantity of unascertained goods.  
                                                 
51 John Bassindale, 'The passing of ownership and  risk in international commodity contracts' (1993) 
52 See above, Intention of the parties to pass the risk and the legal nature of the rule of res perit domino 
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By undertaking a comparative analysis, one may say that the Sale of Goods (Amendment) 
Act has establishes that the risk can be passed where the goods are a specified quantity and 
unascertained; however, the risk in such circumstances must be based on the transfer of 
property, where the Act allows the passing of property over an undivided share in the bulk 
of goods. According to the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act, due to the link with property, 
the risk never passes separately without the property. However, in both of the cases cited 
the risk is deemed to have been passed to the buyer, without the property; where the 
property remains with the seller, irrespective of whether the goods are unascertained goods 
or a specified quantity of unascertained goods. Accordingly, it seems that the passing of 
property is the heart of the matter, while the transfer of risk is based on the transfer of 
property, according to English statutory law, in common law it is permitted for the risk to 
pass separately, before the property, without any condition.  
Indeed, it seems that English statutory law implies that no risk is deemed to have passed 
until the property has passed, and no property passes until the goods are identified in the 
contract; however, it did not remedy an issue where the risk passed separately and before 
the property expressly. A difference between English statutory law and common law 
regarding this issue is noted. It would seem that the common law is broader than English 
statutory law; where the common law allows for the passing of risk, even if the goods are 
unascertained, and does not link risk to the passing of property; whereas English statutory 
law requires the passing of property in order to pass the risk, despite the space left for 
parties’ intention. One may say that the current cases were previous to the promulgation of 
the law; nevertheless, English statutory law does not rule explicitly on this issue.  
The applicable standard is that goods must be sufficiently identifiable as being those to 
which the risk relate, in the forms of a specified quantity of unascertained goods, and no 
property, and consequently risk, passes in relation to unascertained goods. It may be the 
subject of criticism that  there is no explicit provision in English statutory law for this 
issue. It has been argued that, although the SGA has endeavoured to codify the common 
law on sale of goods, some areas were left out of the statutory framework and are governed 
by the common law; consequently, contracting parties choosing ‘English statutory law’ as 
the governing law of the contract are agreeing to the applicability of both the common law 
and the SGA.54 This is reflected in s62-2 of the SGA.55 On other hand, we cannot overlook 
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the common law as the primary source of English statutory law, where the risk could be 
passed separately before the property.  
In fact, with the absence of any such indication on this issue in English statutory law, the 
question that arises is whether the standard of common law can be considered as the 
applicable standard or not? In fact, the answer to this question lies in the provision of s.62 
of the SGA, as mentioned, consequently and logically it can be said that the risk may 
passes separately before the property and it is immaterial whether the goods are ascertained 
or unascertained goods. 
To conclude, it is arguably the case that there are three standards which could cover the 
issue of the passing of risk in relation to unascertained goods. The first is the sufficiently 
identifiable goods standard, where the goods must be specific or a specified quantity of 
unascertained goods. Critically, this view actually links the issue of passing of risk to the 
issue of the passing of property, so that no risk could be passed until the property passes, 
and, as result, no risk passes in relation to unascertained goods, even in such cases where 
the parties have agreed to pass the risk separately before the property.56 Additionally, the 
buyer may bear the risk even if he/she is not in physical possession of the goods, where it 
is deemed that he/she is the owner of said goods.  
This opinion seems to reflect approach of the English statutory law, although it does not 
state it expressly. The second instance is provided by the Stock case, which gave freedom 
for the risk to pass separately before the property and did not link the risk to the property. 
In fact, such a view relied on the intention of the parties and gives priority to the agreement 
between the parties over any other rule. Clearly, this view reflects the party autonomy 
principle. Accordingly, despite the criticism over the imposition of an unfair burden on the 
buyer when he/she is not the owner of the goods, the buyer may bear responsibility for the 
risk, even when he/she is not in physical possession of the goods nor holds the property, 
because according to this view appropriation is regarded as irrelevant, and it argues that 
risk passes as from shipment in any situation.57 The third standard involves cases where the 
                                                                                                                                                    
55 SGA, s 62(2) states: ‘The rules of the common law, including the law merchant, except in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, and in particular the rules relating to the law of 
principal and agent and the effect of fraud, misrepresentation, duress or coercion, mistake, or other 
invalidating cause, apply to contracts for the sale of goods’. 
56 Aedit Abdullah,. "Issues in the Tranfer of Risk in CIF Contracts." Sing. L. Rev. 14 (1993). 160 to 169 
57Margarine Union GmbH v. Cambay Prince Steamship Co. Ltd., 1969 Q.B.1 219 (1969) 
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parties intend to pass the risk when the buyer accepts the delivery note. This view, 
highlighted in the Vickers case, where the court held that the risk had passed to the buyer, 
relied on the implied agreement between the parties, and the delivery warrant, where the 
buyer accepted the delivery note although the property remained with the seller. Indeed, 
the researcher is of the view that this might be more logical than the others because the 
court relied on physical possession, which is supported by the buyer’s acceptance of the 
delivery warrant of goods; thus the buyer becomes the possessor of those goods, and hence 
becomes responsible for the care of those goods.  
 
5.7 Fault Basis - Exceptions in relation to passing of risk under 
English law 
As we have seen, it is generally the case that the risk passes simultaneously with the 
property. However, it may also pass at a different time, according to the intention of the 
parties, whether before, after, or even at the same time as the property passes – in the case 
of the latter, the parties intend to apply the principle of res perit domino. In fact, as pointed 
out in the previous sections, risk may pass otherwise, whether according to the terms of the 
contract or the situation of the goods. Obviously, the risk will be passed regardless of the 
principle of res perit domino, according to the terms of the contract, including the 
expressed or implied intention of the parties. This includes the cases where there is delay in 
delivery, delivery to the carrier, or where the seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his 
own risk, or according to the situation of the goods, such as in the case of conformity of the 
goods to the contract. Under these circumstances, instead of following the principle of res 
perit domino or parties’ intention, the passing of risk will be operated on a “fault basis” as 
examined below.  
 
5.7.1 Delay in delivery:    
The first of these particular rules is contained in s20-2, which reads: where delivery has 
been delayed through the fault of either buyer or seller the goods are at the risk of the 
party at fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault.  The 
scope of application of this sub-section concerns delivery terms, including shipment terms, 
such as FOB and CIF contracts, where the seller is bound to deliver the goods whether at 
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the port of shipment or at any place according to the terms of the contract.58 Further, the 
provision of s20-2 is not restricted to shipment contracts, but is extended to conclude any 
contract of sale of goods regardless of the place of delivery, so long as the contract is a 
contract of sale. The interpretation of s20-2 should be read in conjunction with s102 of the 
SGA, which states, whether any other stipulation as to time is or is not of the essence of 
the contract depends on the terms of the contract. Namely, the determination of the time of 
delivery is subject to the parties’ absolute right to agree on this matter. Accordingly, s20-2 
applies only in the case of agreement between the parties on the timeline for the delivery of 
the goods.  
 
However, an issue may arise in the cases where the parties fail to agree on the timing of the 
delivery.  Delay of delivery at fixed time, in fact can be caused by faults attributed to either 
parties or the seller alone.59  In the case of delay, the party with delay of delivery must bear 
the risk, even though the other party would be expected to assume the risk in the normal 
situation.60  For instance, under a typical FOB sales contract, the buyer must procure space 
on board a vessel. If the buyer fails to do so within a reasonable or agreed time, the buyer 
must bear the risk of any deterioration of goods on the wharf.61 Thus, a simple failure to 
perform by a specified date, although a breach of contract, does not entitle the other party 
to treat the contract as repudiated. However, a failure to perform an obligation within a 
reasonable or agreed time, depending on the interpretation of the contract, may amount to 
repudiation of the obligations for the other party .62 
In the same context, s29-3 of the SGA states that  ‘Where under the contract of sale the 
seller is bound to send the goods to the buyer, but no time for sending them is fixed, the 
seller is bound to send them within a reasonable time’. Accordingly, if the contract is silent 
as to the time of delivery, the seller is bound to deliver the goods within a reasonable 
time.63  A “reasonable time” is defined in s59 of the SGA as any time which is not 
manifestly unreasonable under the circumstances and this time may be affected by the 
                                                 
58 However, s20-2 does not apply where the buyer deals as a consumer. See Benjamin's Sale of Goods (8th 
Edition edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010),316  
59 Michael G. Bridge, The Sale of Goods (Oxford University Press, Oxford UK 1998) ,126 
60 Prof. Tetley, William, Q.C. Sale of Goods-The Passing of Title and Risk. Faculty of Law McGill 
University, 33,34 
61 Lusograin v. Bunge, 1986 Lloyd's Rep. 2 654 (1986)  
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usage of trade, Consequently, a failure to perform within a reasonable time may, depending 
on the interpretation of the contract or the trade usage, amount to repudiation .64 
 
Delay and the breach of the contract 
 
As discussed above, if the seller fails to deliver the goods within an agreed period or within 
a reasonable timeframe, the risk is placed on his part. However, it is noteworthy that the 
application of s20-2 may affect the nature of the contract where the risk passes on, or from 
shipment - such as in CIF and FOB contracts - where the parties intend to pass the risk 
before the goods are delivered. In this regard, Debattista maintains that the  assumption 
that this sits ill with the nature of those contracts is unwarranted, as delay in discharge 
caused by the seller would very likely involve a breach of his obligation to procure a 
contract of carriage.  Consequently, the risk of post-shipment loss caused by delay is 
attributable to and lies with the seller, because he is deemed to be in breach of his 
contractual obligations, rather than because of the application of s20-2.65 In this regard, 
Debattista further argues that his view can be supported by s27 of the SGA, which states 
that it is the seller’s duty to deliver the goods and the buyer’s duty to accept and pay for 
them, in accordance with the terms of the contract of sale, in the sense that the delivery of 
goods by the seller and acceptance of them by the buyer within the agreed period time or 
reasonable time is an essential duty. 
That can be seen in Bowes & Co v Shand & Co66 where the seller was imposed with risk in 
his failure to deliver shipments according to the agreed time.  In this case, the court held 
the view that contracts must be interpreted strictly, so as to render shipments made in in 
February, earlier than March, as agreed in the contract, a breach of the contract of sale, 
which entitled the plaintiffs to reject the rice. This gave the buyer the right to claim 
damages from the respondents in respect of any damage they had suffered.  
In summary, when the seller or the buyer failed to ship the goods within the agreed period 
of time, he was in breach of contract, moreover, according to s20-2 he should assume the 
risk. Since a party is obliged to deliver the goods within a reasonable time, the party in 
breach bears the risk regardless, whether the breach lies in a delivery by shipment or by a 
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separate route, an obligation to deliver the goods, to hand over any documents relating to 
them, and transfer the property or an obligation to take delivery within an agreed period of 
time, or within a reasonable time.67 Such a view has attributed the legal nature of the delay 
to delivery of the goods. Nonetheless, the next question which needs to be addressed is the 
consequences of the lack of expressed wordings of the ‘fault basis’ in s20-2 of the SGA. 
5.7.2 Fault of one of the parties 
 
It has been argued that the risk of shipment loss or damage caused by delay is attributable 
to the fault of either the seller or the buyer, but only “as regards any loss which might not 
have occurred but for such fault”.68 For instance, under a classic FOB contract, the buyer 
must procure space on board a vessel, where the buyer fails to do so within a reasonable 
time, and the buyer at fault must bear the risk even though the seller would normally have 
had to bear the risk until the actual shipment. Although this risk is imposed on the buyer, 
the title remains with the seller.69 The determination of fault leading to risk allocation can 
be seen clearly in the case of Demby Hamilton & Co Ltd v Barden,70 where the buyer 
delayed in collecting the goods at the time agreed and when he did collect it, it was 
discovered that the juice had deteriorated. Although the juice was unappropriated and 
placed in casks waiting for collection, risk was transferred to the buyer. despite the fact 
that no property had passed to the buyer.  
In principle, no property passed to the buyer in the unappropriated goods, hence no risk 
should be passed to the buyer according to s20-1. However, in Demby Hamilton the 
situation was different, where the exception is supposed to be applied instead of the 
general rule in part one or part two of s20-1, in the sense that the risk of deterioration of 
juice occurred as result of delay of the buyer in collecting the goods within reasonable 
time. In other words, delivery has been delayed through the fault of the buyer. The court 
supported the view that where delivery has been delayed through the fault of the buyer, the 
goods are at the risk of the party in fault “as regards any loss which might not have 
occurred but for such fault.” The court also pointed out that the goods referred to must be 
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the contractual goods which have been assembled by the seller for the purpose of fulfilling 
his contract and making delivery. The 30 tons of juice were goods which the sellers rightly 
and reasonably kept for the fulfilment of their contract, and had awaiting the collection. 
Due to the breach on the buyer’s part alone, it was held that the buyer must bear the risk of 
deterioration on the ground that delivery was delayed by his default and that delay had 
caused deterioration. Nevertheless, the fault of either of the parties cannot be considered a 
delay unless the other party has fulfilled his obligations. 
On the other hand, the option to return goods does not affect the passing of risk from the 
seller to the buyer in any case where the seller has fulfilled his obligations of delivery 
towards the buyer. 71 Consequently, if the contract relates to a sale of unascertained goods 
and the buyer delays, then the risk passes only when the seller has set aside goods 
manifestly appropriated to the contract and has notified the buyer that this has been done. It 
is an essential obligation on the part of the seller to undertake all acts necessary in order to 
enable the buyer to take delivery72. In other words, risk would pass when the seller has 
done everything necessary to enable the buyer to take delivery.73  Thus, where the seller is 
ready and willing to deliver the goods to the buyer but the buyer does not take delivery of 
the goods within agreed or a reasonable time, he is liable to bear any risk caused by his 
omission or refusal (fault) to take delivery74. While this view has attributed the legal nature 
of the delay to deliver the goods, due to the fault of either buyer or seller, through breach 
of contract, the next question is which one is more compatible with English statutory law 
perspective. 
5.7.3 Evaluation of fault basis in English law 
 
Based on the discussion above, it can be said that the latter view which adopted the fault as 
basic delay seems more compatible with an English statutory law perspective theoretically, 
as the word fault appears in s20-2. In practice, we have seen that the Bowes case made the 
decision on the ground of breach of contract, whereas the Demby’s decision was based on 
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the fault of the party as the basic cause of delay. This leads the researcher to highlight the 
relationship between the fault of the party and the breach of the contract. In fact, according 
to contract law, the parties to a contract that is legally enforceable are obligated to perform 
the obligations arising from the contract terms, and failure to perform may constitute a 
breach of the contract, for which the other party may seek remedies due to such a breach.75 
A breach of contract can take various forms including the fault of the party.  
From the forgoing analysis, we can see that the legal nature of s20-2 is based on the 
contractual relationship between the seller and the buyer, where the party breaches the 
terms of the contract through the delay to delivery of the goods, by any reason, including 
the fault, as the seller is obligated to deliver the goods at the place of business of the buyer, 
unless the parties agree upon a different arrangement such as in shipment contracts.76  
One may argue that the basic principle of s.20-2 is the delivery of goods, wherein the risk 
passes according to the delivery. In other words, while the prima facie in s20(1) is res perit 
domino unless otherwise agreed, the prima facie in s20-2 is the time of delivery. Namely, it 
is acknowledged that the risk passes simultaneously with the property or according to the 
intention of the parties, such as in a CIF or FOB contract, where the goods have been 
ascertained and shipped at the same time as delivery. If the fault acts as an intervening 
factor in the delivery, then the risk will pass automatically to the party whose action or 
inaction has caused the delay of delivery. Thus, it appears that the crucial factor with 
respect to the passing of risk in the application of s20-2 is the timing of the delivery of 
goods, not the time of passing of property. Therefore, it can be said that the delivery of 
goods plays an important role in the transmission of risk alongside the principle of res perit 
domino and the intention of the parties. 
 
5.8 Passing of risk involving third party (delivery to the 
carrier) 
Section 32-1 of the SGA deals with the sale of goods in transit, where the seller is 
authorised or required to send the goods to the buyer, and/or deliver the goods to a carrier 
and states that ‘Where, in pursuance of a contract of sale, the seller is authorised or 
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required to send the goods to the buyer, delivery of the goods to a carrier (whether named 
by the buyer or not) for the purpose of transmission to the buyer is prima facie deemed to 
be a delivery of the goods to the buyer.’   
 
In such a case, the risk is deemed to have passed simultaneously with the property. 
Namely, depending on the contractual terms, the prima facie rule is that risk passes with 
the property upon delivery to the carrier, where the property passes from the seller to the 
buyer, whether upon the conclusion of the contract, or at the moment of shipment (i.e. 
from the time at which the goods are handed over to the carrier). Due to the provision of 
s32-1, in the case of unappropriated goods, s18 must be read in conjunction with s16, as it 
is obvious that if the seller delivers goods which are mixed with other goods (such as 
unascertained goods) to a carrier, no property can be deemed to have passed.77 What 
constitutes appropriation will vary according to the types of goods in question and the 
general circumstances of the case.  
Generally, unlike property, the risk can pass before the goods have been ascertained, in 
circumstances where the goods form part of a larger but identified, bulk. In most FOB. and 
CIF contracts, risk will pass on shipment, regardless of whether property passes at that 
stage; and this is even so where the goods have been shipped in unsegregated parcels.78 In 
common law, there exists a dichotomy on the question of appropriation in relation to law 
and equity, where the risk in relation to unascertained goods has passed from the seller to 
the buyer on shipment before the passing of the property according to intention of the 
parties.79 
At this juncture, it is necessary to distinguish the difference between the passing of risk 
under s32-1 and s20-2 respectively. While part two of s.20-1 links the issue of the passing 
of risk to the issue of the passing of property res perit domino and according to the parties’ 
intention,  in part one of the same provision, s32-1 introduces an intervening factor when 
the involvement of the carrier of the shipments is concerned. In such cases, the property 
transfers as the risk passes on shipment,80 even though the delivery of goods to the carrier 
could occur before the actual passing of property, where the goods form part of a larger but 
identified bulk or unascertained goods. 
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Indeed, on the basis of “in pursuance of a contract of sale”, it seems that s32-1 makes the 
delivery of goods to the carrier a basic rule  in relation to the passing property and then 
passing of risk; however, a close reading of the provision reveals its compatibility with 
s20-1, as in the case where the passing of  risk occurs simultaneously with the passing of 
property in the sale of goods in transit contracts, then prima facie risk could be passed on 
the principle of res perit domino.  
Nevertheless, according to common law, in the case where a carrier is involved in the 
transport of property, the risk passes to the buyer regardless of whether the property has 
passed or not. Thus, the time of delivery could be a basic rule regarding the passing of risk, 
based on the intention of the parties, where they have agreed that the risk would pass on 
shipment.81  Indeed, despite the difference between English statutory law and common law 
regarding this issue, the result is the same, which is that the risk passes to the buyer on 
delivery to the carrier. Namely, the general rule will be applied where the seller is required 
by the contract to send goods to the buyer, in cases where delivery to a carrier is presumed 
to constitute delivery to the buyer. However, further issues may arise in s32 where the 
seller is liable to bear the risk retroactively in the case of loss or damage to goods due to an 
unreasonable carriage contract made by the seller. 
5.9 The retrospective passing of risk in seller’s failed duty 
involving third party  
In fact, even if the risk lies with the buyer while the goods are in transit, the seller may still 
be liable if damage or losses are due to an unreasonable contract of carriage made by the 
seller with the carrier. Section 32-2: states that Unless otherwise authorised by the buyer, 
the seller must make such contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer as may be 
reasonable having regard to the nature of the goods and the other circumstances of the 
case; and if the seller omits to do so, and the goods are lost or damaged in course of 
transit, the buyer may decline to treat the delivery to the carrier as a delivery to himself or 
may hold the seller responsible in damages.  
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According to s32-2, the buyer could alternatively take an action in damages against the 
seller for failing to make a reasonable contract of carriage, having regard to the nature of 
the goods and other circumstances. In other words, the risk passes to the seller 
retrospectively, subject only to the reasonable burden of the carrier. Therefore, according 
to s32-2, the seller should make a carriage contract with the carrier on behalf of the buyer, 
taking into consideration the nature and circumstances of the goods; subsequently, he will 
disclaim any responsibility for bearing the risk as long as he has made such a contract with 
the carrier. In such contracts, the seller will have regard to the nature of the goods and 
other circumstances, otherwise the goods remain at the seller's risk, in the sense that the 
seller is liable to the buyer for any loss or damage caused from the breach of his 
obligations under the contract of sale, and the carrier being liable for such loss or damage 
under the contract of carriage.82 This is exemplified in the case of B.G. Fruit Market Ltd v 
National Fruit Co., where the seller was obligated to send the goods in heated wagons but 
failed to stipulate that condition with the carrier. It was held that the seller was in breach of 
the contract of sale and therefore liable when the goods suffered frost damage after being 
left unheated.83 It is clear that the seller made the carriage contract with the carrier on 
behalf of the buyer; at the same time he continued to bear the risk of goods retrospectively, 
because he failed to stipulate that the goods must be carried in heated 
accommodation/environment.  
However, the question may arise as to whether liability in relation to an event such as the 
theft of goods is attributable to the party who carries the risk, or is the responsibility of the 
other party, whose fault has caused or enabled the event? Thomas Young & Sons v Hobson 
& Partner,84 highlights that such an issue should rest on the burden of proof. In this case, 
the plaintiffs sold seven electric engines to the defendants. It was a terms of the agreement 
that the engines should go by rail, that they should be put in box wagons with the sellers 
bearing the relevant costs. The sellers put the engines on rail in box wagons, but did not 
secure them by means of battens or in any other manner, with the result that they arrived in 
a damaged condition. The buyer’s refusal to take the delivery was viewed as succeeding in 
proving that the seller had failed in their duty under s32-2 of the SGA to make such a 
reasonable contract with the third party. Considering the nature of the goods and the other 
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circumstances of the case, the buyer was accordingly entitled to reject the goods.  It will 
ordinarily be the obligation of the party alleging fault to prove it; if he or she fails to do so, 
the loss will fall within the risk. Consequently, the goods remain at seller’s risk, in the 
sense that he is liable to the buyer for any loss or damage resulting from this breach of his 
obligations under the contract of sale. 
However, the situation differs depending on the type of contract and the obligations of the 
parties under the contract of sale. . For example, in some of types of contracts, the seller is 
responsible for making arrangements for shipping the goods, and as a result is obligated to 
conclude such a contract of carriage, such as in the case of CIF, C&F and FOB with 
additional services, whereas the buyer is responsible to do it in other types of contracts, as 
is the case in straight FOB.85  
 
Moreover, s32-2 should apply regardless of whether the seller contracts with the carrier as 
principal or as agent for the buyer. However, the words “make such contract with the 
carrier on behalf of the buyer”, may present some difficulties if interpreted strictly as 
meaning “agent for the buyer”. This would mean that this section would be excluded from 
application of the terms concluded in CIF, C&F and FOB with additional services, because 
in these types of contract the seller is obliged to conclude such a contract of carriage in his 
own name and then transfer it to the buyer as one of the seller’s duties. However, under a 
straight FOB contract the situation is different, because in this type of contract of sale the 
seller concludes no contract of carriage at all, because the seller needs only to put the 
goods on board. Thus, he is not obligated to carry and transfer the goods - in none of these 
types of contract does the seller contract with the carrier as agent for the buyer. 
Accordingly, s32-2 would not be applicable for straight FOB contracts, as the seller is not 
obliged to send the goods to the buyer unless the FOB contract obliges the seller to 
conclude such a contract of carriage in his own name on behalf of the buyer, as in the case 
of CIF and C&F contracts.86 
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Notification of shipment 
A C&F contract may not fit within an application with the straight FOB contract under 
s.32-2. Nevertheless it could meet the condition laid down in s32-3, which establishes the 
presumptive rule that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed, where goods are sent by the seller to the 
buyer by a route involving sea transit, under circumstances in which it is usual to insure, 
the seller must give such notice to the buyer as may enable him to insure them during their 
sea transit; and if the seller fails to do so, the goods are at his risk during such sea 
transit.” It is clear that an effect of this provision is to give such notice to the buyer as may 
enable him to insure the goods. It appears that the main issue addressed in this section is: 
whose duty is it to effect an insurance cover?  
Thus, where the seller is under an obligation to effect insurance cover, the section is 
evidently inapplicable. Therefore, the provision is inapplicable to contracts concluded on 
CIF and FOB with additional services, because the contract does not require the buyer 
insure the goods, unless there are risks not covered by the seller.87 It seems clear that in the 
case of Law & Bonar, Limited v British American Tobacco Company, Limited,88 where 
defendants bought from the plaintiffs a quantity of Calcutta hessian at a price CIF Smyrna, 
to be shipped from Calcutta and to arrive at Smyrna by September, 1914. The defendants 
stipulated in the contract that the goods were to be at the plaintiffs' risk until actual 
delivery to the defendants. In fulfilment of the contract, the goods were shipped by the 
plaintiffs' correspondents in Calcutta on the British Steamship City of Winchester. It is 
noteworthy that on July 31, the seller wrote to the buyer pointing out that war risk was not 
covered by the insurance under the contract, but on August 4, 1914, war was declared 
between Great Britain and Germany and on August 13, 1914, the vessel was sunk by a 
German cruiser and the goods were lost.  
To determine the issue of risk passing, the buyer was first of all required to bear the risk 
according to the terms and contract of the CIF, which stipulated insurance against marine 
risks, as required by the contract, and that the goods were at the seller's risk until the point 
of delivery. However, the buyer will bear the risk from shipment. In the current case, it was 
supposed that the seller is not obliged to give such notice to the buyer on the basis that the 
CIF contract  dictates the seller’s duty to insure the goods. Nevertheless, the goods were 
lost by an act of war, which was not covered by the insurance under the contract.  
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Rowlatt J. reported the possibility that s32-3 may apply to a contract made at a time when 
insurance against war risk was usual, but in that case the seller would be under an 
obligation to provide war risk cover anyway. Generally, s32-3 does not apply to a CIF 
contract in times when no one contemplates war, and when war is not being insured 
against. On the other hand, when the war was becoming imminent, another form of 
insurance emerged and the contract ceased to be one which dealt exhaustively with the 
question of insurance. A new obligation therefore arose for the seller, in relation to whether 
there was an employment of the seller by the buyer to effect such an insurance against war 
risks. Rowlatt J. pointed out that: 
 This sub-section annexes a term to the contract, and whether it is applicable or not 
to be decided at the time when the contract is made. I say nothing as to whether the 
sub-section could apply to a CIF contract made at a time when insurance, other than 
those to be provided by the seller - e.g., against war risks - are usual. That point does 
not arise. In this case I do not think that there is any real evidence that it was usual 
to insure against war risks at any material time. Nor am I certain whether the buyers 
themselves had made up their minds whether they would insure against war risks or 
not. 
Accordingly, it was held that s32-3 is inapplicable to ordinary CIF contracts; there was no 
evidence of such employment, in the sense that the seller was irresponsible to effect such 
insurance, on the grounds that insurance does not cover war risks. Even if the contract is 
CIF, at the same time, he must give such notice to the buyer as may enable him to insure 
them during the transit. It is clear that s 32-3 could be applied to a CIF contract only in 
cases where risks are not covered by the seller. There is surely an obligation on the buyer 
to do so in respect of documentary credit purchases, and it is only in respect of these 
contracts that the s32-3 requirement comes into play and where the seller may remain at 
risk if there is insufficient information for the buyer to be able to insure the cargo.89  
 
However, s32-3 can be applicable to contracts where insurance is not included in an 
agreement, such as in the case of C&F and ordinary FOB terms.  Nevertheless, the 
situation may be different in the case of FOB or C&F contracts, with additional services, 
where such contracts are extended to include an insurance contract to be undertaken by the 
seller, unlike the classic FOB and C&F, where it is undertaken by the buyer, who still 
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needs such notice as may enable him to insure the goods. Namely, s32-3 applies to classic 
contracts rather than contracts with additional duties.90  
On the other hand, in a classic FOB contract, s32-3 may still not be applicable and the 
seller may remain at risk if there is not sufficient information for the buyer to be able to 
insure the cargo.91 For example, in the case of Wimble, Sons & Co. v. Rosenberg & Sons92, 
under an FOB sales contract the plaintiffs sold the defendants goods to be shipped by the 
buyer, who then sent instructions to the plaintiffs to ship the goods to Odessa and to pay 
freight on their account, leaving it to the plaintiffs to select the ship. The cargo was loaded 
on a Sunday. The seller did not notify the buyer of the loading and the name of the vessel 
because of a postal delay. The buyer had no open cover and was uninsured. He claimed 
that he did not know the name of the vessel or that the goods had been shipped. 
 A close examination of the facts reveals that although under FOB terms the seller must 
give notice to the buyer to enable him to insure the goods, the essential information 
possessed by the buyer for insurance purposes rendered s32-3 inapplicable. The buyer 
knew the port of discharge and did not need to know the name of the vessel, since he could 
have effected insurance on an Odessa voyage by a vessel or vessels to be declared. 
Buckley L.J. pointed out that the seller provided sufficient information on the freight and 
the ports of loading and discharge which should have enabled the buyer to take out open 
cover, thus fulfilling the requirements of s32-3. In fact, the buyer can always take out a 
general policy of insurance, without needing to know the name of the ship.  
However, as Hamilton L.J. argued, if this view is correct, the section imposes no 
obligations on the seller, because the buyer already has sufficient information to take out a 
general insurance policy anyway, in the sense that the buyer knew the description of the 
goods from the contract he made, the port of discharge because it was selected by him and 
the port of loading from the contract. Actually, the buyer will always know the freight and 
ports of loading and discharge. In the FOB contract it is often the buyer who nominates the 
vessel, so he should not be able to claim ignorance of its name. Even though s32-3 applies, 
the duties are not onerous and therefore the section is not useful at all.93 Alternatively, 
following Hamilton J., it may be that s32-3 only applies to contracts which specify 
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destination; thus since delivery is at the place of destination and involves sea transit, 
warehouse to warehouse. etc. s32-3 could apply to any type of FOB contract where the 
seller undertakes to arrange the vessel and has a choice of ports of loading.  
5.10 Goods delivered at seller’s risk 
 
On this issue, s.33 provides an illustration of overlapping, when it states that Where the 
seller of goods agrees to deliver them at his own risk at a place other than that where they 
are when sold, the buyer must nevertheless (unless otherwise agreed) take any risk of 
deterioration in the goods necessarily incident to the course of transit.  
 
Occasionally the seller agrees to bear the risk throughout the transfer; regardless of the res 
perit domino rule. This rule is subject to the seller's agreement. In any event, s.33 has a 
restricted scope in international sales. For instance, the parties may incorporate into their 
own agreement trade terms such as the Incoterms.94 
Obviously, this provision comes from the principle of party autonomy, where the parties 
have the freedom to agree when the risk passes. Therefore, it can be said that the 
application of s.33 may be consistent with the presumptive rule in s.20-1, where the risk 
remains with the seller even if the property has passed.95  In general, under the rules of 
s.20-1 of the SGA, the parties of the contract may agree expressly or implicitly that the risk 
is separate from the property.96  
However, the question arising is: Does s.33 change the nature of the contract in cases of 
contract for sales involving the carriage of goods, such as FOB or CIF, where the risk 
passes to the buyer, whether on shipment or from shipment, at which point the seller will 
not be responsible for any damage or losses after that? In other words, in the first  the 
parties are agreed on the CIF or FOB terms to pass the risk on (or from) shipment, while 
the second is where the seller agrees to bear the risk through the transfer, according to s.33 
SGA.  
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However, the scope of this rule is unclear with respect to the words the goods necessarily 
incident. It seems that s33 effectively limits the scope of such an agreement by splitting the 
risk during transit so that the seller bears the risk of what may be called "extraordinary" 
loss or damage; that is, due to an accident or casualty. In other words, s33 gives an 
illustration of overlapping the risks, the seller having the general risk and the buyer that of 
deterioration that is necessarily incident to the course of transit. It must follow from s33 
that if deterioration is due to a combination of a "transit" risk and some other cause, the 
loss is to be shared. Perhaps the circumstances and ordinary principles of causation are 
adequate to ensure that one party does not bear more than is his due, as well as in cases of 
overlapping "risks".97 
This can be understood by looking at a Canadian case, Winnipeg Fish Co. v. Whitman Fish 
Co98  where cured fish were sold by sample under FOB terms, namely, to be shipped 
during the winter from the seller’s warehouse at Canso to Winnipeg. The sample was 
sound and satisfactory. The fish arrived in Winnipeg in a frozen state and were received by 
the buyer and kept by them in an outhouse for several weeks before being placed in the 
freezer, the atmospheric conditions being such that the fish could not, in the meantime, 
have deteriorated by thawing. Some of the fish when sold proved unfit, and were 
subsequently returned, while the whole shipment was found unfit for human consumption 
and not up to standard. On inspection the health inspector condemned the whole carload 
and it was destroyed. Approximately six weeks after the fish had been received, the buyer 
notified the seller of the rejection of the carload. In an action for the price at which the fish 
had been sold, the buyer counterclaimed for damages due to breach of warranty and 
consequent loss to their business. 
It was held that the seller could not recover, and that the buyer was entitled to receive 
damages on their counterclaim, and that the risk must be borne by the seller. In fact, the 
sale had been made subject to delivery by the seller at Winnipeg. Accordingly, under s.33 
any loss occasioned by deterioration in transit not necessarily incident to the course of 
transit should be borne by the sellers. The loss in this case was not so incident, and 
furthermore, under the circumstances, the buyer had notified the sellers of the rejection 
within a reasonable time. The judge further highlighted that, assuming the goods to have 
been delivered to the carrier at Canso in suitable and good condition, as found by the Court 
                                                 
97 L. S. Sealy, ' risk in the law of sale' (April 1972,) Cambridge Law Journal, , 247 
98 Winnipeg Fish Co. v. Whitman Fish Co [1909] S.C.R. 453 
Chapter 5   
 
144 
 
of Appeal, any damage causing deterioration to the fish arising from their having been 
frozen and thawed during transit, not being necessarily incident to such transit, must under 
the circumstances of this case be held to have been accidental and exceptional and so must 
fall on the seller.  
From the foregoing, it appears that s33, with its limited allocation of necessary risk to the 
seller, should not be understood to detract from the broader allocation of risk according to 
prima facie rule in s20 or special rules in s32-2 and (3). In other words, it should not be 
allowed to undermine the normal rule that, where the risk is on the buyer, the seller must 
still ship goods that will not in a normal transit deteriorate to the point of unsuitability. On 
the other hand, an unsuitability may entitle the buyer to reject goods that are not in 
conformity with the contract. 
5.11 The lack of conformity of the goods with the contract 
In terms of conformity of the goods, whether it relates to discrepancies in the quantity or 
quality of the goods at issue, it makes no difference whether the quantity of the goods 
delivered is more or less than agreed upon. Similarly, non-conformity of the quality of 
goods means delivery of goods whose quality is worse or better than agreed upon. 
Moreover, goods must be of satisfactory quality according to s14 of SGA, namely they 
would meet the standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking 
account of any description of the goods.99 Thus, it has been stated that a contract of sale is 
not only a contract that goods will arrive, but a contract to ship and deliver goods 
conforming to the contract of sale.100 Generally, conformity can be discussed from several 
perspectives. In other words, one of the most important obligations of the seller is to 
deliver goods in conformity with the contract, and the right of the buyer is to examine the 
goods to ascertain whether they are in conformity with the contract or not, and reject the 
goods when they do not conform to the contract, according to s.14 SGA.  
Hence, when the seller fails to deliver such conforming goods, by any reasons, whether by 
intention, such as counterfeit goods and fraud, or by accidental causes, for instance loss or 
damage of the goods during transfer, he is deemed to have breached a contractual 
obligation. A breach of contract by the seller which is sufficient to allow the buyer to reject 
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the documents or reject the goods on arrival, if he has already accepted the shipping 
documents, results in situations where the buyer does reject the goods, in placing the risk 
on the seller whilst the buyer exculpates himself.101 Accordingly, under English law, in 
such a situation, if the buyer properly rejects the non-conforming goods, the risk and the 
property will revert back to the seller.102 
However, when goods arrive that are not fit for the intended purpose and not in conformity 
with the contract, it may be difficult to determine whether this is due to the seller’s breach 
in delivering goods of unsatisfactory quality, or due to an event that occurred in transit, 
while the goods were at the buyer’s risk. The risk allocation will depend on the evidence 
regarding the state of the goods upon shipment and subject to the burden of proof theory. 
Namely, where the buyer claims the goods to be in non-conformity with the contract, the 
burden is on the buyer to show that they were not capable of withstanding the voyage. On 
the other hand, the seller has to identify the cause or causes of damage or loss and prove 
that they were out of the seller’s sphere of responsibility.103 
 In essence, according to the SGA, risk passes with the property, while property passes at 
the moment of making the contract or when intended in the contract of sale. Therefore, 
regardless of whether risk and property pass at the moment the contract is made, or at an 
intended time, according to s17 of the SGA, it is assumed that the property becomes the 
risk of the buyer who will bear any risk of loss or damage to the goods.  However, if the 
buyer rejects goods whose non-conformity was caused by the seller the risk and the 
property will revert to the seller retrospectively; accordingly, the time of passing of risk 
occurs at the same time as rejection of non-conforming goods. Howevrr, the carrier being 
liable for such loss or damage under the contract of carriage according to s32-2 of the 
SGA.104 
Some difficulty may arise in this context, in the case of CIF contracts, in which documents 
are transferred and payment made, in the case where a buyer accepted the documents and 
later rejected the goods. He might obtain a conditional property on tender of documents, 
which then leads to losing his right to reject the goods, by having dealt with the documents. 
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In the case of Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd105, London exporters, 
under a CIF contract made in August 1951, for the sale of 20 tons of Rongalite to Hong 
Kong merchants, at a price of £590 a ton, for shipment to Hong Kong by October 31 1951, 
at latest, the sellers presented to the buyers' bank bills of lading on December 10 1951, 
purporting to show that the goods had been shipped. They received payment of the price 
agreed under the contract. In fact, the bills of lading had, without the knowledge of the 
sellers, been forged by the third party, the sellers' shipping agents being privy to the 
forgery, and the goods had not been shipped until November 3, 1951. The buyers knew 
before the ship arrived on December 10 that the date of shipment, as indicated by the bills 
of lading, was false but, nevertheless, they took delivery of the goods, retaining them in a 
godown in Hong Kong. Owing to the late shipment of the goods the buyers lost a contract 
for resale. An embargo placed by the Chinese authorities on the importation of Rongalite 
from Hong Kong resulted in such a serious fall in the market price that Rongalite became 
virtually unsaleable in Hong Kong. In February, 1952, the buyers discovered that the bills 
of lading had been forged and sued the sellers for the return of the price, or alternatively 
for damages for breach of contract. Devlin, J held that what the buyer obtains when the 
title under the documents is given to him is the property in the goods, subject to the 
condition that they revert to the seller, if, upon examination, he finds them in non-
conformity with the contract. 
In analysis, a CIF contract puts a number of obligations upon the seller, some of which are 
related to the documents and some of which are related to the goods. These are separate 
obligations; the right to reject the documents arises when the documents are tendered, and 
the right to reject the goods due to unconformity arises when they are delivered. 
Accordingly, the right to reject the goods, thus passing of the risk to the seller 
retrospectively, would be at the moment when the goods are loaded and after an 
examination, and not at the moment of obtaining documents.  
Arguably, even though property and risk will be passed, it seems to be that the position 
under English law is that handing the documents over, and mere acceptance of the 
documents, does not preclude subsequent rejection of the goods for breach of condition 
related to non-conformity of the goods. Thus, the fact that risk will have been passed to the 
buyer is not absolute. It can be understood that the risk will not have passed on mere 
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delivery of documents in any case, and so the result as between buyer and seller will be the 
same.106 Accordingly, a CIF buyer does not lose his right to reject the goods by dealing 
with the documents.107 
                                                 
106 Atiyah, P.S. "Sale of Goods" 5th edition, 246 
107 (n 102) 
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5.12 Conclusion 
To understand the legal nature of these rules, it is essential to examine the rules and the 
exceptions to the risk doctrine in the SGA, in the sense of the nature and basis of these 
rules.108 However, as mentioned above, the passing of risk according to s20-1 may be 
governed by more than one rule; according to these criteria, English statutory law appears 
to have a mixed approach.109 Namely the risk could be passed with the property res perit 
domino rule, at the point when the property passes to the buyer, or at a different time 
separate from the property, according to the agreement of the parties. It has been noted that 
the general rule is that the risk passes with the property, according to res perit domino 
under s20 of the SGA.110 Others have relied on the same section but reached a different 
conclusion, arguing that the basic rule is that the risk passes at the time agreed upon by the 
parties, according to the intention of the parties.111 The rule of s20 may be prevailed by 
expressed or implied agreements; furthermore, it is subject to exceptions or modifications 
which would determine the timing when the passing of risk takes place.112 Therefore, in 
order to ascertain the legal nature of these rules and the relevant exceptions, a comparison 
between the first and second part of s20-1 of the SGA is required. 
In fact, it is clear that the risk may pass at a different time from the property, where the 
buyer has the right to examine the goods in order to ascertain whether they are in 
conformity with the contract or not. In other words, under English law, in a situation where 
the buyer rejects the non-conforming goods, the risk and the property will be revested in 
the seller. Similarly, with respect to s33, the seller may choose to ignore the rule of res 
perit domino and agree to bear the risk through the transfer. That means also the risk 
passes at different time from property, where the property passes on (or from) shipment 
and the risk passes at the place of destination. Therefore, it can be said that application of 
these two rules may be contrary to the presumptive rule in s20-1, in that the risk remains 
                                                 
108 Paul Todd, 'Risk the General Rule' (26 Dec 1997.) Paul Todd's home page 06/02/2014 
<http://pntodd.users.netlink.co.uk/intr/risk/risk.htm#toc 
109 (n 26) 
110 Benjamin's Sale of Goods (8th Edition edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 2010). P.302.See also, Fidelma 
White & Robert Bradgate, Commercial Law (Blackstone Legal Practice Course Guide) (Exford 
University Press, Exford UK OX2 6DP 2007),180 
111 Prof. Tetley, William, Q.C. Sale of Goods-The Passing of Title and Risk. Faculty of Law McGill 
University. Also (n 89) 
112 Robert Bradgate, Fidelma White, 'Commercial Law'  (OUP Oxford, UK 2007) .181   
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with the seller even if the property has passed. At the same time their application complies 
with part one of s20-1 and the words unless otherwise agreed, in the sense, the parties of 
the contract may agree expressly or impliedly that the risk is separate from the property. 
Accordingly, these rules could be included under the category of the first part of s20-1, 
where the parties agree impliedly or expressly that the goods must be of satisfactory 
quality with the contract, according to s14-2, which states that ‘Where the seller sells 
goods in the course of a business, there is an implied condition that the goods supplied 
under the contract are of merchantable quality.’  
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that the legal nature of the passing of risk, under 
rules of conformity with the contract and the rule of s33, is the intention of the parties, 
where the parties have absolute right to agree upon the time of passing of risk according to 
part one of s20-1, unless otherwise agreed. Consequently, it can be said that the time at 
which risk passes under both rules relies on the intention of the parties, which can be 
considered under the category of part one of s20-1, where parties’ intention is the primary 
rule with regards to the passing of risk.113 
Furthermore, as the research has suggested, the situations under s20-2 and s32 may be 
different, as the delayed delivery of the goods through the fault of either the buyer or seller 
will have impacts on how the risk is passed. This depends on whether the goods are at the 
risk of the party at fault, under s20-2, or whether the seller breaches his obligations 
according to s32 of the SGA. Accordingly, the passing of risk under the rules of s20-2 and 
s32 occurs separately from the property. Consequently, despite the primary rule under s20-
1 of the SGA, it can be said that the risk rules under both s20-2 and s32 will be viewed as 
exceptions.   
                                                 
113 See above, Intention of the parties to pass the risk and the legal nature of the rule of res perit domino. 
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Chapter 6 – Passing of risk under the CISG 
6.1 Introduction 
The passing of risk – and in particular which party will bear the risk - is an important issue, 
and one which preoccupies both parties in a contract of sale. The reason for its importance 
lies in its peculiar nature, which might lead to certain harsh and unfair effects upon the 
contracting parties. This is especially the case for international sale of goods contracts 
between different states, where sales involving the carriage of goods is the most common 
situation in international sales contracts.1 
Almost every national legal system includes rules on the passing of risk, and hence, under 
a domestic sale, unlike international sales, it is relatively easy for the parties in the contract 
to achieve their purpose. When one looks at the diverse solutions to the issue of the passing 
of risk across various legal systems, there are various points for determining the timing of 
the passing of risk,  including the moment of conclusion of the contract; the moment in 
which property passes and the moment the goods are handed over,2  in addition to the party 
autonomy principle.  Therefore, such an important issue as sales law could not be left out 
of the scope of one of the most successful attempts to unify the law pertaining to the 
international sale of goods, which is the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (the CISG).  
In fact, unlike the issue of timing in relation to the passing of property, the CISG deals 
with the issue of risk more broadly and in further depth, concerning itself with the issue of 
the risk, rather than the issue of time in relation to the passing of property.3 As the 
principles incorporated in the English law are party autonomy and that risk prima facie 
passes with property, the principles  which are incorporated  in the CISG for risk to pass at 
different moments as will be examined in this chapter. 
The actual moment in which the risk passes under the CISG depends on the circumstances 
of the terms of the contract of sale. Generally, it lies under the provision of arts 67, 68 and 
                                                 
1 Goodfriend, Douglas E. "After the damage is done: risk of loss under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods." Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 22 (1983): 575, 593 
2Heidelberg, 'The Passing of Risk A comparison between the passing of risk under the CISG and German 
law' (1999) 2,3,4.  Available at , http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/romein.html#passing   
3 William Tetley, Q. C., 'Sale of Goods the passing of title and risk a resume' Faculty of Law McGill 
University Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 29 
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69, as well the principles applying to the passage of risk, together with sanctions where the 
seller breaches the contract (Art 70).  However, the issue of delivery can be an important 
factor to be considered in the issue of the passing of risk, as the CISG allows the risk to be 
passed with property and also that the risk of loss of or damage to the goods to be passed to 
the buyer when delivery of the goods is effected in accordance with the provisions of the 
contract. An examination of different aspects of this issue and other related articles4 will 
also be carried out in this chapter. 
6.2 Risk and the Concept of Delivery 
It is necessary to consider whether the concept of delivery has served well to determine the 
time of the passing of risk, and whether there has been delivery of goods, then to determine 
the main issue which is whether the contract of sale involves the carriage of goods under 
the CISG. 
The concept of delivery is, in fact, the key principle in sales law in civil law countries; it 
can be seen in French law (namely deliverance).5 In the third Session of the Working 
Group, the UNCITRAL concluded that the concept of delivery under art 19 of the ULIS 
was an unsatisfactory way to approach the practical problem of risk, because such a 
concept of delivery leads to different interpretations and evident difficulties in practice 
,especially in international sale transactions where neither the seller nor the buyer, but an 
independent carrier, is in possession of the goods for a certain period of time.6 
In general, the handing over of the goods is complete when the goods are in the physical 
care of the carrier. For instance, in a case where damage was caused by improper loading 
by the seller onto a truck arranged by the buyer, the German court held that “handing over” 
requires that the carrier takes care of the goods, which implies an actual surrender of the 
goods to the carrier; and that it is necessary for the seller to load the goods onto or into the 
                                                 
4 Erauw, Johan. "CISG Articles 66-70: The Risk of Loss and Passing It." JL & Com. 25 (2005): 203..See 
Also Gustin, Manuel. "Passing of Risk and Impossibility of Performance under the CISG." International 
business law journal 3/4 (2001): 379-400 
5 Mahr, Benjamin, 'Is the Vienna Convention on international sale of goods too much influenced by civil 
law and should it contain a rule on the passing of property?' (2004). 
6 Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on shipping on the work of its third session, 
31 January - 11 February 1972, Geneva. Also see Mahr, Benjamin, 'Is the Vienna Convention on 
international sale of goods too much influenced by civil law and should it contain a rule on the passing of 
property?' (2004),9 
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respective means of transport; and that the risk only passes when loading is completed.7 
Similarly, in a Swiss case, the court found that the risk had not passed when the goods (a 
machine) fell on the ground from a fork lift and became unsaleable before the machine was 
loaded on a truck that arrived to pick up the goods.8 
On the other hand, a Chinese court held that the risk does not pass even when the goods are 
handed over to the carrier, if the seller fails to present a bill of lading to the bank issuing 
the letter of credit for payment within the time limit stipulated in the sales contract (with 
the consequence on that case that the bill of lading did not reach the buyer); without 
referring to art 67, the court held that the seller still bore the risk because of its breach of 
contract.9 
In the case where the parties agree to make the goods available at the seller's place of' 
business at a specific time but the goods were destroyed before delivery to the buyer, it is 
deemed that the seller has performed his contractual duty to deliver the goods and put them 
at the disposal of the buyer. However, under the rules on risk of loss under the ULIS, the 
risk would remain with the seller because the goods are still under his actual possession. 
Therefore, the approach chosen by the Working Group at the fourth session, was to draft a 
statement of the seller's duty with respect to performance of the contract rather than as a 
definition of the concept of the act of physical delivery.10 This can be seen clearly in art 30 
of the CISG, which regulates the seller’s obligations regarding the handing over of goods 
and documents.11 
From the foregoing it can be understood that the concept of delivery according to the 
Convention should not be restricted to the physical meaning of delivery, but should be 
                                                 
7 Landgericht Bamberg, Germany, 23 October 2006 (Plants case), available on the Internet at 
http://cisgw3.law. pace.edu/cases/061023g1.html 
8 Bundesgericht, Switzerland, 16 December 2008, available on the Internet at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081216s1.html. 
 
9 Wuhan Maritime Court, Hubei, People’s Republic of China, 10 September 2002 (Nanjing Resources Group 
v. Tian An Insurance Co. Ltd., Nanjing Branch), available on the Internet at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020910c1.html 
 
10 Report of the Working Group on International Legislation on shipping on the work of its fifth session, 5-16 
February 1973, New York.,24 
11 Prof. Dr. Peter Schlechtriem, 'Uniform Sales Law - The UN-Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods' (1986) Pace Law School Institute of International Commercial Law. Available At 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-06.html#b, 55 
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understood in a broader sense, which includes putting the goods at the buyer's disposal. In 
the case of default of the buyer to take possession of them, the risk of loss or damage will 
be passed, on the grounds that delivery has occurred by placing them at the buyer's 
disposal. 
Nevertheless, the delivery rule does not seem to be of much practical importance. As 
Flambouras highlighted, the parties normally express their own intention regarding the 
timing of the passing of risk under art 6 of CISG, thus excluding an application of the 
Convention.12  Accordingly, it can be said that the risk may pass at various times 
depending upon the circumstances and terms of the contract of sale, whether under one of 
the rules mentioned, or according to the intention of the parties. For that reason, the 
questions arising in this context are: which of these rules mentioned, including the 
intention of the parties rule, is the general and basic rule for the passage of risk? And what 
moment of the performance, among the various points mentioned above, determines the 
time of passing of risk?  
6.3 Passing of risk in cases involving Carriage of Goods- Article 
67 CISG: 
Article 67 (1) stipulates: 
If the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods and the seller is not bound to 
hand them over at a particular place, the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are 
handed over to the first carrier for transmission to the buyer in accordance with the 
contract of sale. If the seller is bound to hand the goods over to a carrier at a 
particular place, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are handed over 
to the carrier at that place. The fact that the seller is authorized to retain documents 
controlling the disposition of the goods does not affect the passage of the risk. 
 
It should be said that, it is common knowledge that contracts involving carriage of goods 
are the most commonly used in international sales contracts.13 Therefore, the first rule 
                                                 
12 Dionysios Flambouras, ' Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A 
Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ' (2001)) 87-149 Pace Institute of International Commercial 12. Also See 
Ulrich Schroeter, 'Freedom of Contract: Comparison Between Provisions of the CISG (Article 6) and 
Counterpart Provisions of the PECL' (2002) 6 University of Mannheim - Faculty of Law 257-266  
13 Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law 245-290. Available at, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bollee.html.   Also See VALIOTI, Zoi. "Passing of Risk in 
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concerning the passing of risk established in art 67 is: ‘If the contract of sale involves 
carriage of goods ... the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the 
first carrier.’ In this sense, the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to 
the first carrier for transmission to the buyer. However, the second part of article 67(1) 
seems to stipulate exception from the first part of the article, as it covers situations where 
the seller is bound to hand the goods over to a carrier at a particular place, and provides 
that the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are handed over to the carrier at that 
place. In turn, this leads to some essential questions: (i) when does a contract of sale 
involve the carriage of goods; and (ii) what constitutes the first carrier?  In addition to the 
issue of handover at particular places there is also the question of what roles they play in 
the passing of risk. 
6.3.1 Risk and contracts of sale involving carriage of goods 
As mentioned above, the majority of international sales involve the carriage of goods. One 
of the main difficulties of interpretation emerging from art 67(1) is the ambiguity of the 
expression “contract of sale involving carriage of the goods”.14 Seemingly, the CISG does 
not provide a specific rule of interpretation in terms of the timing where the contract of sale 
involves the carriage of goods15.  
According to the provision, the contract of sale may expressly or implicitly include that the 
goods are to be carried by including details with respect to the manner of carriage, e.g. CIF 
or FOB terms. To be more specific, the word cannot mean simply that a consequence of 
the sale will be carriage of the goods, as defined in art 67(1), but must refer to a provision 
in the contract, expressed or implied, requiring or authorizing carriage to be arranged.16 
Consequently, the carriage may be operated by one of the parties in the contract of sale, or 
                                                                                                                                                    
international sale contracts: A comparative examination of the rules on risk under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna 1980) and INCOTERMS 2000." 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 2 (2004): 01-51. Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/valioti1.html#iii.Also see D.E.Goodfriend, 'After the Damage is 
Done: risk of Loss Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods' (1983) Columbia Journal of Transnational Law., 589 
14 Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law, 245-290     
15 Dionysios Flambouras, 'Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A 
Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ' ((2001))   http://www.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio  
16 Barry Nicholas, 'Commentary on the International Sales Law' (1987) Pace Law School Institute of 
International Commercial Law. Available at, http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/nicholas-
bb67.html  
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by an independent carrier, depending on the circumstances and terms of the contract.17 
Essentially, the ambiguities in the expression under art 67(1), lie in determining whether 
the contract of sale of goods involves the carriage or not, which leads to a further question 
as to whether the seller or the buyer or independent party can be deemed as the carrier 
under the article. On the other hand, the silence of the parties concerning whether or not 
the contract involves carriage has to be construed on a case to case basis.18  
The application of arts 31(a) and 6 in lieu of art 67 of the CISG 
A further complication arising from the interpretation of art 67 can be seen in the following 
scenario. Suppose, the seller employs his own means to deliver the goods to the buyer; an 
essential question that demands an answer is whether the contract of sale involves 
carriage? If so, does the risk pass from the seller to the buyer when the seller loads the 
goods onto his own transportation, as art 67 makes it clear that the transfer of risk only 
occurs when the goods are handed over to a carrier? Is it sufficient for the seller to 
effectuate the carriage himself with his own means of transport and with his own personnel 
or does it have to be carried out by an independent carrier? All these factors will have a 
direct legal impact on the interpretation of the passing of risk.  
It has been argued that the term "involves" should be interpreted to require that the contract 
provides for the carriage of the goods.19 In practice, in contracts that do not provide where 
the buyer is to arrange for collection of the goods, the requirement is met in cases where 
the seller is required or authorised to arrange for carriage.20 For instance, in Frozen 
Chicken involving a French seller and a German buyer, the seller delivered the goods 
according to its general business conditions "free delivery, duty-paid, untaxed" and handed 
the goods over to a carrier. The buyer denied that delivery had taken place and the seller 
produced an unsigned receipt with the buyer's stamp on it in order to prove delivery. The 
                                                 
17 Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace 
Law School Institute of International Commercial Law 245-290. Available at, 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bollee.html.   Also See VALIOTI, Zoi. "Passing of Risk in 
international sale contracts: A comparative examination of the rules on risk under the United Nations 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna 1980) and INCOTERMS 2000." 
Nordic Journal of Commercial Law 2 (2004): 01-51. Available at 
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/valioti1.html#iii. 
18 Bernd von Hoffmann, 'Passing of Risk in International Sales of Goods' (1986) Ch. 8, 265-303. Available at  
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/vonhoffmann.html  
19 (n 16)487-495 
20 (n 14) 
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buyer refused to pay and the seller sued it for the outstanding purchase price.21  The court 
held that the buyer had no obligation to pay the purchase price under arts 66 and 67(1) of 
the CISG, as the risk had not been passed to the buyer when the goods were handed over to 
the carrier for transmission to the buyer. Under the term of free delivery, the seller was 
bound to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of business at his own risk, according to art 
31 and 6 of the CISG respectively. In other words, the fact that the seller arranged carriage 
insurance indicated its intention that it was ready to bear the risk of the transport of the 
goods. This would especially be the case where shipping of the goods is carried out by the 
seller’s own transportation.22 
The parties' intention to have the risk passed at the buyer's place of business in Germany 
was highlighted as the significant factor, and accordingly led the court to deviate to arts 
31(a) and 6 of the CISG. Although the contract of sale involved carriage of goods from 
France to Germany by the seller, the court did not apply art 67(1) in a case where the 
parties agreed that the goods would “be delivered free”, as the court interpreted the term as 
meaning that the seller is committed to deliver the goods to the buyer’s place of business. 
In other words, the court considered the buyer’s place of business was the place of delivery 
of goods, thus, such a contract of sale does not involve the carriage of goods according to 
art 67(1).23 By contrast, if the contract of sale involves carriage, but requires the seller to 
have the goods handed over to the buyer at a particular place, the matter is governed by the 
residual rule in art 69 and the risk will pass when the buyer takes delivery of the goods, as 
will be seen.24  
An arbitral tribunal also held the view that a carriage is deemed to be included in the 
contract if the contract provides that the buyer should pick up the goods at the seller's 
address and carry the goods to his own place of business, as decided by the Hungarian 
court in a case where the FOB contract required the Hungarian buyer to pick up the fish 
eggs at the Yugoslav seller's address and carriage the goods to his place of business in 
Hungary. Payment was due two weeks after the delivery of the goods, at which time the 
                                                 
21 (Frozen chicken case). Germany 20 November 1992 Appellate Court Karlsruhe  
22 Ibid. 
23 (n 21) 
24 Barry Nicholas, 'The Vienna Convention on International Sales Law' (1989) Pace Law School Institute of 
International Commercial Law, 201-243 
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UN embargo against Yugoslavia took effect in Hungary. The seller demanded the price of 
the goods; however, the buyer could not pay owing to the UN embargo.25 
It was held that the contract involved carriage under FOB terms and the risk of damage of 
goods passed to the buyer under articles 66 and 67(1) CISG. However, under a contract of 
sale which involves the carriage of goods, when it expressly or implicitly provides for 
subsequent carriage, the contract may expressly provide that the goods are to be 
transported through carrier by one of the parties, including details with regard to the 
manner of carriage, such as in the cases of CIF or FOB terms, which spell out which party 
has the obligation to arrange for a contract of carriage. In that sense, the court based its 
decision on the intention of the parties, where the parties intended to apply FOB terms, 
under which the risk passes to the buyer from the time of delivery, and because the 
delivery time was at the (Yugoslavian) place of business of the seller, the risk then passed 
at that time, even if the carriage was carried out by the one of the parties, which was the 
buyer in this case.26  
Clearly, the different decisions in relation to both cases are due to the different 
circumstances and the terms of each contract, even though both involved the transfer of the 
goods from one place to another by one of the parties, where one was by the seller and the 
other was by the buyer.  In other words, in the first case, the court depended on the terms 
of free delivery, in which the seller was bound to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of 
business and at his own risk based on the combined effects of arts 31 and  6 of the CISG 
which argue for the intention of the parties (clause-free delivery) and the circumstances of 
the contract: i.e. when the seller arranged carriage insurance, as well as the fact that the 
goods were carried for the buyer by the seller’s own means of transportation. This 
indicates that the seller meant to bear the risk of the transport of the goods. Despite the 
similar line of argument, however, the decision was different in the second case, due to the 
different circumstances and terms applied. In other words, in its interpretation of the 
parties’ intention the court applied the FOB terms, where the risk passes from the time of 
delivery and at the place of business of the seller. 
Therefore, it can be said that the concept of the contract of sale which involves the carriage 
of goods varies and depends on the circumstances of individual contracts. This can be seen 
in a German decision which held that a contract providing for delivery "free of charge" was 
                                                 
25 Választottbíróság csatolták a Magyar Kereskedelmi és 163 [HUNGARY Iparkamara 10 December 1996] 
26 Ibid.  
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still a contract involving carriage, where the buyer engaged the carrier and the seller was 
charged for the transport.27  Nevertheless, where the seller was to deliver the goods free at 
the buyer's address, with customs duties unpaid, it was held that the risk passed at the time 
of the place of delivery at the buyer's place of business.28 
Due to its non-mandatory nature, the parties may agree, under art 6 of the CISG, to exclude 
the convention's application, either as a whole or partially, or to derogate from the 
provisions of art 67; alternatively, they may be bound by trade usages or a course of 
dealing that derogates (art 9). Accordingly, if agreement between the parties is consistent 
with art 67(1), the provision would be applied. This is also true when the parties agree on 
terms that address the passing of risk, and the terms CIF29, C & F30 and “list price ex 
works”, are consistent with art 67(1). By contrast, if the trade term is inconsistent with art 
67(1), the agreement between the parties would prevail, in accordance with art 6, and the 
risk then passes according to art 69. Thus, although the goods in the cases examined above 
were handed over to a third-party carrier, the court did not apply art 67(1), due to the fact 
that the parties had agreed that the goods would be delivered “frei haus” (“free delivery”), 
which the court concluded to mean that the seller was assumed to deliver the goods to the 
buyer’s place of business.31 
It is noteworthy that, on deciding whether a contract of sale involves carriage or not, the 
issue of whether the contract of carriage is to be arranged by the seller or the buyer appears 
irrelevant.32 In other words, there is no problem that the sale involves carriage whether it is 
the duty of the seller to arrange the carriage, or the duty of the buyer to arrange the 
carriage. Furthermore, some cases apply art 67(1) without specifying which party was to 
arrange the carriage33. Namely, whether the word "carriage" should exclude situations 
where the carriage is wholly operated by one of the parties depending on the circumstances 
and terms of each contract. It appears that art 67(1) most likely applies at any time, 
according to agreement between the parties, as long as such agreement is consistent with 
                                                 
27 Benjamin's Sale of Goods(8th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, London ,2010),232 
28 Wire and cable case. SWITZERLAND Appelationshof Bern 11 February 2004 
29 Cantone del Ticino Tribunale d’appello, Switzerland,. 253 , 15 January 1998 
30 Cámara Nacional de Apelaciones en lo Comercial, Argentina 191 , 31 October 199. 
31 Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe, Germany 317, 20 November 1992.See Also 83J Hellner, `The Vienna 
Convention and Standard Form Contracts' in P Sarcevic and Volken (eds) Dubrovnik Lectures(1986) 335, 
344 - 345 ('Standard Form Contracts'). For the English approach, critique for the ship's rail and proposed 
solutions, see Ch. III.2(2) and (5), 3(1) and (2), 4(2) 
32 Audiencia Provincial de Córdoba. 247 [SPAIN Audiencia Provincial de Córdoba 31 October 1997 
33 Live sheep case. GERMANY Oberlandesgericht Schleswig 22 August 2002  
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article 67; nevertheless, the concept of delivery indicates an actual transfer of possession,34 
which assumes that the carrier is an independent entity from the parties within the 
contract.35 
Risk and Independent carrier 
 
As discussed above, art 67(1) applies to sales involving carriage performed by the 
contracting party or an independent carrier. In terms of “carrier”, it is a debateable term: 
some have suggested that the carrier must be self-employed and independent. In other 
words, the goods should be carried by a third party, and thus, the cases involving the 
carriage of goods by the parties themselves should not fall within the scope of art 67(1).36 
In view of that, a third party (i.e. an independent carrier) should be responsible for the 
carriage of goods, as the phrasing of art 67(1) "when the goods are handed over to the first 
carrier ... If the seller is bound to hand the goods over to a carrier", expressly states that 
the seller is supposed to hand over the goods to a carrier, meaning a third party, because it 
is not possible to give the goods for carriage to himself.37  
It has been argued that the primary rule of the CISG is that risk passes at such time as 
when the seller delivers the goods to the first carrier. Under traditional terms, the passing 
of risk typically occurs when goods pass from the ship's rail or are delivered on board.38  
Hager is of the same opinion that carriage should be made by an independent carrier and 
not by the seller's personnel. Otherwise, it is open to the buyer to accuse the seller for not 
exercising due care and leads to an increase in the possibility of dispute and litigation 
                                                 
34 John O. Honnold, Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations Convention (3rd 
edition edn Kluwer Law International, 1999)..369-1, n.369-2. discussion infra Ch.II, Part I.A.1, A.2 
35 (n 15)  
36 D.E.Goodfriend, "After the Damage is Done: risk of Loss Under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" (1983) 22 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 575, 
593.See Also F.Enderlein and D.Maskow, International Sales Law (Oceana Publications, 1992). 265  
37 Dionysios Flambouras, ' Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A 
Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ' (2001)) Pace Institute of International Commercial .106. See Also 
D.E.Goodfriend, "After the Damage is Done: risk of Loss Under the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods" (1983) 22 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 575, 
593 
38 Neil Gary Oberman. Transfer of risk from seller to buyer in international commercial contracts: a 
comparative analysis of risk allocation under the CISG, UCC and Incoterms n. 111 (available at 
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between the parties.39  Furthermore, when the goods are carried by the seller, he has to bear 
the risk himself, as a carrier whose liability is covered by insurance, the seller-carrier is 
linking risk, underwritten by an insurance policy, with carrier's duties. This would increase 
his eagerness in meeting his obligation in terms of transporting and delivering the goods 
safely. Consequently, the possibility of bad faith on the seller carrier's side during the 
transit could be eliminated. Accordingly, in the case where the seller carries the goods by 
his own means of transport, these do not fall into the scope of art 67(1) but art 69 (1), 
where the seller bears the risk until the goods are delivered to the buyer.40 
Hence, according to this opinion, under art 67(1) the risk passes only if goods are delivered 
to an independent carrier. Consequently, the handing over goods to a carrier which belongs 
to the seller (or his personnel) is not sufficient for that purpose, simply because the 
delivery of the goods to the carrier indicates the transfer of the possession of those goods 
(i.e. the power to control the goods) and consequently the carrier must be an independent 
legal entity.41 
In contrast, Nicholas argues that having the goods placed on board the vessel of the first 
carrier on the instructions of the seller could be interpreted as constituting a handing over 
by the seller, thus rendering the second sentence of article 67(1) applicable42. However, this 
view was challenged by Berman and Ladd, on the grounds that a literal interpretation of 
the first sentence of art 67(1) applies only if the seller, and not the first carrier acting as the 
seller's agent, hands over the goods to a carrier at an intermediate point43. They are of the 
view that, Nicolas’s interpretation would nullify the Convention's primary rule that risk 
passes on delivery to the first carrier.44 The reason behind this provision is the non-splitting 
of risk during transit, so that, in order to avoid problems of proof and arbitrary solutions, 
                                                 
39 Ingeborg Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) 
(Third Edition edn Oxford University Press, 2010). See Also D.Flambouras, "Transfer of Risk in the 
Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods", available at 
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Commentary on the International Sales Law. The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention (Milan: Giuffrè, 1987).  
40 (n 34) 
41 Honnold , Uniform Law for International Sales n. 369-1. See Also Sylvain Bollée, 'The Theory of 
Risks in the 1980 Vienna Sale of Goods Convention' (1999-2000) Pace Law School Institute of 
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risk is borne by one person for the whole of the transit process.45 In light of recent 
developments in international trade, and especially with respect to the transport of 
containers, unless damage or loss is due to an identifiable cause, it is difficult to assess at 
what stage of the transit loss or damage occurred and therefore who bears the risk. 
Furthermore, with regard to modern contracts of carriage, the carriage frequently involves 
multimodal transport operators, and includes a series of different modes of carriage, as 
well as a series of different carriers.46 
Flambouras emphasises the significant role played by the control criteria in determining 
whether the carrier is an independent entity or not in the case where the seller is an owner 
of a company which conducts transport operations or forms part of his firm. Consequently, 
whether the seller has “an absolute control” over such a freight company or not holds the 
key to the issue of an independent carrier. In the case where the subsidiary is only formally 
independent, but in reality the seller has substantial or complete control over it, art 67(1) 
will not be applicable. On the other hand, if the seller is not closely related to the 
subsidiary company, then art 67(1) will be applicable and the buyer should bear the risk 
during transport, since the goods are not significantly under the seller's control.47 
In this regard, the freight forwarder should not be considered an independent entity, unless 
he accepts liability of the risk of goods to take part on the carriage of the goods. In other 
words, the criterion of liability to take control of the goods would constitute a criterion in 
determining whether the carrier belongs to the seller or not.48 Nevertheless, a different view 
suggested by Hager and agreed by Valioti is that the freight forwarder should be 
considered as the first carrier, and risk should pass to the buyer from the moment when the 
goods are handed over to him, since he forms an independent entity, which takes control of 
the goods.49 Similarly it has been held that delivery to a freight forwarder is the equivalent 
of delivery to the first carrier.50 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the carrier as an 
independent entity was not expressly incorporated into the provision of art 67(1), which 
means that the door is open to different interpretations and this could attract criticism. 
                                                 
45 Goodfriend, 'Risk of Loss under the CISG' (1984) 22 Col. J. Trans'l Law 575, 579 
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47 Ibid. 
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6.3.2 Critical evaluation of art 67(1) 
From the foregoing discussion, it can be said that, when the goods are carried by the seller 
or by a carrier belonging to the seller himself (or his personnel), the emphasis should not 
be placed on art 67(1) but on the agreement of the parties, in accordance with art 6; 
consequently, the risk will pass according to art 69 of the CISG. Art 69 applies to the case 
where the parties agreed that the seller bears the risk under the term of free delivery, where 
the seller is bound to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of business at his own risk on 
the basis of arts 6 and 31, as seen in the Frozen Chicken case.51 
Following the examination of the debates on the term “independent carrier”, the 
independent carrier theory fits well with respect to cases where the goods are carried by the 
seller. However, at the same time, it seems to omit the consequential impacts of the buyer’s 
duty, i.e. whether the carriage of the goods operated by the buyer himself is considered 
under such a theory or not. In fact, it appears that the independent carrier theory disregards 
the case where the contract provided that the buyer should pick up the goods at the seller's 
address and carry the goods. The literal interpretation of an independent carrier would have 
excluded the buyer from being considered as an independent carrier under art 67(1), as in 
the Hungarian case where the court held that the contract involved carriage.52  
In spite of the fact that the risk will be passed at the time of delivery when the carriage of 
the goods is operated by one of the parties, based on the agreement between the parties,  
nevertheless, the research shows that the time and place of delivery could make a 
difference in terms of determining whether arts 67(1) or 69 will be applied. Where the 
parties agree for the carriage to be operated by the seller, the risk will pass at the time of 
delivery at buyer's place according to art 69. Consequently, the risk will not be passed to 
the buyer when the goods were handed over to the carrier during transit and during the 
carriage process by the seller to the buyer. This is because the goods were not yet delivered 
and are still under the control of the seller. Similarly, the case of delivery at a particular 
place to the buyer would see the application of art 67(1),53 because the risk passes at the 
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time the goods are handed over at a particular place to the buyer, which corresponds with 
the provisions of this article. 
From the discussion in the previous section, it can also be supposed that an independent 
carrier theory is based on the liability and control criteria on the physical possession of the 
goods. However, the paradox is that such criteria may also correspond with the case where 
the buyer is the carrier. Therefore, restricting the application of art 67(1) to the case where 
the carrier is an independent entity is undoubtedly  unsatisfactory in practice, on the 
ground that this provision can also be applicable in the case where the delivery of goods is 
to be operated by the buyer as examined above.54 Moreover, although the independent 
entity carrier theory seems logical in excluding the seller from the scope of application of 
art 67(1), it is illogical and unpractical with respect to excluding the buyer where the 
contract of sale can involve carriage of goods, by an independent entity or by the buyer 
himself. For both cases, the risk does not always pass to the buyer when the goods are 
handed over to the first carrier, as it is sometimes subject to exceptions. Thus, according to 
the second sentence of the first paragraph,  if the seller is bound to hand the goods over to 
a carrier at a particular place, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are 
handed over to the carrier at that place, and according to the second paragraph of article 
67, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract.  
These issues are discussed below. 
 
6.3.3 Risk and Carriage from a particular agreed place 
In international shipping, goods sometimes can be agreed to be handed over to the carrier 
at the agreed place specified by the seller.55 Accordingly, the seller may only discharge 
himself from the risk when he hands over the goods to the carrier at the place provided 
under the contract of sale. In fact, the expression “handing over” in art 67(1) of the 
Convention actually fulfils the delivery obligation. It means that the goods must be 
transferred to the carrier's physical control at an agreed place, or made available for 
delivery at an agreed place and at a specific (and agreed) time, and is fulfilled as soon as 
the carrier obtains physical possession of the goods for the purpose of carriage. The fact 
that the seller is authorised to retain documents controlling the disposition of the goods 
does not affect the passage of the risk.  
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It seems that this rule could be suitable to be applied for FAS contracts, where the risk 
passes when the seller places the goods alongside the ship on the port. The same rule 
applies to FOB and CIF contracts as well56 as seen in a Spanish court decision, where the 
dispute was over goods that were defective upon arrival, arising from a contract of sale 
agreed between an Italian seller and a Spanish buyer. During the performance, however, 
when the goods were loaded at the Italian port, the captain of the vessel signed the 
document bearing the remark "clean on board". It was held that, in view of the type of 
contract entered into between the seller and the buyer regarding the delivery and carriage 
of the goods, following arts 31 and 67 of the CISG, the liability of the seller ceased when 
the goods were loaded on the vessel at the port of origin; consequently, from that moment, 
the risk passed to the buyer. It is clear that, under such contracts the ship’s rail could be 
seen as the boundary between the seller and buyer as the risk passes at this place.57 In this 
sense, under FOB terms, ‘at the agreed port’ equates to delivery at a particular place. 
Significant points can be taken from the wording of art 67(1) involving contracts of sales 
which include carriage of goods, in the words "handing over", and the relationship between 
the first and second sentences of art 67(1). It could be understood that the primary 
difference between part one and part two of art 67(1) lies in the place of delivery, in the 
sense that under the first part, the seller is not required deliver the goods at particular place, 
while he is obliged to hand them over at a particular place under the provision of part two 
of art 67(1). In other words, the risk under part two does not pass to the buyer until the 
goods are handed over to the carrier at the agreed place, unlike part one, where the risk 
passes to the buyer when the goods are physically handed over to the first carrier.   
However, a difficulty in interpretation arises under the second sentence of art 67(1), where 
the seller is bound to hand the goods over at a particular place, and arranges for the goods 
to be transported to the particular place by an independent carrier, and for this carrier to 
place them on board the ship. In such a case, it is not clear which sentence of art 67(1) 
should apply. If this “placing on board by the carrier on the instruction of the seller” is 
treated as the equivalent of “a handing over by the seller”, the second part applies. On the 
other hand, it could be argued that the seller is not bound personally to hand the goods over 
at a particular place, but merely to arrange that the goods are so delivered. Then, the case 
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would be presumably governed by the first sentence. Under this construction, the second 
sentence would apply only where the seller uses his own transport facilities to carry the 
goods on the first part of their journey. 
This thesis submits that the first interpretation is preferable58 on the grounds that if the 
second one were adopted, it would make the distinction between the first and second 
sentences meaningless. In any case, the risk remains with the seller while the goods are 
transported in his vehicles,59 otherwise, it would not provide a solution different from that 
of the "first carrier" rule, while the second sentence is supposed to be a further 
qualification to the first. The same result would then follow from a single sentence, 
providing that the risk passes to the buyer when the goods are handed over to the first 
carrier.60 However, this is not the only exception as the application of art 67(1) may also be 
precluded in certain circumstances, particularly when the goods are not identified, 
according to the second paragraph. 
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6.3.4 Risk and Identification of the goods under art 67 of the CISG 
6.3.4.1 Unascertained goods 
Article 67(2) provides that risk does not pass to the buyer "until the goods are clearly 
identified to the contract." This principle can be seen in many legal systems,61 since it is 
common for goods to be shipped under more than one contract of sale, or for a larger 
quantity of goods to be shipped than is needed to satisfy the contracts which the seller has 
so far made. In the case where the goods are sold as unascertained goods, the provision 
imposes an additional condition to the passing of risk, which is identification of such goods 
to the contract of sale. 
It is common that the seller may sell undivided bulk goods for the performance of several 
contracts, such as in the sale of oil contracts, or even a larger quantity of goods than is 
needed to fulfil the contracts he has made. In fact, if a portion of such unidentified goods is 
lost or damaged accidentally, it would be unfair to allow the seller to decide which goods 
are to be delivered to which buyer. Therefore, the policy underlying art 67(2) is to prevent 
the seller, in case of loss or damage of such goods, from falsely claiming that the lost or 
damaged goods were those purchased by the buyer.62 In other words, this provision is an 
attempt to protect the buyer from the false claims of the seller.63  
 
It is necessary, therefore, that the goods are identified and that this occurs through a list of 
the type of acts provided by art 67(2), whether by markings on the goods, by shipping 
documents, by notice given to the buyer or otherwise. Apparently there is no specific act 
required, as the list is in no way exhaustive.  For instance, the Swiss court noted that the 
parties to a CIF contract agreed that the risk of loss would pass when cocoa beans clearly 
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identified to the contract of sale were handed over to the carrier at the port of shipment.64 In 
another instance, the German court’s emphasis was placed on whether the goods were 
clearly identified by the description of the goods in the shipping documents65.  This 
approach is based on the practice that the name of the buyer is normally marked on the 
goods, or the person entitled to claim delivery from the carrier may be inferred from the 
shipping documents. Particularly, the bill of lading then entitles the buyer to receive goods 
that are clearly identified to the contract by the shipping documents. Similar to the 
approach taken by the German court, an arbitral tribunal in Russia found that a seller could 
clearly identify the goods for the purposes of the contract by means of shipping 
documents.66 
Benjamin holds the view that identification involves the selection the article which has 
been agreed within the terms of the contract of the sale of goods. Such responsibility 
usually falls on the seller, who is in the better position to identify and select the goods 
which are to be sold, but this responsibility may also possibly be placed on the buyer by 
consent of the seller also.67 For instance, the parties may agree to have the buyer himself 
separate the goods from the bulk and carry them away, for there will normally be an 
appropriation by actual delivery.68 Such an act of selection in fact, may occur by the action 
of delivering the goods. In this sense, the seller’s delivery of the goods to the buyer, which 
is in conformity to the contract described, would be regarded as identification, which is 
assumed to be unconditional and subject to the consent of the buyer. Logically, this is 
because the buyer received the goods and therefore the goods have become known and 
clearly defined.  
However, although sometimes the intended concept of delivery which can be effective in 
making them the goods identified goods is the physical delivery concept, this is not always 
the case. Other methods may include putting the goods at the buyer's disposal, as the 
seller's duty with respect to performance of the contract.  This is due to the fact that in 
many situations the buyer is not named as consignee in the bill of lading. For example, the 
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seller often prefers to send the goods to himself as the consignee at the port of arrival. This 
is particularly true in situations in which payment has not been received by way of letter of 
credit. Then the seller wants to maintain the possibility of disposing of the goods in case 
the buyer does not procure payment on the presentation of the bill of lading. Consequently, 
the bill of lading may not be a suitable means of identifying the goods to the contract.69 
Therefore, Gustin has suggested that the notice given to the buyer is not a prerequisite to 
identification.70  
 Moreover, such a notice of dispatch provides identification of goods to the contract after 
the risk has passed from the seller to the buyer: when handing the goods over to the first 
carrier or to the sea carrier. The question arises whether or not such identification has 
retroactive effect. In fact, many laws support the viewpoint that an identification of goods 
to the contract that took place after the goods had been lost does not have retroactive 
effect. 
6.3.4.2 Issue of retroactive passing of risk 
The use of notice to the buyer as a means of ascertaining goods can raise the issue of 
retroactive passing of risk imposed on the buyer. Actually, in answering this question, the 
reference to “notice to the buyer” in art 67(2) should be read in conjunction with art 27 of 
the CISG. According to art 27, in the post-contractual communications, any 
communication including a notice given in an appropriate manner entitles the dispatching 
party to rely on its content. Consequently, according to art 27 of the CISG, dispatching 
such a notice to the buyer is sufficient to identify the goods, so long as it has been properly 
dispatched by the seller, in sense that the risk passes when the notice is dispatched and not 
retroactively from the time of shipment.71   
Indeed, like the CISG, several legal instruments support the viewpoint that an 
identification of goods to the contract that took place after the goods have been lost does 
not have retroactive effect, but with different emphasis. The opposite view, however, has 
been defended in, art 100 of the Hague Sales Convention, which states that: If, in a case to 
which paragraph 3 of Article 19 applies, the seller, at the time of sending the notice or 
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other document referred to in that paragraph, knew or ought to have known that the goods 
had been lost or had deteriorated after they were handed over to the carrier, the risk shall 
remain with the seller until the time of sending such notice or document. Clearly, art 100 of 
the ULIS emphasises the importance of the buyer’s knowledge in terms of the notice and 
the passing of risk from the seller to the buyer only in those situations in which the buyer 
knew or should have known at the time of sending of the document that the goods handed 
over to the carrier have been lost or damaged. This implies that, according to the Hague 
Convention, identification of goods to the contract generally has retroactive effect.72 
The approach adopted by the Working Group in the CISG in drafting a statement of this 
issue was clearly completely different from that of the ULIS.  Article 67 (2) of the CISG 
employs unambiguous language, where the risk only passes when the seller gives notice to 
the buyer and not with retrospective effect. It is true that such use of language may 
possibly avoid dispute and undesirable situations with regard to whether or not the seller 
was bona fide in sending the notice. It also encourages the seller to send the notice to the 
buyer without delay, and normally it should be possible for the seller to send the notice of 
dispatch immediately after he has handed over the goods to the carrier73 In general, it may 
reduce the relevant problems considerably and reduces the chances of litigation.74 On the 
other hand, it has been argued that, it may possibly lead to the probability of dispute and 
problems of proof regarding the exact time that the damage or loss occurred, and whether 
or not the damage occurred before sending notice, especially, with respect to the issue of 
good faith and problems of proof regarding the exact time that the damage or loss 
occurred,75 in the case if the buyer did not receive such notice. 
6.3.4.3 Principle of dispatch and receipt 
The use of notice cannot be discussed separately from the principle of dispatch and receipt. 
The last part of art 27 of the CISG states that, a delay or error in the transmission of the 
communication or its failure to arrive does not deprive that party of the right to rely on the 
communication.  In fact, this part of art 27 can raise the issue of whether such notice has to 
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be received by the buyer or not. Although, it can never be concluded that art 27 establishes 
the general dispatch principle for the whole CISG, it can be said that art 27 applies to Part 
III of the CISG. Unlike the declarations covered in Part III, Part II declarations are, for the 
most part, expressly regulated under the receipt theory.76 In other words, during the 
contract’s performance, the risk that a communication will be delayed is governed by art 
27. Any delay of communication will not deprive the sender the right to rely on the 
communication as if it was received. Thus, even though art 27 does not expressly state that 
the communications are effective from their dispatch, the result is the same because even if 
the communication never arrives, it is still deemed to be effective.77 
Despite the fact that it is unfair for the buyer to bear the risk when the notice was never 
received, it has been considered that the general rule that the risk of delay, error or loss in 
respect of a communication is to be borne by the addressee arises out of the consideration 
that it is desirable to have, as far as possible, one rule governing the risks of transmission. 
Although the Convention contains exceptions to this rule, in cases where it was considered 
that a communication ought to be received to be effective,78 the rule in art 27 of the CISG 
as can be interpreted as an instance of the dispatch theory, where it is not necessary that the 
notice reaches the buyer, at least with respect to part III of the CISG, regarding passing of 
risk.79 Practically, the German court referred to art 27 of the CISG and rejected the receipt 
principle in a case where the defendant, as the seller (a German intermediary), claimed that 
it had given notice of non-conformity to the claimant the buyer (a Hungarian company) via 
fax, while the claimant alleged that it had never received such a fax.80 
On the other hand, while the CISG adopts the dispatch principle with regard to 
identification of goods to the contract by the notice, several other legal instruments follow 
the viewpoint that the notice must be received by the addressee in order to identify the 
goods to the contract. Under English statutory, law the act of appropriation whether by 
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notice or otherwise, has no legal consequences, unless it has been assented by another 
party in the contract. Consequently, the party with assent of appropriation will in effect be 
an offeror.81 Furthermore, both the UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European 
Contract Law PECL, for example, adopt the receipt principle as a general rule. Article 
1.9(2) of the UNIDROIT Principles stipulates that [a] notice is effective when it reaches 
the person to whom it is given. In the same way, art 1:303(2) of the PECL states pertinently 
that any notice becomes effective when it reaches the addressee. In this respect, both these 
articles follow, in substance, the rule in Part II of the CISG.82 
Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that art 27 of the CISG is optional and subject to the 
party autonomy principle, where the parties are also at liberty to set other requirements 
according to their intention, such as receipt being necessary for communications to be 
effective. In the absence of an explicit agreement, usages or practices established between 
the parties can modify the principle stated in art 27 of the CISG.83 
 
6.3.5 Risk and identified bulk of goods 
 
Practically, the provision provided in art 67(2), requires the identification to be clear, that 
is, specific and precise, before the risk is passed. This requirement may create difficulties 
of interpretation regarding the nature of shipment of bulk goods, together with goods 
designated to other buyers of the same kind (unascertained goods forming part of an 
identified bulk). This is because the nature of the shipment may not allow the goods to be 
ascertained before being distributed among various buyers, for instance, in the cases of 
transportation of wheat or oil and generally of liquid cargos. An interesting point is 
whether the requirement of identification is satisfied in the case of shares of fungible goods 
contained in an identified bulk.  Issues such as the ascertaining the goods and the timing of 
the risk being passed from the seller to the buyer have to be examined in the compliance of 
art 67 (2).  
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The cases of fungible bulk goods and of collective consignments present a special issue, 
not only in the CISG but in most legal systems as well, due to the difficulties in 
determining the exact time of the passing of risk in such shipments. In fact, different 
opinions and possibilities have been envisaged, with an attempt to find solutions to this 
issue. Enderlein argues that the identification takes place only when the goods are divided 
among the various buyers, with the taking over of the goods. In the sense, the designation 
of the shipment in bulk is not sufficient for there to be a clear identification to allow the 
risk to be passed. He suggests that the risk should pass with the taking over of the bulk 
which is destined for several named addressees, because it is clear that the goods intended 
for every one of these buyers is contained in it. Consequently, in the case of an accident, 
the issue of identification will arise if the bulk is damaged or lost. However, in the event 
that only part of the bulk is damaged or lost, it has to be assumed that the buyers, who are 
not identified yet, bear the risk pro rata of their part in the delivery and the remaining 
goods would have to be delivered accordingly.84 
On the other hand, Honnold argues that the buyers should not be held to have agreed to 
loss sharing in an identified bulk unless this result is clearly indicated by the contract; 
further the situation should be considered separately in each case and it should be clear 
from the terms of the contract: for instance, heating oil loaded onto the ship designated to 
buyer A and the sale of the other half to party B, where such a contract would normally 
state the price per unit (e.g., barrel) and the approximate total quantity. Then, if the 
contract provides that risk in transit falls equally on buyers, the risk will be passed equally, 
as long as that is indicated by the contract. In other words, there is no reason the risk 
cannot be passed to the buyer, even though the goods are fungible bulk goods, as long as 
the approximate total quantity has been calculated clearly and the parties have agreed that 
the risk would pass to the buyer.85 
However, according to Gustins, there are two possibilities regarding identification of the 
goods to the contract relating to the collective consignment. According to the first, the 
designation of the shipment in bulk is not sufficient to constitute a clear identification; the 
risk therefore remains with the seller. Another interpretation suggests that there is 
sufficient identification if the buyer is given notice that the goods acquired are in a 
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specifically ascertained cargo, even if such goods are mixed up with other goods. In 
fulfilment of these criteria, the risk of partial loss is borne proportionally by each buyer86. 
In the case of partial loss, the risk is borne by each buyer proportionally (pro rata). In the 
case where the entire consignment is lost, each individual buyer or consignee will bear the 
losses equally.87 Thus the pro rata solution may work in a total loss.  
Nevertheless, the pro rata solution has been criticised in the case of deterioration in goods 
shipped. The criticism is centred on the potential in legal battles, which can be time 
consuming in the world of trade, where speed is the essence, simply due to the seller’s 
failure to clearly appropriate the goods, or where the carrier has not delivered the goods to 
a particular buyer.88 
This issue is avoided in a different way under the English law, in the amended Sale of 
Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, which is aimed to the pro rata division solution in 
situations regarding the undifferentiated part of an identified bulk and the risk then passes 
to the buyer retroactively.89 The situation under the CISG seems ambiguous, where the 
Convention does not have any specific rules pertaining to these kinds of goods. This opens 
the door for different interpretations as none of the above theories is adopted by the CISG.  
This situation can be seen in Honnold’s attempt to invoke the amendment of the second 
paragraph of the provision in the 1978 Session of the UNCITRAL Working Group. He 
argued that the existing text laid undue emphasis on identification by specifying that goods 
should be marked with an address.  That was not the most usual means of identification 
and was unworkable for bulk goods in practice.  For the reason of clarification, he 
proposed a more flexible formulation, which would be more in tune with commercial 
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practice. However, the drafters of the convention disregarded this idea and the ambiguous 
article remained unchanged and subject to different interpretations.90 
Further interpretation is suggested by Ramberg, following comments made on the article, 
who holds the view that no cases have provided guidance on the issue. However, he 
suggests that in addition to a pro rata solution, another solution for the passing of the risk 
would be to keep the original seller at risk until the goods have arrived at the destination. 
He further argues that the risk should not pass until effective appropriation has been made, 
in order to seek consistent interpretation between art 67(1) of the CISG and Clause B5 of 
the INCOTERMS 2000,91 which reads: ‘that the goods have been duly appropriated to the 
contract, that is to say, clearly set aside or otherwise identified as the contract goods.’92 
This does not differ in substance from the latest version of Clause B5 INCOTERMS 2010 
which reads: The buyer must bear all risks of loss of or damage to the goods from the time 
they have been delivered in accordance with A4.93 
Furthermore, such a view is supported by the Secretary-General, who suggested that such 
transactions would be subject to the basic principle that the risk cannot pass until the goods 
in question are identified. Accordingly, once the bulk was identified, the risk would pass 
with respect to a share in the bulk.94 In support of this view, it has been stated that 
provision of art 67(2) refers particularly to bulk goods and collective consignments. 
According to the wording of the provision, such types of goods can only be identified 
when the seller puts markings on the goods, when the goods are expressly indicated in the 
shipping documents, when the seller gives notice to the buyer, or in any other way,95  To 
sum up, the CISG considers fungible bulk goods as unascertained goods, and thus the risk 
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does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract. This 
interpretation could indicate that art 67(2) covers both types of goods. 
Although, there are several interpretations regarding this issue, it seems there is no definite 
answer, at least under the CISG. It has been said that as the Convention did not 
contemplate such difficulties, parties are strongly advised to expressly provide the exact 
time of the passing of risk in their sale of goods contracts when the sale involves fungible 
goods in identified bulks under arts 6 and 7 of the CISG.96  Additionally, it has been noted 
that with respect to the discussions leading to the final draft, although the drafters made a 
few references to the passage of risk in a fraction of a larger bulk, they did not incorporate 
a specific provision on the subject in the final draft.97 Such gaps mean the provisions 
remain ambiguous.  
6.4 The passing of risk with goods in transit- Article 68 CISG 
Risk in the goods in transit was provided in art 68 of the CISG98 which stipulates:  
The risk in respect of goods sold in transit passes to the buyer from the time of the 
conclusion of the contract. However, if the circumstances so indicate, the risk is 
assumed by the buyer from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier who 
issued the documents embodying the contract of carriage. Nevertheless, if at the time 
of the conclusion of the contract of sale the seller knew or ought to have known that 
the goods had been lost or damaged and did not disclose this to the buyer, the loss or 
damage is at the risk of the seller. 
 
This provision clearly deals with goods sold in transit, no matter whether it is carried out 
by road, rail or sea transportation. This usually occurs where the seller has bought in 
advance large cargos of oil, wheat, natural gas, and metals and generally goods that are 
carried in bulk and start these goods on their journey towards a destination without having 
previously sold the goods and without knowing the recipients, as well as where the goods 
have passed through several hands until reaching their final destination. Under these 
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circumstances, the contracts of sale will be concluded while the goods are in transit 
process.99 According to art 68, the risk passes to the buyer at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract.  
However, this rule is qualified in the same article by the second part of the provision, 
which stipulates that if the circumstances so indicate, the risk is assumed by the buyer from 
the time the goods were handed over to the carrier, who issued the documents embodying 
the contract of carriage. Nevertheless, the buyer’s burden in terms of risk will not be 
passed if the seller knew or ought to have known that the goods had been lost or damaged 
and did not disclose this to the buyer. In such a case, the risk remains with the seller who 
fails to exercise due diligence or acted in bad faith. 
Clearly, this article allows flexibility and party autonomy, where the risk of goods sold in 
transit could be borne by the buyer or the seller or by both, according to the accompanying 
conditions and circumstances of the contract. In other words, in principle, the risk could be 
borne by the buyer from the time of the making of the contract and by the seller if the 
seller knew or ought to have known that the goods had been lost or damaged and did not 
disclose this to the buyer. It could be also borne retroactively by the buyer, from the time 
the goods were handed over to the carrier, or loss or damage can be at the risk of the seller 
before and after conclusion of the contract, according to part three of the article.  
   
6.4.1 The buyer bears of risk at the time of conclusion of the contract 
The first sentence of art 68 appears to be clear and unambiguous, where, the risk of the 
goods sold in transit passes to the buyer only at the time of conclusion of the sales 
contract.100 In that sense, the seller disposes with the risk once the contract is concluded and 
then the buyer will bear the risk of the goods. It appears that, the drafters see the risk in 
stages: before the goods were purchased and after the conclusion of the contract.101 
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Critically, the passing of risk from the time of conclusion of the contract of sale may create 
difficulties with regard to determining the time when damage occurred to the goods in 
transit, especially when damage results from processes like water seepage or overheating, 
where the problem may be more serious.102 Thus, such a rule may lead to disputes between 
the parties and be further complicated by insurance issues. In this regard Mr. Rognlien, the 
delegate to the Vienna Conference from Norway, argued that the passing of risk rule had to 
be founded on purely practical considerations. For example, in such a case, the original 
seller would have to take out an insurance policy covering at least the period in which he 
himself bore the risk. The cost of such insurance would be included in the cost to the buyer 
in the form of a corresponding increase in the price of the goods. It would therefore fall to 
the buyer or the successive buyers to take out additional insurance, because the risk would 
in fact pass while the goods were in transit. In terms of costs, the buyer pays the costs of 
insurance twice; once through the price of the sale and once from the moment the purchase 
is completed. Consequently, he argued that the time of passing of risk should not take 
place while the goods in transit process.103 
Furthermore, it has been argued that, the buyer who examines the goods is in a better 
position to claim against the insurance company or the carrier. Therefore, the risk should 
be borne by the buyer from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier.104 This is 
the position is taken by art 99 of the Hague Convention (ULIS)), which reads: ‘Where the 
sale of goods in transit by sea, the risk shall be borne by the buyer as from the time at 
which the goods were handed over to the carrier.’105  
Nevertheless, the 1978 draft gave rise to further controversy and caused some delegates of 
the developing countries to voice their uneasiness with the idea of risk passing 
retroactively to the buyer.106 Those delegates highlighted the issue of unfairness caused by 
placing the risk on the buyer before the time of the conclusion of the contract, especially, 
in CIF contracts, where placing the risk on the buyer from the time of shipment would 
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mean  the buyer would have to pay for goods that were already damaged or lost, which was 
usually covered by seller’s insurance.107 
In this regard, the researcher is of the opinion that the meaning of ‘goods sold in transit’ 
deserves further examination in relation to risk. It was said that the word ‘sold’ cannot 
have the technical meaning that it has in some legal systems, connoting goods the property 
of which has passed to the buyer. With no express provision dealing with the passing of 
property in the CISG, a more logical interpretation should only refer to goods made the 
subject of a contract of sale after they have been shipped and are on their way to the 
destination.108 Moreover, the buyer could not have any insurable interest until he contracted 
to buy the goods. Additionally, such a provision has led to mandatory insurance of the 
goods, resulting in a further transfer of resources from Third World to developed 
countries,109 since the insurance market has generally been controlled by the developed 
countries. Such a result was also unfair to buyers in developing countries, who would often 
prefer not to insure the goods but rather to bear the risk themselves.110 
Moreover, such an interpretation would not add much to what is likely to follow from the 
application of the rules governing the burden of proof, since, in most cases, the buyer bears 
the burden of proof and, consequently, if he fails to establish the proof, that of the loss. In 
short, if the time when the loss or damage occurred cannot be established, it is likely to be 
assumed by the buyer.111 Considering the issues of fairness, insurance practice and burden 
of proof, modification was made the first part of the draft provision allowing the risk to 
pass generally when the contract is concluded. Furthermore, art 68 would not work for CIF 
and CFR terms where the risk will pass to the buyer from the moment when the goods pass 
the ship's rail at the port of shipment. Apparently, this option creates an unfair situation 
regarding the buyer, where the buyer has to bear any loss or damage to the goods even 
before the contract is concluded, i.e., from the moment when the goods pass the ship's rail 
at the port of shipment.112 
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It has been suggested that, in order to avoid such situations, it is recommended that parties, 
involved in such contracts, applying party autonomy, should agree in advance to the point 
in which risk is to be passed.113 In other words, parties could agree that risk passes either at 
the beginning of the contract or at the end of transit;114 consequently, the issue could be 
avoided.115  
6.4.2 Passing of risk at the time the goods are handed over to the carrier 
The second sentence of art 68 stipulates that, if the circumstances indicate otherwise, the 
buyer will bear the risk of loss from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier 
who issued the documents embodying the contract of carriage. The approach established 
by the second sentence of art 68 appears to be the exception to its ambiguity in 
definition.116  
Generally, the term ‘circumstances’ seems here to refer to the intention of the parties, 
expressed, implied or inferred from the circumstances of the contract.117 In other words, 
such circumstances very often are associated with the intention of the parties, where the 
parties intend to pass documents embodying the contract of carriage to the carrier at the 
time the goods were handed over to the carrier. Consequently, it is reasonable to require 
the buyer to assume the risk. Due to the importance of party autonomy, the reading may 
also imply that the risk can be passed retroactively even before the conclusion of the 
contract, if the parties so wish.  
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It has been widely argued that this pre-condition should include the transfer of the 
insurance policy to the buyer118 or the buyer takes out a retroactive insurance cover to cover 
the risk, which is possible if he is not yet aware of the loss.119 Nevertheless, Heidelberg has 
defined such circumstances as objective circumstances, independent of any legal 
arrangements.120 He further rebutted the argument that cases where the insurance only 
insures the risks from the time of conclusion of the contract or when the goods are not 
insured at all should fall into the scope of the first part of art 68 of the CISG and the risk 
should pass at the time of conclusion of the contract.121 Here, the reason that an insurance 
considered an objective circumstance, indicates that the risk is assumed to pass to the 
buyer from the time of the conclusion of the contract, according to part one of art 68 of 
CISG. 
In this regard, the Russian court held that the risk in respect of goods sold in transit passes 
from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier who issued the documents 
embodying the contract of carriage,122 when the goods were purchased on CFR and CPT in 
Petersburg. To be precise, the court viewed the actual timing of the risk passing to the 
buyer being the time when the goods have been delivered to the first carrier at the ship's 
rail in the port of shipment (St. Petersburg). Furthermore, this risk was passed to the buyer 
retroactively, before the conclusion of the contract. 
It has been suggested that the second sentence of the rule should be applied when the 
precise moment when the loss or damage occurred cannot be established, to avoid the 
difficulties of proof which arise from splitting of risk  and to prevent disputes between the 
parties.123 Furmston argues that this view is grounded on the basis that the risk will be 
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passed onto the buyer at the same time of his reasonable physical possession of the goods, 
since the buyer can take care of the goods as the actual holder of the goods.124 
Although, such a construction would certainly have practical advantages, it cannot be 
reconciled with the legislative history of art 68, especially in that the CISG, generally, is 
not concerned about preventing the problems arising from splitting of risk.  However, it 
appears that such a construction would not add much to what is likely to follow from the 
application of the rules governing the burden of proof.125 
On the face of it, the transferring of risk retroactively seems unfair for the buyer, where the 
buyer bears the risk of the goods before the contract or even before the passing of property. 
On the other hand, this rule is clearly consistent with the view which places the risk upon 
the party who is in physical possession of goods, as well as following principle of delivery 
which adopted by the CISG. In other words, the buyer rather than the seller has a practical 
and immediate interest in the goods, and as long as the circumstances so indicate, the risk 
is assumed by the buyer from the time the goods were handed over to the carrier who 
issued the documents embodying the contract of carriage, since the buyer is bound to take 
reasonable care of the goods, hence bearing the risk.126 Apparently, the physical possession 
and taking care of the goods by the buyer is the crucial factor under this rule, where the 
goods are regarded as being in physical possession of the buyer from the time the goods 
were handed over to the carrier who issued the documents embodying the contract of 
carriage. 
Although, the first sentence of art 68 stipulates that where the goods are sold while they are 
in transit, the risk normally passes to the buyer at the time the contract is concluded, there 
is a discrepancy with terms where the risk passes to the buyer from the moment when the 
goods pass the ship's rail at the port of shipment. The second sentence clearly provides 
some exceptions, allowing space for party autonomy, and falls in line with such terms 
where risk passes on conclusion of the contract retrospectively, as from ship's rail at the 
port of shipment, if the circumstances so indicate (e.g. if the insurance policy is to the 
order of the assured or has been endorsed to the buyer). Obviously, the party autonomy 
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principle plays significant role under the second sentence of art 68, where the risk passes to 
the buyer retroactively, from the time of the handover to the carrier, based upon the 
parties’ agreement, which takes priority over the typical rule of the first sentence of art 
68.127  Nevertheless, the retroactive passing of the risk under the second part of art 68 ought 
to apply only in favour of a seller who acts diligently and in good faith.  
                                                 
127 Peter Schlechtriem and Petra Butler, UN law on international sales: the UN Convention on the 
International Sale of Goods (2008). See Also Honnold J, Uniform Law for International Sales (3rd edn, 
1999), 371 
Chapter 6   
183 
 
6.4.3 Exception to retroactive assumption of risk - the seller’s actual or 
presumed knowledge 
The third part of art 68 states that there is no retroactive assumption of risk if, at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract of sale, the seller knew or ought to have known that the 
goods had been lost or damaged and did not disclose this to the buyer. Accordingly, if the 
seller fails to disclose the loss or damage, the loss or damage is at the risk of the seller, 
meaning the seller is punished for his bad faith.128 This sentence acts as an exception to the 
general rules in allocating risk in the goods in transit. However, the question that arises is 
whether this sentence refers to both previous sentences or not?  
In this regard, it has been argued that it refers only to the second sentence, since the risk 
does not pass from the moment the contract is concluded if the loss or damage had already 
been affected, if the seller knew or is supposed to have known about it129. Furthermore, it 
has been submitted that, such interpretation would not add anything to what the first 
sentence itself provides. Since the risk passes to the buyer at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract, it is immaterial whether the seller was then aware of the loss or not, where in 
both cases the risk is with the seller. 130  Accordingly, it can be said that this provision 
restricts the application of the second sentence of art 68. Thus, the passing of risk cannot 
have retroactive effect, even when the circumstances so indicate, if the seller acted in bad 
faith at the time of the sale.131 
Nevertheless, the question that arises with respect to interpretation of the provision of the 
third sentence is whether the seller should bear only the damage or loss that he knew about 
at the time of the sale, or does his obligation extend to any possible damage existing at the 
time of the sale and in respect of which he had no knowledge? Additionally, it needs to be 
established whether the seller is liable for damage which, even though caused after the 
sale, is caused by circumstances which were concealed from the buyer at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract? The history of the third sentence of art 68 of the CISG does not 
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provide any guidance. Initially a conscious decision was made to adopt a rule which, 
unlike the rule in ULIS, placed the entire risk on a seller who was not acting in good 
faith.132 This creates a loose definition which can be subject to different interpretations.  
According to Schlechtriem, the meaning of this sentence encompasses only the damage 
that the seller knew or ought to have known about by the time of the conclusion of the 
contract. In this sense, the seller is only liable upon the risk occurring before the time of 
the conclusion of the contract; otherwise, the risk is with the buyer. Clearly, this approach 
was not adopted to emphasise the link between the second and third sentences of art 68,  
and suffered a further setback in terms of the issue of burden of proof.133  
In contrast, after a review of suggestive legislative history, Nicholas supports a different 
view and argues that the seller should bear the risk for the loss or damage before and after 
the conclusion of the contract, and that the seller’s knowledge is immaterial, as long as it 
was caused by the same damaging event as that which caused the original damage.134 
Nicholas noted that such an interpretation has the advantage of avoiding a splitting of the 
transit risks as well as addressing the difficulties arising from the burden of proof.135 
Honnold warmly welcomes this approach as far as it supports holding the transit loss on 
the seller but is doubtful about the basis and advisability of a “causally connected” 
limitation. As suggested, under the final version of art 68 the provision concerning the 
effect of seller’s knowledge relates only to the second sentence, in which retroactive 
passing of risk depends on “circumstances”, such as shipping documents and policy of 
cargo insurance. These circumstances dividing the loss can involve complications in 
sharing responsibility for salvage and in sharing claims under one policy of insurance. 
When a seller knows of the loss and does not disclose this to the buyer, the seller’s conduct 
constitutes or amounts to fraud.  
Consequently, it has been argued that, non-disclosure of the loss when the seller was aware 
of it amounts to fraud and constitutes a serious breach of contract.136  Therefore, the main 
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protection for the buyer against the seller’s bad faith lies in the remedies. Hence, such 
conduct by the seller allows the buyer to avoid the contract; in that sense arts 67, 68 and 69 
do not impair the remedies available to the buyer on account of the breach.137 Besides, the 
lex contractus may provide that in such circumstances the contract can be void.138 In the 
sense, if the seller knew or ought to have known that the goods had been damaged, he 
should have communicated this fact to the buyer so that the buyer could decide whether to 
buy into such a situation. In other words, the loss or damage is at the risk of the seller, 
meaning that the buyer can exercise all remedies available in case of breach of the contract, 
according to arts 45 and 70 of the CISG,139 to be examined later. 
Indeed, although art 68 has been cited in several reported decisions, these decisions failed 
to interpret its meaning.140 Apparently, interpretation of the third sentence in this article is 
still ambiguous and contentious, where there seems to be another gap within the CISG 
framework. Consequently, interpretation and settling of this issue seems to be referred to 
art 7(2) of the CISG, in conformity with the general principles which it is based on, or, in 
the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules 
of private international law. Consequently, art 7 of the CISG could play a significant role 
with respect to determining which risks should be borne by the seller. Apart from this, art 
68 also remains unclear as to whether it is necessary for the passing of risk in sales of 
transit goods for the goods to be identified to the contract. This will be discussed in the 
next section. 
6.5 Identification of the goods under article 68 of the CISG 
As has already been examined, art 68 CISG deals the passing of risk in the case where 
goods are sold in transit. This type of sale can involve bulk goods where the partitions of 
the goods remain unknown at the pre-shipping and shipping stages.141 What can be argued 
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is that this provision clearly does not require goods to be identified before the time of the 
passing of risk. This may be adduced by the reading of the Convention itself, in the case of 
identified goods before shipment. While arts 67 (2) and 69(3) require identification for risk 
allocation, this element is clearly absent from art 68.142 
It has been argued that even though art 68 does not explicitly require the goods to be 
clearly identified for the passage of risk to occur, its general view is referring to art 67, 
where the goods must be clearly identified.143 Nevertheless, nothing in the text of art 68 
would justify interpreting these words so as to cover the case of goods that are already 
appropriated or identified after the start of the transit to a contract concluded before the 
start of that transit. This demonstrates the absence of a definition in art 68 CISG 
corresponding to the requirement of clear identification in art 67 (2) of the CISG.144 It has 
been submitted that, under this article the risk in respect of goods sold in transit would not 
pass on shipment if the shipment was of unascertained or unidentified goods for 
transmission to various consignees.145 
However, such a view may face problems arising from bulk goods designated to several 
buyers, as art 67 itself fails to provide a definite answer to this issue. Attempting to resolve 
this problem, Schwenzer states that two different situations must be distinguished. If the 
contract entitles the seller to deliver a collective consignment, risk passes to the buyers at 
the time laid down in art 68 and they bear any loss pro rata,146 as discussed.   In this case 
the risk should pass with the taking over of the bulk which is destined for several named 
addressees, because it is clear that the goods intended for every one of these buyers is 
contained in it.   
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On the other hand, if the seller is not entitled to deliver a collective consignment, the basic 
principle underlying art 67 (2) means that risk should pass to the buyer only when the 
goods have been clearly identified to the contract. From the buyer's point of view, the 
simplest solution is to shift the transit risk onto the seller by means of a special clause, such 
as the out-turn clause used in the oil trade. Indeed, according to this view, the rule of art 67 
is applicable upon the situation in art 68, even though that art 68 does not explicitly require 
the goods to be clearly identified.147 In support of that, The United Nations Secretary-
General suggested that such transactions would be subject to the basic rule that the risk 
cannot pass until the goods in question are identified.  It was argued that once the bulk was 
identified, the risk would pass with respect to a share in the bulk.148 
On the other hand, there is no provision which prevents the passing of risk in the case of 
unascertained goods under art 68 of the CISG. Although some interpretations have linked 
the passing of risk in unascertained goods under provisions of art 68 to the provisions of art 
67(2), where the goods must be ascertained before the risk passes, such  views did not 
make their way into the Convention. Therefore, the priority will be given to the legal 
provision of art 68, which is devoid of this requirement.  In other words, depending on the 
literal interpretation of legal provisions, art 68 must be applied literally, even in absence of 
the requirement. Accordingly, it may be acceptable for the risk to be passed even if the 
goods are not identified, which may create problems and disputes because of the lack of 
explicit provision regarding identification of the goods. Thus, it would be worthwhile to 
put an explicit provision requiring identification of the goods on the lines of articles 67 and 
69 of the CISG.  
6.6 The passing of risk in contracts not involving carriage of 
goods (the residual cases) Article 69 CISG 
Article 69 of the CISG provides that:  
(1) In cases not within articles 67 and 68, the risk passes to the buyer when he 
takes over the goods or, if he does not do so in due time, from the time when the 
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goods are placed at his disposal and he commits a breach of contract by failing to 
take delivery. 
(2) However, if the buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than a 
place of business of the seller, the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is 
aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. 
(3) If the contract relates to goods not then identified, the goods are considered not 
to be placed at the disposal of the buyer until they are clearly identified to the 
contract. 
 
After dealing with cases involving carriage of goods by a carrier and sale of goods in 
transit, the convention deals with the residual cases in art 69, covering those potential 
situations which are not covered by the previous articles.149 This provision applies to all 
contracts that do not involve carriage of the goods by a carrier150 and is intended to make a 
distinction between art 67 involving carriage of the goods and art 68 involving goods being 
handed over to a carrier. 
The distinction can be seen in the interpretations given by the courts and tribunals, where 
the German court concluded that a contract term “list price ex works” was not inconsistent 
with art 67, on the ground that  the goods were to be taken by a third party carrier from 
Japan.151 A similar logic was also applied by an arbitral tribunal which applied art 67(1) to 
a contract that provided that “the buyer has to pick up the fish eggs at the seller's address 
and take the goods to his facilities in Hungary” and that the price was FOB Kladovo.152 On 
the other hand, an arbitral tribunal found that art 69 (2) rather than art 67 governed the 
passing of risk, in terms of a contract where the seller agreed to deliver the goods under the 
“DAF” (“Delivery at Frontier”) INCOTERMS.153 Accordingly, by deciding that in cases 
not within art 67 and 68, risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods or, if he 
does not do so in due time, from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal when 
delivery is due and he is aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal. 
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Similarly, under EXW contract risk passes from the moment when the goods have been 
placed at the disposal of the buyer at the seller’s premises and requires notice to be 
given.154 However, under the CISG, if the parties have agreed on a specific date for taking 
over the goods, a failure to do so constitutes a breach of contract when the agreed time has 
passed, or if they did not agree on a specific date, when a reasonable period has passed 
after the buyer has received notice that the goods are ready for taking over, as will be seen 
later.155 
Indeed, within this residual provision, the first paragraph of art 69 is itself residual on 
risk156. The second paragraph of art 69 applies when the buyer is bound to take the goods at 
a place other than a place of business of the seller,157 taking over of the goods at another 
person’s premises or at a public warehouse or handing over of the goods by the seller to 
the buyer or to a carrier named by the buyer.158 This provision refers to the situation where 
the buyer is bound to take over the goods at a place other than the seller's place of business. 
This narrows the scope of paragraph (1) to sales where the taking of possession must occur 
at the seller's place of business,159 where the first case is covered by art 69(1) and the last 
two cases are covered by art 69(2). The conditions which need to be fulfilled for the 
application of art 69 will be critically examined below.  
6.6.1 Taking over goods at seller’s place of business 
Article 69 covers the passing of risk in cases outside the scope of arts 67 and 68. The 
primary condition for its application is that ‘the goods are placed at his [the buyer’s] 
disposal’. The term “disposal” actually indicates the actions of the goods have been 
delivered at the seller’s premises and the buyer is in the actual or “presumed ought to” 
position to take over the goods and exercise custody of the goods. However, these two 
premises are subject to the condition of “packaging identification”, added in art 69(3).160  
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Once all three conditions are established, the risk is deemed to be passed from the seller to 
the buyer from the moment he takes over the goods, as the buyer is viewed as the party in 
the best position to arrange insurance covering any loss to the goods due to the fact of 
“being put at his disposal”.  
The presumption and later policy underlying this rule is that the party in custody of the 
goods is in a better position to look after them, protect them and take out an insurance 
cover, providing that the parties did agree on a specific time for the buyer to be in custody 
of the goods or the buyer has received a notice of readiness. As the goods are very likely to 
be in the seller's premises which is likely to be covered by a standard building and contents 
insurance policy,161 there will be few difficulties in establishing the buyer’s actual 
awareness of the delivery of the goods.  
However, the words “buyer’s presumed knowledge of the delivery” may cause further 
issues in international trade, as no requirement of notice is imposed on the seller.  
Complications may arise with the potential combination of seller’s negligence and the 
passing of risks. In particular, the burden of proof placed on the buyer to prove that 
damage to something which is in the seller's custody was caused by the latter's negligence 
is unreasonable.162 
6.6.1.1 Risk and the issues of buyer’s actual or presumed taking over the goods  
According to Heidelberg, the meaning of “taking over the goods” means taking actual 
physical possession of goods. This can be effected by the buyer and the representatives of 
the buyer, such as a forwarding agent carrier. Placing the goods only at the buyer's disposal 
does not suffice.163 In other words, the rule is that the risk passes to the buyer when he 
takes actual physical possession on delivery of the goods, and not placing the goods at the 
disposal of the buyer. However, a unilateral act of the seller does not suffice. The 
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reasoning behind this is that the seller should assume the risk as long as the goods are 
under his control. 164  
Moreover, if the buyer bore the risk while the goods are in the seller's custody, the latter 
would be exempted from duty of care towards the safekeeping of the goods, which would 
cause further disputes.165 
 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the CISG does not permit an interpretation that art 
69(1) does not specify physical handling of the goods as the time when risk passes. Over 
and above this, the second part of art 67(1) clearly distinguishes between the activities of 
making the goods available and taking control of them, which makes such a construction 
dubious. Hence, “taking over” by the buyer implies that the buyer or his agent has actual 
control of the goods. This interpretation is consistent with the policy underlying the first 
part of art 67(1), in that the seller should bear the risk as long as he has control of the 
goods and therefore the means of protecting them.166 
However, the researcher is of the view that the interpretation of art 69(1) should not be 
limited to the actual knowledge but other factors as well. Insisting on the interpretation of 
“actual knowledge” under art 67 (1) would fail to consider the possibilities of buyer’s 
actions, which amount to the knowledge or the buyer’s reluctance in taking over the goods 
for other reasons. In the former case, one may wonder whether the buyer should be 
considered as having the knowledge of the delivery and having taken over the goods as 
soon as he is handed over documents of title, such as a bill of lading.  Moreover, the focus 
of art 69 concentrates on the actual activities of making the goods available and taking 
control of them leaves some room for factual disputes over whether such transfer of control 
had actually occurred. 
This view is also supported by Bollée who states that buyer’s taking over the goods as soon 
as the exchange of documents is completed is essential for the rule that the goods are taken 
over as soon as they are placed at the buyer's disposal.167 Furthermore, according to a 
residual character of art 69(1) the risk passes anyway, as soon as the seller has placed the 
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goods at the buyer's disposal at his place of business. The buyer’s failure to take over the 
goods (default of acceptance) would amount to a breach of contract. Consequently, the 
second part of art 69(1) provides that if the buyer fails to take delivery in due time, the risk 
passes to the buyer from the time when the goods are placed at his disposal and such delay 
amounts to a breach of contract.168  
In this context it has been argued that a failure to take over the goods in due time 
constitutes a breach of contract if the agreed time for taking delivery has passed, or if no 
time has been agreed or a reasonable period has expired after the buyer has received notice 
that the goods are ready for delivery.169 In the case where a notice was issued by the seller 
or in the form of a de factor notice being provided in a sale of goods contract, 170 it may be 
reasonable to see the buyer being punished for his non-diligent behaviour for not taking 
over the goods, thus the latter bears the risk following a breach of contract.171  
However, the non-requirement of notice under art 69(1) would see the risk being passed 
even though the goods are still under the custody and control of the seller, as long as the 
agreed time for taking delivery has lapsed. Moreover, such a result would obviously be 
contrary to the general policy of the CISG. When the risk passes at delivery time, in the 
sense of physical possession, it is very likely to create disputes between the parties, 
particularly in case of loss or damage of the goods while they are under the seller’s 
custody, as discussed. Under these circumstances, the issue can be further obscured with 
the buyer’s possible accusation of the seller’s failure to exercise due diligence to protect 
the goods diligently.172   
In this regard, the debates took place over the proposal made by the Australian delegation 
to amend art 67(1) to consider the exchange of documents as controlling the disposition of 
the goods sold, which was rejected at the Conference, with the Norwegian delegation 
emphasizing that “placed at his disposal” covers only the goods as such and not any 
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documents.173 Goodfriend lent his weight to the Norwegian view and supports the view that 
a better interpretation of art 69 (1) is that there can be no “taking over” by the buyer until 
the buyer or his agent has the actual control of the goods. This also comports better with 
the policy underlying the first part of art 69(1) that the seller should have the risk of loss as 
long as he has control of the goods as well as the means of protecting them, which amounts 
to “disposal”.174  
However, the researcher holds the view that the issue does not lie in the physical taking 
over of the goods, but the buyer must be aware. In other words, unilateral disposal by the 
seller is not sufficient, the buyer must be aware that the goods are at his disposal whether 
by notice or by any other act that would render the buyer aware  According to 
Schlechtriem,175 notice is necessary only in the case where no date is agreed and reasonable 
time is presumed176 and the case where the buyer is bound to take over the goods at the 
seller's place of business. However, different rules will be applied when the buyer bound to 
take over the goods at a place other than a place of seller’s premises. 
6.6.2 Taking over goods at other locations 
In contrast with art 69 (1), the emphasis under art 69(2) is on “the place other than the 
seller’s premises”. Accordingly, if the place of delivery is other than the seller's place of 
business then art 69 (2) comes into effect. Paragraph (2), however, is a special provision 
for cases where the buyer is to take over the goods from a place other than a place of 
business of the seller.  Different places of delivery determine the application of paragraph 
(1) or paragraph (2) of art 69, in the sense that the provision under paragraph (2) applies 
where the buyer is bound to collect the goods at a place of delivery other than the seller's 
place of business, such as a public warehouse or another party's manufacturing premises 
where the finished goods are located.  
In such cases the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is aware of the fact that 
the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. Here the policy considerations are 
different from the one underlying art 69(1). The policy underlying art 69(2) is based on the 
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consideration that the seller is in no better position than the buyer to protect and insure the 
goods or to pursue any claims arising from them, when the goods are placed at a place 
other than the seller’s premises.177 
The same paragraph also applies to the case in which the contract of sale involves the 
carriage of goods but outside the scope of art 67(1). Although the applicability of art 69(2) 
to the public warehouse has been noted earlier, the duty to hand the goods over to the 
buyer at the destination port does not imply handing them over to a carrier there. Indeed, 
under international practice, the seller's obligation ends when the goods are unloaded from 
the transnational carrier. Therefore, the second sentence of art 67 (1) does not apply to 
such a contract, even in the unusual case where the contract of sale provides for the 
subsequent inland transport, since the seller is not “bound to hand the goods over to a 
carrier”. Hence, art 69 (2), rather than art 67 of the CISG, would logically apply.178 
Employing the same argument, it may be also applied to the case in which the contract of 
sale involves the goods being carried by the seller or by a carrier belonging to the seller 
himself. In other words, the seller bears the risk under the term of free delivery, where the 
seller is bound to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of business at his own risk, simply 
because the combined effects of arts 6 and 31 of the CISG would see the exclusion of art 
67(1) and the residual effect of art 69(2) which allows these types of contracts to be 
interpreted accordingly, as one sees in the Frozen Chicken case,179 where the destination 
contract was seen as falling outside the scope of the provisions of either the first or second 
sentence of art 67(1). Accordingly, art 69 (2) should apply and the buyer would not assume 
the risk of loss until the goods arrived and the seller would retain the risk of loss until that 
point.180 
6.7 The Relationship between Articles 67(1) and 69(2) 
Despite the efforts to distinguishing the different situations by the application of arts67 (1) 
and 69(2) respectively, at this juncture, it is worth examining the inter-relationship and 
difficulties which may arise from these two provisions. An interrelationship between arts 
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67(1) and 69(2) of the CISG may, in fact, create difficulties with regard to interpretation of 
art 67(1) and the scope of the coverage of art 69(2) in terms of their applicability. 
Arguably, in the absence of a clear indication of “the particular place”, such as other than 
the destination in the second sentence of art 67(1), it may be possible to interpret that 
sentence as applying to a destination contract. In terms of the scope of coverage, the 
provision of the first sentence of art 67(1) would be read as relating to shipment contracts, 
while the second sentence relates to destination. Article 69(2) would thus be restricted in 
its application to situations in which the buyer takes over the goods at a public warehouse. 
In its plain meaning, the second sentence of artv67(1) may be interpreted to apply to a 
destination contract to include an obligation by the seller to hand over the goods to an 
inland carrier at the buyer's port. Since neither the buyer nor his place of business is 
usually at the port itself, this would not be an unreasonable obligation. In particular, the 
overall objective of the CISG is to provide efficient provisions with broad coverage of 
typical contracts involving carriage of goods. 
The different scope of the application can also be observed from the perspective of 
international practice. Indeed, under international practice, the seller's obligation ends 
when the goods are unloaded from the transnational carrier. Consequently, the second 
sentence of art 67(1) apparently does not apply in the situation covered by art 69(2), where 
the contract of sale provides for the subsequent inland transport, since the seller is not 
bound to hand the goods over to an inland carrier. In keeping with regular commercial 
practice and trade usage, this interpretation of art 67(1) above should be rejected and art 
69(2) should apply.181 Furthermore, the conditions of “delivery must be due”, “the goods 
must be placed at the buyer’s disposal” and “the buyer must be aware that the goods are at 
his disposal” act as the positive conditions which must be fulfilled in the application of art 
69(2), where see the risk passes only when delivery is due and the buyer is aware of the 
fact that the identifiable goods are placed at his disposal. 
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6.8 Conditions to be fulfilled in the application of art 69(2) 
6.8.1 Delivery must be due 
Under article 69(2), the buyer's liability for the risk of loss does not arise until delivery is 
due. In other words, the seller has to fulfill his obligation to deliver the goods at the due 
time, whether at the agreed time or within a reasonable period of time.182 It is worth noting 
that the maturity of delivery under art 69(2) should be understood in conjunction with art 
33 of the CISG which states that:  
The seller must deliver the goods: (a) if a date is fixed by or determinable from 
the contract, on that date; (b) if a period of time is fixed by or determinable 
from the contract, at any time within that period unless circumstances indicate 
that the buyer is to choose a date; or (c) in any other case, within a reasonable 
time after the conclusion of the contract. 
 
Under art 33 of the CISG, the seller has to place the goods at the buyer's disposal at that 
time (art 33(a)) or within that period (art 33(b)) when a fixed date was specified in the 
contract or when the period for delivery was assumed from usage or practice. If there is no 
such agreed provision, the seller has to place the goods at the disposal of the buyer at a 
warehouse, a place of manufacturing or at a place of destination within a reasonable time 
after the conclusion of the contract.  
As stated, the buyer's failure to take delivery would constitute a breach of contract on the 
buyer's part. Such a breach would still see the risk of non-performance remaining with the 
seller until he has placed the goods at the disposal of the buyer. When the goods are placed 
at the buyer's disposal earlier than the due time, the risk does not pass to the buyer until 
delivery is due.183 It has been argued that, the delivery becomes mature at the time in which 
the seller is obligated to deliver and the buyer has the right to claim the delivery.184 
Nevertheless, the difficulty arises when the seller delivers the goods earlier than the due 
time. In other words, when the goods are prematurely placed at the buyer's disposal, before 
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delivery is due. In such a hypothetical scenario, it has been well argued that, in principle, 
the buyer is not bound to take delivery but may choose to do so. However, if the buyer 
opted for the taking of delivery, then he should bear the risk.185 
In a case involving a Norwegian seller (the plaintiff) selling raw salmon to a Danish 
company, it was further sold to a German buyer (the defendant) after being processed. The 
Norwegian seller sent a confirmation order to the buyer. Pursuant to this, under the DDP 
contract, the seller had to deliver the raw salmon to a specified delivery address, which was 
other than the company's place of business. Upon receipt of the confirmation order, the 
buyer signed and returned this order to the seller, through the Company. Subsequently, the 
seller delivered the raw salmon to the Company and sent the invoices to the buyer. The 
invoices indicated the Danish company's place of business as the delivery address. As a 
result of the bankruptcy of the Danish company, the buyer did not receive the raw salmon 
and  refused to pay the purchase price.  
The court applied art 69(2) which states that: if the buyer is bound to take over the goods at 
a place other than a place of business of the seller, the risk passes when delivery is due, 
and further found that the risk of loss had passed when the seller delivered raw salmon to a 
third party processor, because the buyer acquiesced in the delivery and delivery was due. 
In other words, the seller discharged its delivery obligation, although delivery occurred at a 
place other than the place stipulated by the contract and the DDP contract, as the buyer was 
named as recipient of the raw salmon in the delivery note.186  
On the other hand, it has been suggested that such a strict and literal interpretation of art 
69(2) might see that the risk remaining on the seller, even if the buyer picks up the goods. 
Nevertheless, the present researcher would argue against such a suggestion as it obviously 
is contrary to the general policy of the Convention. Therefore, it is argued that the risk 
should pass to the buyer when the buyer accepts to take over the goods prior to the 
scheduled date.187  
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6.8.2 The goods must be placed at the buyer’s disposal    
The second condition employing a different approach from the general policy rule in art 
69(1), is the passing of risk under the provision of art 69(2), which does not depend on the 
buyer's taking possession of the goods. In other words, the risk does not pass only at the 
time at which the goods are actually taken over by the buyer, but could be passed at the 
time at which the goods are placed at the buyer's disposal, when delivery is due.188 Goods 
are placed at the disposal of the buyer once the seller has done what is necessary for the 
buyer to be able to take possession of the goods. Normally, this would include the 
identification of the goods to be delivered, the completion of any pre-delivery preparation 
to be done by the seller, such as packing, and the giving of such notification to the buyer as 
would be necessary to enable the buyer to take possession.189 Unlike the provision in art 
69(1), the goods are not delivered at the seller’s place of business and the practical 
considerations involving insurance practices, mentioned above, do not apply under art 
69(2); consequently, there is no reason for risk to remain with the seller, as long as he has 
fulfilled all his obligations required.190  
This view remains consistent with commercial practice embodied in INCOTERMS (2000), 
where under a sale "Delivered Ex Ship" risk passes to the buyer when the goods are placed 
at the disposal of the buyer (A4, A5, B5), where the seller has fulfilled his obligation to 
deliver when he has made the goods available at his premises (i.e. works, factory, 
warehouse) to the buyer.191 
 Hager has argued that, while the unilateral act of placing the goods at the buyer's disposal 
would be seen as sufficing for the purpose of art 69(2), the seller should do everything 
necessary to enable the buyer to take control of the goods. For instance, if the goods are in 
a warehouse, the seller should give instructions to the warehouse keeper or should give the 
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buyer an effective delivery order and the goods are at the buyer's disposal if he can require 
the warehouseman to deliver them to him.192   
This view also corresponds well with the issue of insurance. Placing the goods at buyer's 
disposal under art 69(2) is actually justified by the argument that the seller normally does 
not insure goods which are not in his care, or at least when the seller is not in a more 
favourable position than the buyer to insure the goods, to watch over them, and to claim 
damages from the insurance company. In case of a long-distance sale of goods, the seller 
placing the goods at the disposal of the buyer at the place of business of the buyer or at a 
third place would see the seller being unable to be in any better position to exercise the 
duty of care, hence an unreasonable burden on the seller. In such case, it would be more 
reasonable to place the risk upon the buyer. In the case where transport documents are 
required for handing over the goods, the goods are not placed at the disposal of the buyer 
until these documents have been handed over to him.193 
6.9 3. The buyer must be aware that the goods are at his 
disposal 
The buyer must be aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal. This 
awareness must be positive and can be brought about by the handing over of documents or 
by any other (informal) message.194 Without such knowledge, it would be difficult to 
contemplate a case where the buyer is in breach of contract for not taking over the goods.195 
The requirement of buyer’s awareness is supported by Bridge, who argues for the seller’s 
positive duty to ensure the arrival of the notice at the buyer’s end, on the grounds that the 
reasonableness of the imposition of the duty lies in the fact that the seller is placed in the 
best position in terms of the awareness of the dispatch of the notice. Bridge’s view 
corresponds with a ruling of a German court, where the German buyer did not receive the 
‘positive notice’ sent by the seller advising the storage of the furniture delivered to a 
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Hungarian warehouse, in which the furniture subsequently disappeared after the 
bankruptcy of the warehouse owner. The court held that the buyer was not obliged to pay 
the price according to art 66 CISG, because the seller failed to persuade the court on the 
point of the arrival of the notice at the buyer’s end. The failure of ensuring the arrival of 
the notice at the buyer’s end would not see the conditions of “the buyer’s awareness” and 
“being placed at his disposal” being fulfilled.196 However, the seller may be exempted of 
the duty for sending the positive if the parties have agreed on the timing for placing the 
goods at the buyer's disposal in the contract, for the reason that the buyer should already be 
aware of the time when the goods will be placed at his disposal.  
At this juncture, it is worth noting the differences between the notice requirements under 
art 69(1) and (2). According to art 69 (1) the risk passes when the buyer commits a breach 
of contract by not taking delivery of the goods, whereas that is not necessary under art 
69(2) of the CISG. Moreover, under paragraph one, when the parties have agreed on a 
specific date the buyer does not have to be notified that the goods are at his disposal. In 
contrary, under paragraph two, the buyer should actually be aware that the goods are ready 
to be taken over by receiving a notification. Seemingly, the policy behind this is that in 
these cases the goods are under the control of neither of the parties and therefore none is in 
a better position to look after them - the risk, in that case, should pass to the buyer as soon 
as he is in a position to take delivery of the goods. On the other hand, in the absence of 
such an agreement, the seller must notify the buyer that the goods have been placed at his 
disposal. As awareness implies actual knowledge, it is essential that the notice is not 
effective unless received by the buyer.197  
The interpretation of the action of sending notice will be construed by the general rule of 
art 27 CISG, which states that notification becomes effective from the time of dispatch. On 
the other hand, art 24 of the CISG, which expressly relates to the conclusion of the 
contract, thus has to be applied to other cases where the receipt or similar conditions are 
required. Therefore, in this regard, it has to proceed on the assumption that a notice was 
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received, meaning that art 24 suffices, even when, exceptionally, has not informed the 
buyer.198 
In particular, where goods are warehoused, the risk passes when the buyer becomes aware 
of the fact that the goods are at his disposal and requires the warehouse keeper to deliver 
the goods to him, if the contract demands it. Such a demand arises from the situation where 
the warehouse keeper has acknowledged the buyer’s right to possession of the goods, or 
the seller provides the buyer with a document in which the warehouse keeper promises to 
deliver the goods’.199 It has been argued that such a delivery note containing only an 
instruction is not sufficient to affect the passing of risk to the buyer.200 Roth further noted 
that the seller should give the buyer a delivery note with a fixed time for the collection of 
the goods.201  
Indeed, while the rule under paragraph one is that the risk passes to the buyer when he 
takes delivery of the goods either by actual, physical possession or by handing over 
documents, the passing of risk under the provision of art 69(2) does not depend on the 
buyer's taking physical delivery of the goods. It could be passed by buyer's taking physical 
delivery, or at the time at which the goods are placed at his disposal when delivery is due. 
Although the passing of risk at the time in which the goods are placed at his disposal when 
delivery is due may deviate from the general rule of the art 69, it can be also understood as 
a delivery as long as the buyer has become aware and delivery is due, where the goods are 
place under the buyer’s control. However, the normal application of art 69 may be 
precluded, in certain circumstances where the goods are not identified according to the 
third paragraph. 
6.10 Identification of the goods under art 69 of the CISG 
(Unascertained goods) 
The third paragraph of art 69 requires, as a prerequisite for the risk to pass to the buyer, the 
clear identification of the goods in the contract. A similar rule was encountered previously 
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in art 67(2), and consequently the same interpretations apply to both provisions. 
Accordingly, the seller is expected to send a notice to the buyer to inform him that the 
goods have been identified and are at his disposal; he will have then fulfilled his obligation 
to enable the buyer to take over the goods.202 Again, the same particular difficulties arise in 
cases of fungible goods sold in identified bulks (i.e. wheat, oil and liquids in general). It 
has been argued that the phrasing of paragraph three suggests that identification is 
achieved and the risk passes when the part of the goods sold to the buyer is actually 
removed or when there is, for example (if the goods are stored in a warehouse), an 
acknowledgement on the part of the warehouse keeper that he holds the specific quantity 
on the buyer's behalf.203 It is submitted, though, that the strict interpretation of the 
requirement of identification is not desirable, it should be sufficient that the seller acts in a 
way that enables the buyer to take over the goods.204 
Although, there are several interpretations regarding this issue, it seems there is no definite 
and clear answer, at least under the CISG where the issue seems still ambiguous. It has 
been said that the Convention did not contemplate such difficulties. It may be because an 
identification of the goods is, for all intents and purposes, inseparable from the taking of 
delivery, and the goods may be considered adequately identified when the seller simplifies 
the taking of delivery.205 Yet it has been suggested that, when the sale involves fungible 
goods in identified bulks, the parties are strongly advised to expressly provide the exact 
time of the passing of risk in their sale of good contracts, in accordance with arts 6 and 7 of 
the CISG.206  Additionally, it has been noted that in the discussions leading to the final 
draft, the drafters made few references to the passage of risk in a fraction of a larger bulk, 
and did not incorporate a specific provision on the subject in the final draft.207  Hence, such 
gaps left within the CISG framework have caused ambiguities. 
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6.11 Risk and Remedies- Article 70 CISG 
When entering into a contract, the general presumption is that, as the contract is legally 
binding for the parties, the obligations will be met. Therefore, the rules governing the 
passage of the risk of loss – i.e. from the seller to the buyer - under the CISG can become 
complicated if, somehow, in the process of trying to meet contractual obligations, the 
contract is breached. Art 70 of the CISG states that: If the seller has committed a 
fundamental breach of contract, articles 67, 68 and 69 do not impair the remedies 
available to the buyer on account of the breach. 
Article 70 clearly regulates the relation between the passing of risk and the remedies 
undertaken by the buyer when the seller has committed a fundamental breach of contract 
prior to the occurrence of the damage. This also applies when the goods are lost by 
accident, independent of the breach of contract by the seller, and/or irrespective of whether 
the goods are lost or damaged by accident (as governed by the previously mentioned 
provisions in the of passing of risk),208 on the ground that the main aim of art 70 is not 
about the passing of risk as such, but rather any breach of contract due to the actions or 
omissions of the seller.209 However, if the fundamental breach is so serious that it entitles 
the buyer to the remedy of avoidance, the risk is said to be passed back to the seller 
retroactively. 
According to the wording of this article, the remedies of the buyer remain intact and the 
rules of articles 67, 68 and 69 in relation to the passing of risk do not impair the remedies 
available to the buyer if the seller has breached any obligations under the contract, so long 
as the seller has committed a fundamental breach of contract. Put another way, the rule in 
relation to contractual breach trumps the passing of risk.210 Nevertheless, that does not 
release the buyer from his obligation to pay the price, this price risks the obligation be 
paid, notwithstanding the loss or reduced value. The seller's obligations are deemed to be 
duly performed.211  
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It is noteworthy that the general rule of this article allows the buyer to rely on grounds for 
exemption provided by the Convention in the event of a fundamental breach of contract, 
independently of the passage of risk. The buyer will be able to rely on such grounds for 
exemption despite the fact that goods suffer damage due to an accidental event after the 
passing of risk.212 In other words, a distinction must be made between two perspectives: (i) 
defects in the goods under a sale of goods contract and (ii) the passing of risk. It has been 
said that art 70 is concerned with defects to goods, and not with the passing of risk. Where 
the risk has already passed to the buyer, the buyer can only request remedies, such as 
restitution, if the seller breached any fundamental obligations under the contract.213 
Nevertheless, such a general rule could be exempted, in which case the risk may be 
transferred back to the seller retroactively, especially if the seller is in fundamental breach 
of the contract. This is particularly true in cases where the buyer declares the contract 
avoided according to art 49 on non-delivery of goods, as will be seen.  
 
The necessary prerequisite is the commitment of a fundamental breach of contract by the 
seller which took place prior to the occurrence of the damage.214 Thus, it can be said that 
one striking feature of art 70 of the CISG is that it is confined to fundamental breaches of 
contract by sellers. In contrast, any other breach will not be sufficient. Namely, the 
provision of art 70 is only concerned with cases in which the fundamental breach is 
unconnected with loss or damage to the goods.215 Put simply, loss or damage to the goods 
should not be caused by any reason relating to the seller’s fundamental breach, but should 
instead be accidental; in the case of the former, art 70 would not concern the issue of the 
passing of risk, but constitute a breach of contract due to an action or omission by the 
seller.  
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However, the question arises: how can one judge whether a fundamental breach of contract 
by the seller (the loss or damage) is the result of an accident, regardless of the fact that the 
seller has breached the contract?  
6.11.1 Fundamental Breach 
“Fundamental breach” is a central concept in the system of remedies under the CISG. It is 
a pre-requisite in the avoidance of the contract by either party.216 However, the intention of 
those involved in creating the draft version was to remove the phrase “fundamental 
breach” from this provision, so that in any situation where a non-fundamental breach 
occurs, the fact that such a breach had occurred would not impair the remedies available to 
the buyer. However, in the final version of the Convention, the phrase “fundamental 
breach” was reinstated, and the legislative history does not provide any clues as to whether 
this inclusion was intentional or simply the failure to correct an earlier error.217 However 
Roth suggests that the phrase “fundamental breach” remained in the provision due to a 
simple error.218 
A typical example of a fundamental breach of contract is the lack of conformity of goods 
which exists at the time when the risk passes to the buyer. Furthermore, it has been argued 
that a delay in delivery, which might occur in combination with deterioration in the quality 
of the goods, may also constitute a breach of contract. The possibility of delayed delivery 
may seem like an aspect of “legal risk”, but it is not the same. It is a risk associated with 
contracting to perform by a particular date, wherein non-performance by that date 
represents a breach of contract.  
Nevertheless, the question arises as to whether such a phrase as fundamental breach can be 
confined to the aforementioned examples or has instead a broader application? In fact, the 
meaning of art 70 as it relates to (having committed) a fundamental breach of contract, 
should be read in conjunction with art 25 of the CISG, which reads: 
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in 
such detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled 
to expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a 
                                                 
216 Jan Hellner, ‘The Vienna Convention and Standard Form Contracts’ in Paul Volken and Petar Sarcevic 
(eds), International Sale of Goods: Dubrovnik Lectures (Oceana 1986), 226, 
217 (n 1) 600  
218 (n 201) 305 
Chapter 6   
206 
 
reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have 
foreseen such a result. 
 
In reading this article, a fundamental breach means that any obligation under the contract 
can suffice, provided the other requirements for a fundamental breach are present, 
irrespective of whether the duty was specifically contracted between the parties, or if, 
instead, it followed from the provisions of the Convention. Even the breach of a collateral 
duty can give rise to a fundamental breach.219  
In practice, in one case a contract was entered into between the parties, where it was agreed 
that the seller would keep the goods cool (i.e. at a suitable temperature) during transport to 
New York. The seller took insufficient care to assure direct transport, and during the 
vessel’s stop-over excessive heat accumulated which caused the goods to deteriorate. The 
tribunal found that, notwithstanding that risk passes when goods cross the ship’s rail 
(delivery time), the parties had entered into a separate agreement relating to temperature 
risk. It was held that the seller breached the contract and the court granted the buyer 
damages to cover then responsible for the damage under art 66 CISG. Accordingly, the 
seller bears the risk, even after the goods are delivered.220 This means that the concept of a 
fundamental breach is broader, and not confined to the aforementioned examples. In 
Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
a fundamental breach of contract occurred when air compressors did not conform to the 
sample model and the accompanying specifications regarding cooling capacity and energy 
consumption.221 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that late delivery does not always constitute a fundamental 
breach: for example, failure to deliver goods cannot be deemed a fundamental breach in 
such cases where the parties have not agreed a precise date of delivery.222 However, a delay 
in delivery can become a fundamental breach, especially when a timely delivery is in the 
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special interest of the buyer.223 Depending on the circumstances of the transaction - such as 
the need to fulfil an obligation - the delivery time may be considered a material term.224 
Put another way, the concept of a fundamental breach, according to art 25 of the CISG, 
seems loose and something of a general concept, as it depends on the circumstances. In this 
sense, art 70 is applicable to claims for damages or loss, and these claims might arise out 
of a wide range of situations according to the circumstances of each individual case.225 For 
instance, it has been argued that the CISG does not distinguish between the breach of 
principal and ancillary obligations. Consequently, any breach of obligation, either a 
principal obligation or an ancillary one, can contribute to the prerequisite of fundamental 
breach stipulated in art 70,226 providing that the obligation in question is related to a 
fundamental breach by the seller of an international sale of goods contract subject to the 
CISG. 227    
In relation to the appropriate method of determining the loss or damage suffered as a 
consequence of a breach in the contract under art 70, the provision provides no guidance 
on this issue. Therefore, the court or arbitral tribunal need to determine the manner which 
is best suited to the circumstances. This makes it clear that the basic philosophy 
underpinning the action for damages or loss is to place the injured party in the same 
economic position he/she would have been in if the contract had been performed, including 
loss of profit – this is germane, as, the concept of loss does not include loss of profit in 
some legal systems. The broad and flexible concept of the provisions, as outlined in art 25, 
would also create greater balance, leading to compatibility with the different legal 
systems.228  
Accordingly, once the seller has committed a fundamental breach of contract, arts 67, 68 
and 69 do not impair the remedies available to the buyer on account of the breach. Thus the 
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buyer will have at his disposal all the Convention’s remedies available to him in case of 
fundamental breach, which take priority over the risk rules.229   
6.11.2 The buyer's remedies on account of the seller's fundamental breach  
Although the risks pass to the buyer, according to art 70 he has at his disposal all the 
Convention’s remedies offered to him in case of fundamental breaches to the contract by 
the seller. In fact, art 45 outlines the basic remedies available to the buyer for the seller's 
breach. However, art 45's remedial framework does not distinguish between material and 
non-material breaches.230 Consequently art 45 must be read in conjunction with the concept 
of a fundamental breach as described in art 25. Extending his rights to substituted goods, 
extension of time, and avoidance, as found in arts 46-52, does not prevent the buyer from 
subsequently seeking damages under arts 74-76. To this end, the following sections will 
review the range of buyer remedies outlined in art 45.231  
 
6.11.2.1 Right to Avoid Contract  
The buyer can declare the contract avoided according to art 49 if there has been a 
fundamental breach of contract. If the buyer declares the contract avoided, he is released 
from his obligation to pay the price and is entitled to recover what he may have already 
paid under the contract.232  However, it is critical to note that the buyer's remedy under art 
49(1), to which he is entitled under art 70, may be limited by another provision in the 
Convention. 
Article 51(1) provides that “if the seller delivers only a part of the goods or if only a part of 
the goods delivered is in conformity with the contract, Articles 46 to 50 apply to the part 
that is missing or does not conform”.  Nevertheless, art 51(2) makes it clear that the buyer 
may avoid the contract in its entirety if such failure to deliver the goods amounts to a 
fundamental breach of the contract. Thus, under art 51(2), the buyer is given an option to 
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limit avoidance of the contract. It is debatable to what extent the buyer is entitled to such 
partial avoidance.233 
However, one noteworthy point in this regard relates to the general rule of art 70, which is 
that the remedy of avoidance may result in the risk being placed retroactively back upon 
the seller, meaning that the seller bears any loss or damage that occurred (even after the 
buyer has received the goods), unless the casualty is due to an act or omission by the 
buyer.234 Put simply, because the contract is terminated, consequently all the obligations 
and the effects of the contract would be considered terminated as well. Such an 
interpretation may perhaps indicate that art 70 not only concerns the remedies available in 
relation to the defects to the goods, but also to the passing of risk, where the risk passes 
back to the seller retroactively. As a result, the seller might then bear the risk of goods that 
are under the buyer's control. However, the difficulties which result from this divorce 
between risk and possession are attenuated by the fact that the right to avoid the contract 
must be exercised within a reasonable time, as well as the actual existence of a 
fundamental breach of contract.235 
The buyer's obligation to give notice 
 
The issue of reasonable time highlights the limitations of the avoidance remedy, which is 
consistent with the underlying policy of CISG governing the contract of sale. The 
importance of completing transactions is based upon the recognition of the high costs 
incurred in international sales.236 In fact, art 49 should be read in conjunction with art 26, 
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which states that, a declaration of avoidance of the contract is effective only if made by 
notice to the other party. This means that such notice is indispensable in the issue of a 
declaration of avoidance of the contract. 
Some cases have addressed the buyer's obligation to give notice of avoidance. Taking 
Germany as an example, the buyer’s duty to send a notice was deemed as fulfilled if the 
buyer could prove that notice of avoidance was sent, not that it was received.237 Also it was 
ruled that the notice must be explicit to the seller, as the buyer’s duty is to ‘expressly 
declare the agreement avoided vis-a-vis the opposite party; so that there are no remaining 
doubts such a declaration of avoidance must be explicitly recognizable and realizable to 
the other party.’238Hence, an implied declaration is insufficient.  
In contrast, an arbitration panel disregarded the need for such a formal declaration. It did 
not identify any specific action that the buyer was required to take, but instead pointed out 
that notification by the buyer depends on the circumstances of the case. It also allows the 
buyer to declare the contract as avoided by his statement of action - whether expressly or 
by implication 239 - providing such notice occurred within a reasonable time frame.  
Thus, while the Convention does not explicitly require a period of time for notifying 
avoidance, it could be said that identifying such a period of time may be subject to the 
interpretation of the court, according to the circumstances of the case. Often, decisions are 
based on the nature of the goods and the circumstances of the parties involved.240 However, 
the timing for making avoidance notice known to the seller must be within a reasonable 
time frame.  Consequently,  a Spanish court found 48 hours as a reasonable time for giving 
notice of avoidance after a fundamental breach had taken place.241 On the other hand, it has 
been held that the buyer was denied the right to avoidance because the declaration of 
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avoidance occurred five months after the breach,242 which was viewed as an unreasonable 
period of time; hence the risk remained with the buyer.  
Thus, despite the fact that such a notice is indispensable in the issue of a declaration of 
avoidance of contract, it is clear that neither art 49 nor art 26 stipulates any formality 
required, nor do they indicate the content or period of time needed to satisfy the notice. 
Thus the formality and the content - as well as a reasonable time frame needed to satisfy 
the notice requirement under art 49 and art 26 - have not been clearly resolved.243 So it can 
be held that determining such issues - subject to the circumstances of each case – is 
important, allowing that the buyer is able to avoid the contract and consequently revert the 
risks and the goods to the seller. Nevertheless, returning the goods to the seller after 
avoidance has occurred would be subject to art 82 of the CISG. 
6.11.2.2 Restitution of the goods substantially in the condition in which he received 
them 
Essentially art 70 also should be read in conjunction with art 82, which provides in 
paragraph 1 that the buyer may not avoid the contract or require the seller to deliver 
substituted goods if it is impossible for the seller to make restitution of the goods 
substantially in the condition in which he received them, where the right to avoidance can 
be lost.  Thus, the impossibility of making restitution of the goods, or of making restitution 
of the goods substantially in the condition in which he received them, is clearly another 
limitation of avoidance under art 70 which would prevent the buyer from avoiding the 
contract244 or exercising the right to substituted or repaired goods, as will be seen. Art 82(1) 
states that the general rule - that the two remedies mentioned in arts 49 and 46 are not 
available if the buyer cannot return the goods substantially in the condition he received 
them. Generally speaking, the remedies remain available unless the damage to the goods 
was due to an act or omission by the buyer. Notwithstanding this restriction, its effect is 
mitigated by the exception in art 82(2) (a), which provides that the buyer can avoid the 
contract or require substitute goods, while ‘the risk remains with the seller, since the buyer 
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is permitted to exercise those rights irrespective of the loss of or damage to the goods 
except where that loss or damage is due to the buyer’s act or omission’.245  
6.11.2.3 Right to Substituted or Repaired Goods 
The buyer can ask for delivery of substituted goods in accordance with art 46(2). He can 
always claim this remedy, even in cases where the defective goods may have been 
destroyed. However, this right may be limited in some legal systems by art 28 of the CISG, 
which relieves a court of the obligation to order a specific performance if such a remedy 
would not be granted under domestic law; it is noteworthy that the risk in such a case 
would pass back to the seller, in a manner similar to a case of avoidance.246 It is also 
subject to the limitations mentioned in arts 51 and 82, as the buyer is required to give 
notice under art 39 or within a reasonable period of time, as in the case of the lack of 
conformity of the goods.247 A reasonable time-frame, as well as the formality and the 
content, are need to satisfy the notice requirement under art 39, which would be 
determined according to the circumstances of the cases, as mentioned above. 
 
Another remedy that the buyer can claim, despite the risk being passed, is the repair of the 
goods under art 46(3). This provision applies only in those cases where the goods were 
only damaged and not irretrievably lost. Article 47(1) which offers the buyer discretion to 
fix an additional period of time for performance by the seller of his obligations and may be 
expanded by analogy to cases in which such period has not been stated. If, however, the 
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goods are destroyed before their repair248 the buyer may resort to other remedies with 
respect to the seller’s breach of contract, because repair is no longer feasible. 249  
6.11.2.4 Right to a Price Reduction 
Under art 50, pursuant to art 45(1) (a), despite the risk being passed, the buyer can request 
the seller to reduce the price of goods that do not conform to the contract, even if the price 
has already been paid.250 Obviously the goods must be damaged due to the omission of the 
seller. Thus, if the defective goods have been destroyed due to an accidental event, then 
this remedy will have no meaning.251 Price reduction must logically be proportionate to the 
value that the non-conforming goods bore to the value of the conforming goods at the time 
of delivery, and it has been suggested that the assessment of the value of the goods should 
be at  the place where the seller has to perform.252  However, this suggestion is possibly 
subject to the interpretation of the courts and the circumstances of the cases.253 For 
instance, the Hungarian court held that the buyer's place of business, or the place where the 
goods will be directed, should be regarded as the market in which value is to be 
ascertained.254 
6.11.2.5 The right to ask for damages 
The buyer has the right to ask for damages according to arts 74- 77 CISG; however this 
right is restricted, since it will only cover the damage or loss which occurred before the 
risk passed. Thus, this type of remedy is the most unsatisfactory one under art 70 and 
therefore, the buyer rarely relies on it.255 However, these last two remedies could be 
avoided by the right of avoiding the contract, in the case where the buyer intended to avoid 
the contract of sale, which makes them insignificant. 
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6.11.3 Conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion it can be argued that, although art 70 concerns the remedies 
relating to a fundamental breach under the CISG, it can also be said that it concerns the 
passing of risk, where the risk under art 70 may pass back to the seller, in cases or 
remedies of avoidance the contract, and when the buyer asks for delivery of substitute 
goods, but only under the limitations mentioned above and in the case of fundamental 
breach.   
However, despite the fact that the fundamental breach of contract is the basic element in 
the remedies offered to the buyer under art 70, it has been argued that, where the breach is 
not fundamental, the risk is passed to the buyer as normal, and the remedies which may be 
available are the remedies of repair, reduction in price and damages for the goods that were 
defective before the passing of risk, based on the tortious liability. The tortious liability lies 
in the omission of the seller depriving the buyer of what he was entitled to expect under the 
contract. To conclude, in a usual situation, the buyer has to bear the risk of any damage or 
loss of goods due to accidental events. He will not have the discretion to declare the 
contract avoided or ask for substitute goods, since these remedies are available only in 
cases of fundamental breach of contract.256  
6.12 Party autonomy principle and the legal nature of the 
passing of risk rules under the CISG 
In order to understand the legal nature of the rules in relation to the passing of risk under 
the CISG, it is necessary to analyse in depth the foundation of such rules. In this sense, the 
nature and basis of these rules may be said to evolve out of the general rule, and introduces 
the possibility of exceptions.  
The passing of risk under the Convention appears to be governed by more than one 
provision. In the case where a contract of sale involves carriage of the goods, art 67 applies 
when the goods are delivered to the first carrier, at which point the risk passes at the time 
of delivery to the first carrier. However, the parties’ agreement on handing the goods over 
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at particular place other than the seller’s place, may have some effect257 on this rule; for 
instance, it is suitable to be applied for FAS contracts where the risk passes when the seller 
places the goods alongside the ship at the port. The second provision provided by art 68 
deals with goods sold in transit, where the risk under this provision passes to the buyer at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract. Typically, the risk in respect of goods sold in 
transit passes to the buyer only at the conclusion of the sales contract (Art. 68 (first 
sentence). There is, however, an important exception. The risk passes to the buyer 
retroactively, from the time of the handover to the carrier "if the circumstances so 
indicate”. Thus, even in the latter case, under art 68, the basic rule is in relation to the 
passing of risk at the time the contract is concluded and the principle of delivery plays a 
significant role. Where the goods are already in transit, this indicates strongly that the 
goods have already been delivered to the first carrier.258 The third provision provided by 
art 69 is that risk passes from the seller to the buyer at the time when the buyer takes over 
the goods at the seller's place of business.  This rule is limited by the exception, in the case 
where the buyer is to take over the goods from a place other than a place of business of the 
seller.259 
Seemingly, the Convention adopts the theory of time of delivery of the goods, connecting 
the passing of risk to delivery and possession of the goods. Consequently, under the CISG 
the risk passes to the buyer at the moment when the buyer or the carrier takes delivery of 
the goods.260 The phrases “seller is bound to hand them over at a particular place”, “if the 
circumstances so indicate” and “other than a place of business of the seller” indicate the 
influence party autonomy may have on the interpretation of the CISG provisions in this 
regard. 
The multiplicity underpinning the rules relating to the passing of risk in the CISG seems at 
first glance to suggest that the Convention's basic rule is that risk passes when the seller 
hands over the goods to the first carrier. Accordingly, delivery plays a significant role in 
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the passing of risk under the CISG, whether the act of delivery is to the first carrier or to 
the buyer himself, regardless of whether the buyer has taken physical delivery of the 
goods, or, alternatively, at such time in which the goods are placed at his disposal, where 
the fact that the seller retains transportation documents (or has already passed them over), 
does not affect the passing of the risk.261 It could be said that the delivery principle, 
whether to the first carrier or at the seller's place of business, is the general rule under the 
CISG, at least in relation to the aforementioned rules. 
 It is immaterial who the goods were delivered to, so long as they have been handed over. 
In other words, the principle of delivery remains the general rule in all such provisions, 
notwithstanding who is the recipient or where the delivery takes place; each of these rules 
is limited by exceptions, as well as instructions which are subject to the principle that the 
risk cannot pass until the goods in question are identified as seen. 
It is obvious that in arts 67 and 69, the CISG rejects the definite link between the passing 
of property and the passing of risk as understood in the English law and the idea of the 
single risk at the time of the conclusion of the contracts. Ambiguities are further 
compounded by the different approaches taken by the CISG, different national laws and 
the ULIS. For instance, in terms of the concept of “délivrance” applied in art 97(1) of the 
ULIS which stipulates that the risk only passes when there has been a delivery of goods 
conforming to the contract. Consequently, in the case where the delivered goods do not 
conform to the contract, the risk does not pass to the buyer but is still on the seller.262 
Conversely, under the CISG, the issue of conformity comes under the scope of a 
fundamental breach of contract, according to art 70, where the risk has already passed to 
the buyer. In such cases the buyer can only request remedies if the seller has breached any 
fundamental obligations under the contract, as seen above. However, it is borne in mind 
that the legal effect of the rules concerning the passing of risk is that, as all provisions of 
the CISG are, non-mandatory and can be subject to the parties’ agreement. 
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6.12.1 Party autonomy principle and the rules of passing of risk under 
the CISG 
As discussed above, the CISG is an international convention on the unification of 
substantial laws which act as default rules in the absence of an agreement between parties. 
However, such default rules are subject to the parties’ agreements displaying, modifying or 
excluding the relevant provisions. Bearing this in mind, it is always essential to reflect all 
CISG provisions upon art 6,263 where one is reminded that the application of the CISG has 
no mandatory force on the parties in question and is subject to the party autonomy 
principle. Article 6 indicates the scope of the party autonomy. Generally, it is stipulated 
that contracting parties may exclude the application of the Uniform law in whole or they 
may choose to derogate only from the effect of any of its provisions. Such inference can be 
easily be drawn from the interpretation of CISG art. 6 and, in the case of the UNIDROIT 
Principles, confirmed in its Official Comments.264 
It has been said that some general principles can be easily identified in the provisions of 
the CISG itself. One such principle is that of autonomy, although it has not been expressly 
provided by the CISG, and so it must be deduced from its specific provisions by means of 
an analysis of the contents of such provisions. If it can be concluded that they express a 
more general principle, capable of being applied also to cases different from those 
specifically regulated, then they could also be used for the purposes of art 7(2).265 
 
Hence, the parties are given the freedom to deviate from the aforementioned rules 
provided, and to agree otherwise, in that they have freedom to identify the time when the 
risk will be deemed to have passed. For instance, the parties may incorporate into their 
own agreement trade terms, such as the INCOTERMS, to achieve such an effect.266 They 
may agree to vary a standard trade term, adopt a trade term that is local, 267 or use a trade 
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term in connection with the price rather than delivery.268 The parties may also agree to the 
allocation of risk by incorporating the standard terms, trading customs or general business 
conditions of the seller or buyer.269 
Undoubtedly, in accordance with art 6 of the Convention, the parties’ agreement will 
govern their sale of goods contract and their intentions will take priority over any other 
rule,270 even in the possible case of derogations from the provisions of Chapter IV. 
However, art 6 in this regard must be read in conjunction with art 9 (1), which states that 
the parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which 
they have established between themselves. This indicates that the parties are bound by 
agreed trade usages with respect to risk of loss or damage. It is also necessary to consider 
art 8 of the CISG, where the parties’ intentions and statements can be interpreted in 
accordance with the practices and usages they have established between themselves. These 
can be applied even though they are not expressly mentioned in the contract. In 
consequence, INCOTERMS may be regarded as usages established between the parties, if 
they have used them in previous transactions between themselves and, as a result, they will 
be applied to their sales contract, even though they were not expressly referred to.271 
Consequently, an expressed or implied provision on the passing of risk that has been 
agreed upon by the parties may have legal impacts on the issue of the passing of risk. 
 For example, the practice of a long-term business relation between a French seller 
(plaintiff) and German buyer (defendant) was addressed in the Frozen Chicken case. The 
seller delivered the goods according to its general business conditions "free delivery, duty 
paid, untaxed" and handed the goods over to a carrier. The court employed art 8 to 
interpret a (franco domicile) provision in a contract, finding that the clause addressed not 
only the costs of transport but also the issue of the passing of risk.  
The court interpreted the provision in line with the reasonable understanding of the 
circumstances of the contract. The court found that this clause did not merely deal with the 
cost of the transport but also with the passing of the risk. Furthermore, it was held that the 
buyer had no obligation to pay the price under arts 66 and 67(1) CISG, as the risk had not 
                                                 
268 2 U 175/95 OLG Köln OLG Oberlandesgericht Provincial Court of Appeal (Germany)1997 9 July 1997  
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270 Honnold, J. O., and Flechtner, H. M., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention, (4 edition ,Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009), 528 
271 Feltham J.D., ‘C.I.F. and F.O.B. Contracts and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods’ Journal of Business Law, (1991) , 413, 416 
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passed to the buyer when the goods were handed over to the carrier for transmission to the 
buyer. The seller was bound to deliver the goods at the buyer's place of business, in 
conjunction with article 6 CISG, at its own risk. This was specified in the parties’ 
agreement in the contract, and, consequently, it deviates from the strict interpretation of the 
CISG rules.272 Furthermore, in the case Jasmine Aldehyde, where the parties entered into a 
separate agreement relating to temperature risk, the tribunal upheld the parties’ intention in 
relation to the rule of passing of risk at the time of delivery.273  
From the previous analysis, it would appear that the courts support the intention of the 
parties and its precedence over any other default rules of the CISG, which further supports 
the view that the agreement of the parties is the basic rule in the passing of risk. 
Consequently, it is appropriate to conclude that the party autonomy principle can play a 
significant role in the Convention’s rules. Thus, this leads us back to determine the basic 
rule surrounding the passing of risk, in the previous comparison of the rules of the CISG. It 
appears that the party autonomy provided in art 6 of the CISG is acting as the basic rule in 
determining the contractual relationship between the exceptions laid down in the CISG 
discussed above. In other words, where the parties agree to pass the risk at a particular 
time, the interpretation of the passing of risk will lean towards the intention of the parties.  
Furthermore, even in the case of partial exclusion of the Convention, the contracting 
parties may not derogate the application of the CISG. Firstly, these are the mandatory 
provisions of the CISG itself and secondly these are the mandatory provisions of the law 
that should regulate the contractual relation in case when the party autonomy concept was 
not applied.274 Article 6 of the CISG indicates only one prescription of the Convention that 
has mandatory character and therefore the contracting parties may not derogate from its 
application of Article 12.275The mandatory prescriptions in the second hypothesis should 
be determined in each separate case. It is worth noting that the limitation of art 12 does not 
apply in the case of total exclusion of the Convention.276 In that case the contracting parties 
should act only in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the domestic law that 
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normally would regulate the contractual relation.277 However, it has been argued that as 
well as art 12 there are also other mandatory provisions of the Convention that impose a 
limitation on the contracting parties’ freedom of choice under the provision of art 6278, 
despite not being mentioned in art 6; however, it is submitted that none of these articles 
restrict the parties' freedom of contract.279 
To conclude, priority to an agreement between the parties is directly given in the wording 
of art 6 of the CISG: “the parties may exclude or vary the application of this Convention”, 
where it is stated that the parties have an absolute right to create the terms of the contract 
according to their intention.280 Thus, while party autonomy can supersede the default 
provisions in the CISG,  its interpretation must also take arts 6 and 8 into consideration, as 
the Frozen Chicken case demonstrated. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
Globalization is an inevitable trend nowadays, with international trade becoming more 
important than ever. To keep up with this trend, the function of both national and private 
international law is now moving from a traditional one based on protection towards one 
based on facilitation. As examined in the previous chapters, the rule of party autonomy is 
the primary one and takes priority in the application over any other rules. However, in the 
absence of any expressed or implied indication regarding the intention between the parties, 
the default rules will be applied; the default rules are statutory law, whether the SGA or the 
CISG.  
Concerning the principles of passing of risk and property, the research has demonstrated 
that, apart from party autonomy the principle of res perit domino continues to link the 
transfer of risk with the transfer of property in English law, as a long established principle, 
where the general rule in relation to the passing of property  is that the property passes at 
the  time of the conclusion of the contract of sale, so long as the goods are ascertained and 
that no risk passes until the property has been transferred. Section 16 of the SGA provides 
the general principle and starting point when considering the passing of property and risk 
in relation to unascertained goods. Accordingly, where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods, no property - and thus no risk in relation to the goods - is transferred 
to the buyer unless (and until) the goods are ascertained. On the other hand, contemporary 
legislation, notably the CISG, segregates the notion of property from the risk, and relegates 
the transfer of the title to a position of less importance to the transfer of risk. Article 4 (b) 
of the CISG makes it clear that it does not govern the passing of property in relation to the 
goods sold.  
 
In this regard, an attempt will be made in this chapter to draw conclusions from the issues 
arising from the passing of risk and property which have been examined throughout this 
work. It is also the researcher’s intention to provide evaluations, suggestions and remedies 
in this area of law, where draft models will be presented in attempt to avoid the legislative 
conflicts arising from the passing of property and risk under both the CISG and English 
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law. Such models will be represented as Provisions to be added to the relevant provisions 
of the passing of property under the CISG and passing of risk under SGA.  
7.1 Conclusion drawn from the issues arising from the passing 
of property  
Section 17 of the SGA deals with the intention of the parties that the property of 
ascertained goods passes when the parties to the contract intend it to pass. The intention of 
the parties appears clearly where the parties intend to pass the property of goods at a 
particular time. The courts readily draw inferences as to the parties' intention from the 
terms used in the sales contract. Indeed, where the goods represent specific property, these 
will pass when the parties intend it to be transferred. On the other hand, if no intention is 
evident, the act sets out the rules in s.18 for determining when property will pass. 
However, if the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods, no property in the goods is 
transferred to the buyer until the goods are ascertained under s16. It seems that the parties 
have a right to agree the time when the property passes, but this right of freedom has been 
modified by s.16 SOGA, which provides the general principle and starting point when 
considering the passing of property in relation to unascertained goods.  
Accordingly, it can be said that there are two fundamental factors required for the transfer 
of property: the first, pointed out in s16, is that the goods must be ascertained and 
consented, subject to s18 (5); the second factor is the party autonomy principle, pointed out 
in s17, which involves the intention of the parties to pass the property, and where the 
property passes at the intended time according to s.17, or even according to s18 (5). When 
the parties agree on the time of assent to appropriate the goods that means they intend to 
pass the property at such time. For example, when the parties agree to pass the property at 
the time when the buyer will give consent to the seller to appropriate the goods, this could 
signify that they intend to pass the property at the time of consent of appropriation. 
However, if no time is specified for the passing of the property, then relevant rules from 
s.18 should be applied for the ascertainment of the parties’ intentions. With s.18, where 
‘there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, the 
property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made, and it is immaterial 
whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, be postponed. 
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To reiterate, the party autonomy principle is the primary rule which overwrites the relevant 
provisions in the application over any other. Accordingly, in the absence of any expressed 
or impliedly indication regarding the intention between the parties, the default rules will be 
applied. 
Even though there are two basic factors which are required for the time of passing of 
property under English law, the party autonomy principle - which is laid out in s.17 and 
states that property passes at the moment specified or intended in the contract of sale - is 
the basic rule underpinning the passing of property. That is to say, English statutory law 
adopts the principle of party autonomy as a basic rule regarding the time of passing of 
property, with the proviso that unascertained goods must be ascertained beforehand (s. 16). 
The situation under the CISG is different, since art 4(b) expressly excludes the issue of the 
transfer of property from the scope of the application of the convention. However, a more 
in-depth analysis of the reading of arts 6 and 19 of the CISG reveals the significant role 
played by the party autonomy principle, where, art 6 of the CISG makes it clear that 
contractual provisions prevail over the rules of the CISG. In this sense, as we have seen, 
the CISG recognises that party autonomy is the essential principle. It could even be said 
that it has adopted the freedom of contract principle, as well as giving express recognition 
which serves to protect rights in the international sale of goods. Obviously, arts 6 and 19 
taken together create a freedom of contract principle under the CISG, while art 19 extends 
freedom to the parties in order to negotiate the terms of contract in line with their interests. 
Furthermore, art 6 gives the parties the freedom to reject the convention in its entirety, or 
derogate from or vary the effect of any of its rules. 
Consequently, it is possible for the parties - either with or without choosing an applicable 
law to fill the gaps left open by CISG - to determine the time of passing of property 
autonomously and according to their own intention, due to the freedom of contract 
principle, and because there is no provision in the Convention which prevents the parties 
from shaping the agreement according to their wishes/interests.  The parties can therefore 
determine the timing of passing of property, either through choosing an applicable law, 
where the property will be passed according to the rules and provisions in the chosen law, 
or, alternatively, by agreeing on the time of the passing of property independently (i.e. 
without choosing an applicable law).  
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It can be said that the legal nature of the CISG signifies that property in goods can be 
passed according to the party autonomy principle, where the intention of the parties is the 
main factor in identifying the time of the passing of property; this means that property 
passes at such times as both parties agree. 
Thus, although art 4(b) of the CISG expressly excludes the issue of the transfer of property 
from the scope of the application of the convention, it can be held that the CISG regulates 
the issue of the passing of property implicitly. In other words, the exclusion of the issue of 
the passing of property by art 4(2) leaves the remedy of such an issue open and in many 
cases dependent upon the intention of the parties involved. 
Furthermore, arts 6 and 19 provide both parties with the freedom to identify the terms of 
their contract, including the ability to determine the time at which the property is 
transferred from the seller to the buyer, based on the absence of any express provision 
regulating such issues in the CISG which would prevent the parties in the contract from 
identifying the time of transfer of property according to their intention.  
To summarise, the Convention expressly excludes the issue of the transfer of property by 
art 4(b) with respect to the default rule, which means that there are no default rules 
regarding the issue of the transfer of property. In other words, it can be said that the CISG 
implicitly adopts the party autonomy principle as a basic rule in relation to the passing of 
property.  
However, the problem lies in cases where such an agreement between the parties is absent, 
and where there are no default rules in place. Moreover, art 7(2) of the CISG, and the 
Convention’s general principles must not be referred to. This is because the questions 
concerning the property of the goods sold, or questions concerning the validity of the 
contract, or of any of its provisions, must not be answered with the help of general 
principles, as these questions are expressly excluded from scope of art 4(2) of the CISG. 
Thus, the effect of a sales contract on the property in the goods is left to the party 
autonomy principle and the applicable national law, to be determined by the rules of 
private international law of the forum. 
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7.2 Evaluation and remedies in relation to passing of property 
under the English law and the CISG 
Along with English law, the CISG adopts the party autonomy principle, where the 
intention of the parties is the basic rule in relation to the passing of property. However, 
although the party autonomy principle is the basic rule under English law, based on s.17 
and is the basic rule under the CISG, based on arts 6 and 19, the difference lies in the 
default rules. In this sense, English law involves default substitutional rules, which apply in 
cases where there is an absence of expressed or implied indication regarding the intention 
between the parties. In contrast, the CISG lacks such default rules regarding the transfer of 
property, simply because art 4(b) expressly excludes the issue of the transfer of property 
from the scope of the Convention.   
This thesis has argued that this exclusion represents a major drawback. It has been pointed 
out that the exclusion of such default substitution rules in relation to the passing of 
property clearly creates difficulties, especially in the absence of any expressed or implied 
indication regarding the intention between parties; instead, they can choose a domestic law 
to govern their contract. This solution has the advantage of allowing their contract to be 
uniformly and fully governed by a single domestic law. However, its disadvantage is that a 
uniform solution may not be easily achieved. As a result, efforts from nation states are 
needed to overcome these problems. 
It is worth mentioning that the outcome of this research is that the CISG regulates the issue 
of the passing of property implicitly, by the party autonomy principle, but not based on 
express provision in the Convention. This conclusion was reached on the basis of the 
interpretation and analysis of some of the provisions of the Convention, as seen in Chapter 
Four. 
Obviously, the CISG does not concern its provisions with the passing of property issue 
regarding the default rule, which makes it more open to criticism. In particular, the passing 
of property is one of the most important issues in the field of international trade. For that 
reason, it would certainly be beneficial for international trade if a uniform rule on the 
passing of property were to be included in the CISG. Although there are significant 
differences the between legal systems, harmonization cannot be ruled out. Due to the scope 
of the issues involved, it will, however, take quite some time to achieve.  
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In contrast, the default rules in English law appear to be more pragmatic and its precise 
structure makes it a more efficient and better developed one than the CISG regarding the 
passing of property. 
7.3 Conclusion drawn from the issues arising from the passing 
of risk 
The passing of risk under English law is governed by more than one rule; according to the 
criteria of s.20 (1) of the SGA, English statutory law appears to have a mixed approach.  
Namely, the risk could be passed with the property, under the res perit domino rule, at the 
point when the property passes to the buyer, or at a different time (i.e. a time separate from 
the passing of the property), according to the agreement of the parties. On the face of it, the 
general rule is that the risk passes with the property, according to res perit domino under 
s.20 of the SGA. On the other hand, with a more in-depth interpretation of the same 
section, a different conclusion may be reached, which is that the basic rule is that the risk 
passes according to the intention of the parties. In this sense, a general rule of s20 can be 
modified by expressed or implied agreement. Such agreements have priority over any other 
rules. Accordingly, in the absence of any expressed or implied indication regarding the 
intention between the parties, the default rule of part two of s.20 will be applied.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the legal nature in relation to the passing of risk is the 
intention of the parties, where the parties have the absolute right to agree upon the time of 
passing of risk, according to unless otherwise agreed stated in part one of s.20(1). That is 
to say, English statutory law similarly adopts the principle of party autonomy as a basic 
rule regarding the time of the passing of risk. Thus, there is nothing peculiar about 
separating the transfer of risk from the transfer of property.  
The intention of the parties is clearly respected where the parties intend to pass the risk of 
goods at a particular time, whether with the property or separately at a different time; the 
parties can separate the passing of risk and property, and such agreement will govern the 
issue relating to the passing of risk; in addition, the risk will be passed at the agreed time. 
Therefore it can be seen that determining the time at which the risk passes may be based on 
the issue of determining whether the passing of property occurs, according to s.17 or s.18. 
The risk and property will then pass at the same time, according to an agreement regarding 
the passing of property. 
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Moreover, it doesn't matter whether the parties intended to pass the risk at the same time as 
the property, or even before or after the passing of property, where it is expressed as 
“unless otherwise agreed.’’ It is therefore possible for the parties to make provisions in the 
contract of sale to determine that the risk passes at a different time from the property. 
Undoubtedly, the phrase unless otherwise agreed refers to the party autonomy principle, 
and consequently the risk could be passed before or after the property has passed, 
according to an agreement between the parties. Thus, the goods must be sufficiently 
identifiable as those to which the risk relates. It might therefore be assumed that the 
contract must be one for the sale of specific goods; alternatively, if it was for the sale of 
unascertained goods, the goods should have become ascertained before the risk could pass.  
Thus, there is no provision in English statutory law highlighting the passing of risk with 
regard to whether the goods are specific or unascertained; it appears that the goods must be 
sufficiently identifiable as being those to which the risk relates. Therefore, in the contract 
of a sale of specific goods, the risk could be passed from the seller to the buyer separately, 
before or after property, especially in cases involving the passing of risk after property, as 
this indicates clearly that the goods are specific goods, because according to s16 of the 
SGA no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are 
ascertained. Consequently, and logically, no risk passes so long as the risk is linked to the 
property. 
It is noticeable that English law links the issue of the passing of risk to the issue of 
property, and it appears that English statutory law implies that no risk is deemed to have 
passed until the property has passed, and no property passes until the goods are identified 
in the contract. Provision of s.20 (2) links the issue of risk to the rules of s.17 and s.18 of 
the SGA.  
Put simply, when such rules govern the passing of property, so long as the risk follows, the 
property will be passed intuitively, according to the rules underpinning the passing of 
property. It can be said that s 20 does not provide any new rule; apparently it refers the 
issue of timing in relation to the passing of risk to the rules on the passing of property 
contained in s17 and s.18 of the SGA. 
However, the issue arising in this context is when the parties agree to pass the risk before 
the property, assuming that the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods. As we have 
noted, there is no expressed provision in English statutory law which prevents the parties 
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in the contract from agreeing to pass the risk before the property, even if the goods are 
unascertained, whereas neither the SGA 1979 nor the Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 
1995 specifically deals with the passing of risk in relation to unascertained goods.  
In this sense, there is no provision highlighting the passing of risk with regard to whether 
the goods are specific or unascertained. However, both acts1 are linked to the issue – that 
is, the passing of risk in relation to the passing of property - where the property never to 
pass until goods are viewed as specific goods according to s.16 of the SOGA 1979 or a 
specified quantity of unascertained goods Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995. Namely, 
the risk could be allowed to be passed in cases where the goods are unascertained based on 
the intention of the parties; it may occur in circumstances where the parties intend – either 
explicitly or implicitly - to pass the risk before the property, even if the goods remain 
unascertained. 
Assuming that the prima facie of English law is that the goods which the risk relates to are 
sufficiently identifiable, then the contract must be one for the sale of specific goods. As a 
result, it is illogical to rely upon such standards, due to the fact that they are impossible to 
apply, because the goods remain unascertained and are not sufficiently identifiable as those 
to which the risk relates (unknown goods).  
Indeed, it is the researcher’s point of view that the absence of legal rules regulating such an 
issue could be considered as a weakness in English law. The law provides no answer, nor 
is there any exclusive rule for regulating the issue of the passing of risk before property in 
the case of unascertained goods, based on part one of ss.20 and 17 SGA, which cannot 
serve the requirements of high seas trade, and at the same time makes the rules in relation 
to the passing of risk under English law ineffective and therefore requiring remedy and 
improvement. Such rules cannot be a model for Libyan law or any other law which needs 
to be improved, as the model on which they would be based - i.e. English law -  itself 
needs to be remedied with respect to the issues previously mentioned 
On the other hand, the passing of risk under the CISG is different, where such issues are 
governed by more than one provision. In cases where a contract of sale involves the 
carriage of goods, art 67(1) deals with such cases and applies when the goods are delivered 
to the first carrier, at which point the risk passes at the time of delivery to the first carrier.  
                                                 
1 SGA 1979 , Sale of Goods (Amendment) Act 1995 
Chapter 7  
229 
 
However, the parties’ agreement to hand over the goods at a particular place other than the 
seller’s place, may have some effect on this.2  
Art 68 deals with goods sold in transit. In respect of such goods, the risk passes to the 
buyer from the time the contract is concluded. This is qualified in the same article by the 
provision that if the circumstances so indicate, the risk is assumed by the buyer from the 
time the goods are handed over to the carrier, retrospectively. Indeed, even in the latter 
case under art 68, where the basic rule is in relation to the passing of risk at the time the 
contract is concluded, the principle of delivery plays a significant role. In cases where 
goods are already in transit, it is viewed as a strong evidence that the goods have already 
been delivered to the first carrier.  
In all other cases ‘not covered by arts 67 and 68 of the convention’ the Convention 
provides that the risk passes to the buyer when he takes over the goods at the seller's place 
of business.  This rule is limited by the exception where the buyer is to take over the goods 
from a place other than the seller’s place of business. The general policy in art 69(1) is 
once again that the seller should bear the risk so long as he has control of the goods. 
Paragraph (2), however, makes special provision for cases where the buyer is to take over 
the goods from a place other than the seller’s place of business, most commonly from a 
public warehouse. In such cases the risk passes when delivery is due and the buyer is 
aware of the fact that the goods are placed at his disposal at that place. The policy 
considerations here are different, where the seller is in no better position than the buyer to 
protect and insure the goods or to pursue any claims arising from them. Therefore, the 
buyer should bear the risk as soon as he is in a position to collect the goods. Article 69 (2) 
also applies to the case in which the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods, but 
which is not covered by art 67 because the seller is required to hand the goods over to the 
buyer at a particular place. Indeed, delivery plays a significant role in the passing of risk 
under the CISG, whether the act of delivery is to the first carrier or to the buyer himself, 
regardless of whether the buyer has taken physical delivery of the goods, or, alternatively, 
at such time in which the goods are placed at his disposal. 
                                                 
2 Hager, G. and Schmidt-Kessel, M., in Schlechtriem P,and I. Schwenzer, Commentary on the UN 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 928. See 
also, Bernd von Hoffmann, 'Passing of Risk in International Sales of Goods' (1986) Ch. 8, 265-303 
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7.4 Conclusion drawn from party autonomy principle  
The rules in relation to the passing of risk under the CISG will not always apply, since the 
parties may have either made a specific agreement according to party autonomy under arts 
6 and 19 of the convention. In other words, according to art 6 the parties are given the 
freedom to over-write the aforementioned rules, provided they agree, and that they have 
freedom to identify the time when the risk will be deemed to have passed. 
It is clear that, in accordance with art 6 of the Convention, the agreement between the 
parties will govern the sale of goods contracts and their intentions will take priority over 
any other rule;3 however, in this regard art 6 should be read in conjunction with art 19 (1) 
which indicates that the parties are bound by the terms agreed with respect to risk, loss or 
damage. It is also necessary to consider art 8 of the CISG, where the parties’ intentions and 
statements can be interpreted in accordance with the practices and usages they have 
established between themselves.  
Consequently, an expressed or implied provision on the passing of risk that has been 
agreed upon by the parties has a definite legal impact on the issue of the passing of risk. 
Moreover, as seen, the courts support the intention of the parties and its priority over any 
other default rules of the CISG, and the further reinforces the view that the agreement of 
the parties is the basic rule in the passing of risk. Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude 
that the party autonomy principle plays a significant role in the Convention’s rules.  In this 
sense, the party autonomy provided in art 6 of the CISG is the basic rule in determining the 
contractual relationship between the parties regarding the passing of risk. Accordingly, it 
can be concluded that the aforementioned rules in relation to the passing of risk provided 
by the CISG are default rules, and apply only in the absence of any expressed or implied 
indication regarding the intention between the parties. In other words, where the parties 
agree to pass the risk at a particular time, the interpretation of the passing of risk, will 
always lean towards the intention of the parties. Nevertheless, the risk does not pass to the 
buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract. 
                                                 
3 Honnold, J. O., and Flechtner, H. M., Uniform Law for International Sales under the 1980 United Nations 
Convention, (4 edition ,Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2009) , 528 
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7.5 Conclusion drawn from the importance of identification of 
goods  
Identification of goods to the contract is important, because the risk cannot pass to the 
buyer if the goods are not identified, under art 67(2) CISG. The provision provided in art 
67(2) and 69, requires the identification to be clear, that is, specific and precise, before the 
risk is passed. This requirement actually links the passing of risk to the situation of the 
goods, where no risk passes until the goods are identified. This is unlike the English law, 
which links the risk to the passing of property as seen.  Such a rule distinguishes the CISG 
from the English law regarding the rules of passing of risk. In other words, while the major 
gap in English law is lack of a rule about passing of risk in the case of unascertained 
goods, the CISG has avoided such difficulty by providing rules of identification of goods 
to pass the risk. While arts 67(2) and 69(3) require identification for risk allocation, this 
requirement is clearly absent from art 68.4 In fact, it has been argued that even though art 
68 does not explicitly require the goods to be clearly identified for the passage of risk to 
occur, the general view is to refer to art 67(2), where the goods must be clearly identified.5  
Nevertheless, there is no provision preventing the passing of risk in the case of 
unascertained goods under art 68 of the CISG. Although some interpretations have linked 
the passing of risk in unascertained goods under art 68 to art 67(2) where the goods must 
be ascertained before the risk passes, such views did not make their way to the Convention. 
Therefore, the priority will be given to the legal provision of art 68 which is devoid of this 
requirement.  In other words, depending on the literal interpretation of legal provisions, art 
68 must be applied literally, even with the absence of such a requirement. Accordingly, it 
may be acceptable for the risk to be passed even if the goods are not identified. Especially, 
the CISG does not provide an answer for cases where the goods sold or appropriated to a 
sale form part of an undivided bulk. 
                                                 
4 Harold J. Berman & Monica Ladd, Risk of Loss or Damage in Documentary Transactions Under the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods, 21 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 423, 430 (1988). See Also 
Shivbir S. Grewal, 'Risk of loss in goods sold during transit: a Comparative study of the U.N. Convention 
on Contracts for the international sale of goods, the U.C.C., and the British Sale of Goods Act' at 102 
(1991) 14:93 Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School 97. See Also Neil Gary Oberman, 
'Transfer of risk from seller to buyer in international commercial contracts: A comparative analysis of risk 
allocation under the CISG, UCC and Incoterms' in (LLM edn 1997). Available at 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/thesis/Oberman.html#fn120 
5 Heidelberg, 'The Passing of Risk A comparison between the passing of risk under the CISG and German 
law' (1999) 2,3,4. See Also Manuel Gustin, ' Passing of risk and impossibility of performance under the 
CISG ' (2001) International Business Law Journal ,4. See Also Ingeborg Schwenzer, Christiana 
Fountoulakis, Mariel Dimsey, 'International Sales Law  A Guide to the CISG' (2nd edn Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2012),936 
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7.6 Undesirable situations caused by the incompleteness of both 
instruments and remedies  
A more detailed reading of the rules of the Convention indicates that there is a shortage of 
explanatory detail contained in it, and thus there is a lack of efficiency.  This is especially 
the case where an absence of trade usages is noted. One of the main difficulties of 
interpretation emerging from art 67(1) is the ambiguity of the expression ‘contract of sale 
involving carriage of the goods’.  Apparently the CISG does not provide any specific rule 
of interpretation in terms of the timing in the contract of sale involving the carriage of 
goods.6 Furthermore, it does not give definitions for terms such as the 'first carrier', 
'handing over’, ‘the act of delivery’ and ‘indicative circumstances’; thus, the absence of 
satisfactory definitions may lead to uncertainty and undesirable litigation.7 
Nevertheless, in accordance with art 7(2) of the CISG, such questions concerning this 
matter have to be determined and interpreted in accordance with the general principles or, 
in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the 
rules of private international law. Moreover, although art 67 and art 69 require that 
identification of the goods is needed in order to pass the risk, unlike the English Sale of 
Goods (Amendment) Act 1995, nevertheless, the CISG does not provide an answer for 
cases where goods sold or appropriated to a sale form part of an undivided bulk.  
Further it seems that the Convention fails to take into account modern developments and 
practices in international trade, since it does not include separate rules on containerisation, 
despite the immense growth in the use of containers. This means that unless damage or loss 
is due to an identifiable cause, it is difficult to assess at what stage of the transit loss or 
damage occurred and therefore who bears the risk.  
However, the main weaknesses of the CISG lies in its lack of provision on the passing of 
property, which is an issue that is addressed in English law more efficiently, pragmatic and 
accurately. In contrast, with respect to the issue of the passing of risk, the default rules of 
the CISG are more efficient and pragmatic than the English law, especially with regard to 
the passing of risk in unascertained goods before the passing of property, as argued above. 
                                                 
6 Dionysios Flambouras, 'Transfer of Risk in the Contract of Sale involving Carriage of Goods: A 
Comparative Study in English, Greek Law and the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods ' ((2001)) VI 87—149.113,114  http://www.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio   
7Ibid. 
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Therefore, this thesis will conclude with recommendations and suggestions as simple 
provisions of remedies, in an attempt to contribute to the improvement of English law, the 
CISG and jurisdictions needing modernisation of their trade law and thereby provide a 
more effective model.  
7.7 Draft Model Rules 
7.7.1 Passing of property  
Model provisions 
Unless otherwise agreed, where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, the 
property in the ascertained goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made. 
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the property in the goods passes to the buyer at the 
time of taking the delivery. 
The basic rule as to the passing of property under English law and the CISG is that it 
passes at the moment specified or intended in the contract of sale. If, however, the contract 
is silent, then one looks at the appropriate statutory rules for determining at what moment 
the parties intended the property to pass. Such default rules are regulated by English law, 
but are lacking in the CISG.  
Property questions will of course remain very important, particularly for the purpose of 
determining the distinction between the sale and the agreement to sell.  In the case of 
agreement to sell, the title of the property remains with the seller; however, in the case of 
the sale of the property, it passes to the buyer. Therefore, regulating such default rules in 
the CISG is significant. It would certainly be beneficial for international trade if a rule on 
passing of property were to be included in the CISG. Although there are significant 
differences the between legal systems, greater harmonization cannot be ruled out. Due to 
the scope of the issues involved, it will, however, take quite some time to achieve.  
Therefore, the draft model regarding the passing of property under the CISG could be 
inspired by the rule of the English law, where the property in the goods passes to the buyer 
when the contract is made, subject to s.16 of SGA, where the goods must be ascertained. 
The proposed draft model clause of remedies provides thus: 
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Unless otherwise agreed, where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, the 
property in the ascertained goods passes to the buyer when the contract is made. 
In fact, this model clearly contains three important elements. The first one is the party 
autonomy element, which presented under the phrase  ‘unless otherwise agreed’, based on 
the importance of the party autonomy principle provided in art 6 of the CISG. Thus, the 
basic rule of party autonomy regarding the issue of the passing of property under the CISG 
could be regulated expressly rather than implicitly. The second element is the default rule 
itself, which presents the time of passing of property in the absence of agreement between 
the parties, namely that unless otherwise agreed the property under the CISG passes at the 
time of making the contract. However, this element must be subject to the third element 
regarding to situation of the goods. In other words, no property in the goods is transferred 
to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. This provision is actually consistent 
with the provision made in s.16 of SGA, which restricts the goods to be specified before 
the property passes.  
The researcher’s attempt in fact, may be applicable especially to the rules of risk under the 
CISG being linked to the situation of the goods not to the property.  Thus, this draft model 
does not conflict in meaning with the rules of passing of risk under the CISG, where the 
property and risk can be passed separately.  
On the other hand, it has been proposes that uniformity in this field of law is possible, 
suggesting the adoption of the delivery principle as the default rule, where the proposed 
draft model clause for remedies provides thus: 
Unless the parties agree otherwise, the property in the goods passes to the buyer at the 
time of taking the delivery. 
If this principle is adopted as the uniform rule with respect to the transfer of property 
pursuant to international sales contracts,  as well as upholding party autonomy, the 
problem mentioned above would be avoided, especially as the risk under the CISG risk 
passes at the time of delivery. According to such a draft model rule on the passing of 
property, the transfer of property would occur at the time of delivery.8 However, 
                                                 
8 Ulrich Drobnig, Transfer of Property, in towards a European Civil Code, Arthur Hartkamp et al. 
eds.(Kluwer Law International 1998), 345, 360 
Chapter 7  
235 
 
application of such a model requires it to give sufficient definitions for the terms ‘handing 
over’ and ‘the act of delivery’, in order to avoid uncertainty and undesirable litigation. 
Taking into account the situation of the goods, where there is a contract for the sale of 
unascertained goods, no property in the goods is transferred unless and until the goods are 
ascertained. Indeed, linking the passing of property and risk to the situation of the goods 
separately, where the goods must be ascertained, makes the CISG more pragmatic and 
efficient in the field of sale of goods contracts. Thus, it can avoid the fault which occurs in 
English law, as discussed above.  
It is noteworthy that the regulation of the issue of passing of property under the CISG, 
whether in accordance with the time of making of the contract or the time of delivery, 
strongly requires amendment of art 4(b) of the CISG regarding the exclusion of the issue of 
passing of property. It requires to be amended in order to avoid legislative conflicts.  
Thus, it would certainly be beneficial for international trade if a rule on passing of property 
were included in the CISG. Although there are significant differences the between legal 
systems, harmonization cannot be ruled out. Due to the scope of issues involved, it will 
however take quite some time to achieve, as achieved in the case of passing of risk more 
effectively than in English law. 
7.7.2 Passing of risk 
Model Provision 
Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property in 
them is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in them is transferred to the 
buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk, whether delivery has been made or not. 
Nevertheless, the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly 
identified. 
This thesis concludes that the CISG has provided a clearer set of rules in relation to the 
timing of the passing of risk than English law, as the latter does not treat the issue of 
passing risk separately (i.e. before the property) in the case of unascertained goods, while 
the CISG links the issue of the passing of risk to the situation of the goods, provided that 
the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified in the contract.  
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This approach is inconsistent with English law in which risk would transfer regardless of 
the identification of goods. Meaning, as we have seen, that English law links the issue to 
the passing of property, and the prima facie case that the risk passes with property, where 
no property passes in the case of unascertained goods, instead of linking it to the situation 
of goods as the CISG does. Consequently, further complications may arise regarding the 
issue of the passing of risk when linked to the passing of property. Such complications may 
occur in circumstances where the parties intend explicitly or implicitly to pass the risk 
before the property, in the case of unascertained goods, based on s.17 and s.20 (1) part one 
as seen. The difficulty arising in relation to such a case regards determining which goods 
were sent at the buyer’s risk. In that sense, it is difficult to allocate the risk of loss and 
damage. Therefore, the draft model regarding the passing of risk under the English law 
could be inspired by the rule of the CISG, where the risk is linked to the situation of goods, 
and does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract. 
Accordingly, the proposed draft model clause of remedies regarding to the issue of passing 
of risk under the English law can be represented  by adding on a subsection to s.20(1) of 
SGA, as follows: 
Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the property in them 
is transferred to the buyer, but when the property in them is transferred to the buyer the 
goods are at the buyer's risk, whether delivery has been made or not. Nevertheless, the 
risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified. 
Hypothetically, English law links the risk to the situation of the goods, where no risk 
passes to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified within the contract, and then the 
risk could never be passed until the goods are ascertained.  This conflict has been avoided 
in the CISG, which links the risk to the situation of goods, not to property. This may be 
due to the exclusion of the issue of property from the scope of the CISG.  
However, from a general point of view, it can be said that, unlike the issue of the passing 
of property, the CISG is an apparently more efficient and better developed model with 
respect to the issue of the passing of risk than English law, for the reason that its structure 
appears more attuned to pragmatic situations and is more precise. This serves the trade's 
requirements for quick and safe reference, whereas the main difficulty which lies in 
English law is linking the passing of risk to the passing of property, which has created a 
problem with regards to the passing of risk in the case of unascertained goods; 
consequently, it is difficult to allocate the risk of damage and loss. 
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The crucial point is the term unless otherwise agreed, which allows the parties to agree on 
the time of passage of risk, regardless of whether it is restricted by the situation of the 
goods and whether they are unascertained goods or not, with the absence of any express 
provision regulating such issues. However, this term cannot be annulled, because it 
represents the party autonomy principle as a basic rule in relation to the passing of risk 
under English law. However, a subsection regarding the identification of the goods can 
instead be added to the SGA which is analogous to s.16. This may fill the gap and restrict 
the passing of risk to the situation of the goods so that  no risk can then be transferred to 
the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. 
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7.8 Evaluation and remedies in relation to passing of property 
and risk under the Libyan law 
The Libyan civil code requires new rules that reflect global standards of international trade, 
which leads to a need for an accurately drafted legal system that is able to facilitate the 
formation of contracts with merchants from different countries and resolve the legal 
problems that may potentially arise out of contracts of sale. This thesis makes a valuable 
contribution to address the gaps in the incomplete Libyan Civil Law through the extensive 
research on the provisions of both the English Sale of Goods Act and the CISG. 
In the research it was intended to suggest model provisions to amend some rules of passing 
of property and risk that would facilitate a completion of the Libyan Civil Code in this area 
of law in order to reflect global standards of international trade. Therefore, this thesis will 
be concluded with recommendations and suggestions.   
7.8.1 Remedies and suggestions concerning passing of property 
It was shown above that the basic rule of passing of property under Libyan law is that it 
passes at the moment specified or intended by the parties of the contract in the contract of 
sale. On the other hand, if no intention is evident, the property passes from the seller to the 
buyer at the time as the contract is concluded, according to default rules provided by s 936 
of Libyan Civil Code, as long as the goods are specific goods in an unconditional contract 
and the seller is the owner of the goods.   
Obviously, the party autonomy principle in Libyan law is the primary rule which 
overwrites the relevant provisions in the application over any other. Accordingly, in the 
absence of any expressed or impliedly indication regarding the intention between the 
parties, the default rules will be applied. 
Apparently, such rules of passing of property under the Libyan law are not very different 
from the rules of passing of property under the English law, where the basic rule as to the 
passing of property under English law is party autonomy, although in the absence of any 
expressed or implied indication regarding the intention between the parties, the default 
rules will be applied, in which case the property passes at the time as the contract is 
concluded, according to the rules set out the rules in s.18 of SGA, as seen above.  
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Arguably, the difference between the Libyan law and the English law lies in rules that 
would provide presumptions for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at 
which the property in the goods is to pass to the buyer. While the English law provides 
these rules clearly and in a very detailed way in s18, the Libyan law still ambiguous and 
lacks of sufficient details regarding such rules. 
On the other hand, they both differ from the rules of passing of property under the CISG, 
simply because the CISG clearly excludes such default rules, taking into account the party 
autonomy principle as basic rule of passing of property according to art 6 of the CISG as 
seen above. Accordingly, the CISG cannot be a useful model for Libyan law, as the model 
upon which it would be based would itself need to be improved, as mentioned previously. 
In contrast, as pointed out, the rules of passing of property under English law appear to be 
more structurally pragmatic and precise, making it a more efficient and developed than the 
CISG regarding the passing of property. Consequently, such rules of passing of property 
under the English law may be a suitable model for the Libyan law. 
7.8.2 Draft Model Rules of passing of property for the Libyan law 
The draft model regarding the passing of property under the Libyan law could be inspired 
by the rules of the English law, where the property in the goods passes to the buyer when 
the contract is made, subject to s 16 of SGA, where the goods must be ascertained. The 
proposed draft model clause of remedies provides thus: 
Unless otherwise agreed, where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, the 
property passes to the buyer when the contract is made. 
Noticeably, this draft model provided for the Libyan law is the same model provided for 
the CISG, which was inspired from the English law. Put simply, this issue has been 
addressed in the English law more efficiently and accurately, as this model clearly contains 
three important elements. The first one is the party autonomy element, which is presented 
under the phrase ‘unless otherwise agreed’, based on the importance of the party autonomy 
principle provided in s 147 of the Libyan law, which in general applies for all types of 
contracts, including sale of goods contract, whether with respect to movable goods or 
immovable, including the passing of property issue. 
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Consequently, this draft model could fill the gaps left by the incomplete Libyan legal 
framework involving the passing of property issue, which currently links the party 
autonomy principle with the time of passing of property issue. This would make it more 
practical, efficient and pragmatic, in order to avoid ambiguity and some misinterpretations 
that may occur through the application of s 147 on the passing of property issue. 
The second element in this draft model is the default rule itself, which presents the time of 
passing of property in the case of absence of an agreement between the parties. This part of 
the model in fact, distinguishes between immovable (real property) and movable goods, 
with an intention to avoid conflicts arising from goods in transit or unascertained goods, 
for instance, with respect to jurisdiction, where Libyan jurisdiction differs in whether the 
case related too immoveable (real property) or moveable goods. In this sense, jurisdiction 
of the courts differs between immovable real property and the movable goods. While the 
jurisdiction in the cases of the movable goods is the court where the defendant is located,9 
the jurisdiction in the cases of immoveable goods is the court where the real property 
located.10  
However, such a model must be subject to the third element regarding the situation of the 
goods. In other words, no property in the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until 
the goods are ascertained. This provision is provided by the Libyan law, which, at the same 
time is consistent with the provision provided in s 16 of SGA, which restricts the goods to 
be specified before the property passes. 
7.8.3 Draft Model Rules for ascertaining intention  
Further ambiguity of Libyan Civil Law lies in its lack of some detailed rules that would 
provide presumptions for ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which 
the property in the goods is to be passed to the buyer. In other words, the rules would 
provide presumptions for ascertaining the intention of the parties in the case of absence of 
any indication of intention of the parties, where the seller is bound to measure or weigh the 
goods to ascertain the price and specific goods in a deliverable state.  
Indeed, as noted above while the English law provides such rules clearly and in detail in 
s18 SGA, the Libyan law is still ambiguous and lacks of some details regarding such rules. 
                                                 
9 Libyan civil procedure code, S 53 
10 Libyan civil procedure code, S 54 
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On the other hand, both English and Libyan law rules differ from the rules of passing of 
property under the CISG, simply because the CISG clearly exclude such default rules. 
Therefore, the CISG cannot be a model for Libyan law in this regard. Accordingly, the 
rules of passing of property under the English law appears to be more efficient and better 
developed than in the CISG. Consequently, the draft model regarding the rules for 
ascertaining intention under the Libyan law could be inspired by the rules of s 18 of 
English law;  the proposed draft model clause of remedies provides thus: 
Unless a different intention appears, the following are rules for ascertaining the 
intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is to pass to 
the buyer.  
 
Rule 1. Where there is an unconditional contract for the sale of specific goods in a 
deliverable state, the property in the goods passes to the buyer when the contract is 
made, and it is immaterial whether the time of payment or the time of delivery, or both, 
be postponed.  
Clearly, rule 1 only applies where the contract is ‘unconditional’ and the goods in a 
‘deliverable state’. In the present context, unconditional is usually taken to mean that the 
contract does not contain any term which suspends the passing of property until some later 
event. The words ‘a deliverable state’ mean that when they are in such a state that the 
buyer would under the contract be bound to take delivery of them, bearing in mind the 
situation covered by rule 2, where the goods are not defective, but need something doing to 
them before the buyer is required to accept delivery. This provision is proposed to remove 
the ambiguity over the provision of s 255 of Libyan Civil Code which is a general 
provision, which applies to any contract. In other words, even if the provision of s 255 of 
Libyan Civil Code extends to cover the contract of sale of goods, the draft model relates 
the situation to the contract of sale of goods and the passing of property issue. 
Rule 2. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the seller has to put 
the goods in a deliverable state, the property does not pass until such actions be carried 
out and the buyer has notice thereof.  
Rule 2 applies in the case if specific actions have to be carried out on the goods, in order to 
make them deliverable and the property does not pass until the work is carried out. This 
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covers the situation where the goods are not in a deliverable state at the time of the contract 
and so property does not pass under rule 1, but they are later put into a deliverable state.   
As noted previously, Libyan Law lacks detailed rules that would provide presumptions for 
ascertaining the intention of the parties as to the time at which the property in the goods is 
to pass to the buyer, and among of these rules is putting the goods in a deliverable state. 
This provision in fact, is to remedy the lack of such rules in the Libyan civil code; thus this 
draft model can contribute to provide more detailed rules regarding the passing of property 
issue. 
Rule 3. Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, but 
the seller is bound to weigh, measure, test or do some other act or thing with reference to 
the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property does not pass until such 
act or thing be done and the buyer has notice that it has been done. 
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, the seller may be bound to weigh, 
measure, or do something to the goods to ascertain the goods to be placed in a deliverable 
state. The purpose of this proposed rule is to, remedy the lack of such rules in the Libyan 
civil code. Consequently, this draft model can contribute to provide more detailed rules 
regarding the passing of property issue under the Libyan Law. Thus, the property does not 
pass if the seller failed to weigh, measure, test or do something else required by the 
contract to put the goods in a deliverable state for the purpose of ascertaining the price. 
Rule 4: when goods are delivered on sale or return, or on approval, property passes 
when the buyer adopts the transaction or fails to give notice of rejection within a 
reasonable time. 
If the transaction is one of sale or return, the buyer loses the right to return the goods if she 
approves or accepts them or otherwise adopts the transaction.  This means that, if the buyer 
does something which an honest person would not do unless he or she intended to adopt 
the transaction, he or she will be treated as having adopted it.   
This rule covers the situations where the goods are supplied on the understanding that the 
sale is dependent on the person in receipt of the goods adopting the transaction. Such 
agreements might be entered into because of a retailer’s uncertainty about demand for a 
product. This rule is intended to address the ambiguity over an offer and accepting or 
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rejecting the goods.   In other words, there is no contract of sale or agreement to sell, but 
only an offer by the seller which the buyer may accept or reject.  
Rule 5. (1) Where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained or future goods by 
description, and goods of that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally 
appropriated to the contract, either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the 
buyer with the assent of the seller, the property in the goods then passes to the buyer; and 
the assent may be express or implied, and may be given either before or after the 
appropriation is made.  
 
Rule 5. (2) Where in pursuance of the contract the seller delivers the goods to the buyer 
or to a carrier or other bailee (whether named by the buyer or not) for the purpose of 
transmission to the buyer and does not reserve the right of disposal, the seller is deemed 
to have unconditionally appropriated the goods to the contract. 
While rules 1 to 4 are concerned with specific goods, rule 5 concerns unascertained goods. 
Once the goods are ascertained, property passes at the time the contract is made unless the 
parties intent otherwise. The property in the goods passes to the buyer where there is a 
contract for the sale of unascertained goods or future goods by description and goods of 
that description and in a deliverable state are unconditionally appropriated to the contract, 
either by the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller. 
Although, this rule has been addressed under s 208 of Libyan Civil Code, it is not detailed, 
nor does it provide any guidance regarding how such appropriation can occur, whether by 
the seller with the assent of the buyer or by the buyer with the assent of the seller. 
Consequently, the Libyan Law is in need of such a detailed rule to avoid such weakness.  
 
7.8.4 Remedies and suggestions concerning passing of risk 
As mentioned above, Libyan law appears to have a mixed approach regarding the issue of 
the passing of risk. That is to say, the risk could be passed at the time of delivery, at the 
point when the delivery passes to the buyer, or at a different time, according to the 
agreement of the parties, where the general rule is that the risk passes at the delivery time, 
under s 210. On the other hand, with a more in-depth interpretation of s 147, a different 
conclusion may be reached, which is that the basic rule is that the risk passes according to 
the intention of the parties. In other words, the general rule of s 210 can be modified by 
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expressed or implied agreement and such agreements have priority over any other rules. 
Accordingly, in the absence of any expressed or implied indication regarding the intention 
between the parties, the default rule of s.210 will be applied. 
It is therefore possible for the parties to make provisions in the contract of sale to 
determine that the risk passes at a different time from the delivery. Certainly, the phrase of 
s 147 is the party autonomy principle; consequently, according to an agreement between 
the parties, logically the risk could be passed before or after the delivery time. Therefore, 
the goods are assumed to be sufficiently identifiable as those to which the risk relates. It 
might therefore be assumed that the contract must be one for the sale of specific goods, 
alternatively, if it was for the sale of unascertained goods, the goods should have become 
ascertained before the risk could pass. 
However, there is no provision in the Libyan civil code highlighting the passing of risk 
with regard to whether the goods are specific or unascertained. It would appear that there is 
no problem regarding the passing of risk at the same time of delivery or even after the 
delivery time, because timing in relation to the passing of risk would be linked and subject 
to the act of delivery in the case of specific goods; where the goods already will be 
ascertained through the act of delivery. 
However, the difficulty arising in this context lies in the case when the parties agree to pass 
the risk before the delivery, assuming that the contract is for the sale of unascertained 
goods. As we have noted, there is no expressed provision in Libyan Civil Code which 
prevents the parties in the contract from agreeing to pass the risk before the delivery time, 
even if the goods are unascertained. Moreover, there is no provision highlighting the 
passing of risk with regard to whether the goods are specific or unascertained. In other 
words, Libyan law links the issue of passing of risk in relation to the delivery time rather 
than linking it to the situation of the goods.  
Accordingly, it can be said that the risk may pass before the delivery time, regardless of 
whether the goods are specific or unascertained. Based on this, further complications may 
arise with the issue of the passing of risk being linked with the passing of delivery. Such 
complication may occur in circumstances where the parties intend, explicitly or implicitly, 
to pass the risk before the delivery, even if the goods remain unascertained.  
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However, the general principle of the passing of risk issue is different between the English 
law and the Libyan law. While the principle under the English law res perit domino rule, at 
the point when the property passes to the buyer, the delivery time is the general principle 
under the Libyan law. In other words, as seen, the English law links issue of passing of risk 
to the property instead of the situation of the goods. Accordingly, it can be said that the 
risk may pass before the time of passing of property, regardless of whether the goods are 
specific or unascertained. On the other hand, Libyan law links the issue of passing of risk 
to the delivery time, regardless of whether the goods are specific or unascertained, where 
in both laws the risk can pass even if the goods remain unascertained according to the party 
autonomy principle. Accordingly, it can be said that the both laws are two sides of the 
same coin, where the same weaknesses are found in Libyan law and English law. 
Accordingly, such rules of passing of risk under the English law cannot be a model for 
Libyan law, as the model upon which they would be based - i.e. English law - itself needs 
to be remedied with respect to the issues previously mentioned. 
In contrast, as pointed out previously, the rules of passing of risk under the CISG appear to 
have a more pragmatic and precise structure, making it a more efficient and better 
developed than the rules of English law regarding the passing of risk. This thesis concludes 
that the CISG has provided a clearer set of rules in relation to the timing of the passing of 
risk than the English law. While the latter does not treat the issue of passing risk separately 
(i.e. before the property) in the case of unascertained goods, the CISG links the issue of the 
passing of risk to the situation of the goods under Art 67-2, provided that the risk does not 
pass to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified in the contract. Therefore, such rules 
of passing of risk under the CISG maybe a suitable model for the Libyan law. 
7.8.5 Draft Model Rules for the passing of risk 
Apparently, the draft model regarding the passing of risk under the Libyan law could be 
inspired by the rules of the CISG, where the risk does not pass to the buyer until the goods 
are clearly identified to the contract. The proposed draft model clause of remedies provides 
thus: 
Unless otherwise agreed, the goods remain at the seller's risk until the delivery time, 
but when the delivery has been made to the buyer the goods are at the buyer's risk 
notwithstanding of passing of property. Nevertheless, the risk does not pass to the 
buyer until the goods are clearly identified to the contract. 
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In fact, this draft model of Libyan law provides three important elements. The first one is 
the party autonomy element, which is presented in the phrase of unless otherwise agreed. 
This is based on the importance of the party autonomy principle provided in s 147 of the 
Libyan law, which applies in general for all types of contracts, including sale of goods 
contract, whether with respect to movable goods or immovable, including the passing of 
risk. A valuable aspect of this draft model lies in linking the party autonomy principle with 
the time of passing of risk issue, which makes it more practical, efficient and pragmatic, in 
order to avoid ambiguity and misinterpretations that may occur through applying s 147 on 
the passing of risk issue. 
The second element in this draft model is the general rule presented in the default rule, 
which presents in the time of passing of risk, where the risk passes to the buyer at the time 
of delivery in the case of absence of agreement between the parties. Moreover, this part of 
the model in fact distinguishes between immovable (real property) and movable goods and 
links the issue of passing of risk to the movable goods. 
Finally, the third element is regarding the situation of the goods. In other words, no risk in 
the goods is transferred to the buyer unless and until the goods are ascertained. In fact, the 
value of this part of the model lies in the restriction of transferring the risk only in 
ascertained goods. At the same time, it links the risk to the situation of the goods, where no 
risk passes to the buyer until the goods are clearly identified within the contract, and then 
the risk could never be passed until the goods are ascertained. Such conflict has been 
avoided in the CISG, which links the risk to the situation of goods not to property and 
works with the proposed rule 1 on the passing of property. Nevertheless, Libyan law still 
needs to bridge the gaps in the current Libyan Civil Code in providing a model to draft the 
suitable and detailed legal rules in line with developments in international trade.  
7.8.6 Draft Model Rules for international trade 
As noted previously,  in its use of domestic rules in the interpretation of international sale 
of goods, the Libyan law fails to provide any rules in respect of passing of risk in goods 
sold in international transit, neither rules governing sale of goods involving carriage of 
goods by different modes of transportation across borders. A research study bridging the 
gaps in the current Libyan law in this area of law will be invaluable for Libyan legislators 
in providing a model to draft suitable and detailed legal rules in line with developments in 
international trade.  
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The researcher is of the view that, such provisions could be inspired by the rules of the 
CISG, where such issues are governed by detailed provisions. In cases where a contract of 
sale involves the carriage of goods, art 67(1) deals with such cases, and, applies when the 
goods are delivered to the first carrier, wherein the risk passes at the time of delivery to the 
first carrier. However, parties’ agreement upon handing the goods over at particular place 
other than the seller’s place, may have some effect on this. 
In addition, art 68 deals with goods sold in transit. In respect of such goods, the risk passes 
to the buyer from the time the contract is concluded. This is qualified in the same article by 
the provision that, if the circumstances so indicate, the risk is assumed by the buyer from 
the time the goods are handed over to the carrier, retrospectively. Thus, even in the latter 
case, under art 68, where the basic rule is in relation to the passing of risk at the time the 
contract is concluded, the principle of delivery plays a significant role. In cases where 
goods are already in transit, it is viewed as a strong evidence that the goods have already 
been delivered to the first carrier. 
On the other hand, Art 69 covers sales not “involving carriage” and not relating to goods 
sold in transit; it is thus the residual rule for passage of risk. In practice, this does not look 
like the standard international case. It seems to cover scenarios more associated with 
domestic sales. Accordingly, this article cannot be of value to Libyan law, put simply, the 
draft model of general rule mentioned above covers such situation. 
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